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Abstract 
 
 This dissertation is made up of two main sections. The first section argues that the current 
social culture and legal structure of international human rights needs to be more flexible and 
inclusive if it truly aims to be universal in scope. This is because The Universal Declaration and 
its offshoots are still underpinned by secular-liberal principles and therefore, they are at odds 
with other cultural traditions. To this end, this section critically explores popular human rights 
histories and contemporary ethical theories that attempt to justify human rights. In doing so, it 
argues that the debate is still ongoing and therefore, the exclusion of any alternative visions is 
unjustified. Thus, the goal of the first section is to ‘create a space of dialogue’ for one such 
alternative vision.     
 The second section of this dissertation constructs a theory of virtue ethics that has the 
ability to ‘ground’ an Islamic vision of human rights. This is because virtue ethics addresses 
fundamental questions concerning human existence which ultimately determine the constitution 
of human rights. In order to answer these questions, this study operates within the framework of 
the school of ‘Islamic Traditionalism’ and in doing so, it concludes that much of the friction 
between Islam and contemporary human rights is due to the fact that the latter emphasizes 
secular-liberal understandings of freedom, equality, and justice. In contrast, this study argues that 
an ‘Islamic’ human rights model must be grounded in God and His revelation and moreover, that 
it must emphasize human duties, inward transformation, and societal balance. It also argues that 
an ‘Islamic’ human rights society is one that is filled with ‘reminders’ of the Divine presence and 
structured in a way that allows Muslims to achieve their primary purpose in life – a virtuous 
‘Heart’ in this world and felicity in the hereafter.  The second section concludes by offering 
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some introductory remarks concerning contemporary human rights issues such as the 
implementation of Islamic law in general, pluralism, corporal punishment, and gender. In doing 
so, this study argues that there are ‘spaces of convergence’ that create a minimal overlapping 
consensus between the two traditions. However, this study also argues that there are fundamental 
differences and that these differences should be welcomed by human rights theorists and 
advocates. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Human rights – as expressed in the International Bill of Rights – are increasingly envisioned as a 
set of self-evident and foundational truths. In turn, many human rights advocates and 
organizations are treating them as the legal and social norm for the global community. However, 
despite this growing popularity, it is clear that human rights are far from self-evident or 
foundational. Rather, they are symptomatic in so far as they are derived from particular 
worldviews and the latter’s basic metaphysical, ontological and epistemological suppositions. 
Today’s human rights are a product of the secular-liberal ethical tradition and have their roots in 
Christian natural law. Therefore, they cannot be qualified as ‘universal’. If this fact is 
consistently ignored, there will continue to be growing friction and resistance from other cultural 
traditions around the world. These traditions will carry on seeing human rights as an alien 
concept that is being employed as a tool for Western or Global imperialism.1,2 In light of this, this 
study argues that the legal structure and social culture of human rights needs to be more flexible 
and inclusive. It needs to open up a space for different human rights visions that share the same 
goal of protecting citizens by curbing excess of power and helping those citizens pursue their 
community’s particular vision of ‘the good’. If this is done, this study’s working assumption is 
                                               
1 This study uses The English Oxford Living Dictionary’s definition of imperialism as “a policy of extending a 
country's power and influence through colonization, use of military force, or other means”. There is a debate 
concerning imperialism and its ‘location of power’ in an increasingly globalized and technological world. For a 
more detailed approach to this debate and its related concepts, see: Loomba, Ania. Colonialism/Postcolonialism. 2nd 
Ed. New York: Routledge, 2005.  
2 The argument that human rights are being used as a tool for imperialism is a valid one. Many international 
organizations, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), invoke the concept of rights to 
further their global reach and economic agendas. Unfortunately, an in-depth study of human rights and economics is 
beyond the scope of this work. For a brief discussion on the topic, see: Freeman, Michael. Human Rights: An 
Interdisciplinary Approach. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007. Pp. 176-201. Also see: Fairbrother, Richard and 
McCorquodale. “Globalization and Human Rights.” Exploring International Human Rights: Essential Readings. Ed. 
Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens. London: Lynne Rienner Pub, 2007. Pp. 248-255.   
 
 
 2 
that it will result in cross-cultural differences and similarities and the latter would make up the 
core of what could rightly be called ‘universal’ human rights. However, many theorists, such as 
Jack Donnelly and Michael Ignatieff, are quick to dismiss tradition in general, and the Islamic 
religion in particular, as a potential source for human rights. For example, Donnelly writes that 
“Muslims are indeed regularly and forcefully called upon…to treat other with respect and 
dignity…[However,] these injunctions…appeal to divine commands that establish duties, not 
(human) rights.3 According to Ignatieff, “In Islamic eyes, universalizing rights discourse implies 
a sovereign and discrete individual, which is blasphemous from the perspective of the Koran”.4 
The reason for this dismissal of religion is a matter of both theory and practice. In theory, human 
rights discourse in the West has shifted from the religious sphere into the political and legal 
sphere and thus, it is in friction with any discourse that is theological in nature. Related to this is 
the apparent dominance of (liberal) reason in the public space and its assumption that any 
dialogue based on revelation and belief is outdated and primitive.5  Indeed, John Rawls (d.2002) 
– who is normally accredited for the rival of modern liberalism – held that the public sphere, 
particularly in the area of politics, should be reserved for language that only ‘reasonable’ people 
would endorse.6 Of course, delineating what is ‘universally reasonable’ is problematic and this 
problem is critically explored throughout this study. In practice, Islam is generally considered 
responsible for many human abuses such as the female genital mutilation (FGM) taking place in 
Africa and in the Middle East, the penal code implemented in areas such as Afghanistan and 
Saudi Arabia, as well as the 9/11 attacks carried out on US soil.  
                                               
3 Donnelly, Jack. Universal Human Rights: In Theory and Practice. 2nd ed. New York: Cornell University Press, 
2003. P. 73. 
4 Ignatieff, Michael. “The Attack on Human Rights.” Foreign Affairs 80:06 (2001) Pp. 103-104. 
5 The modern resurgence of the liberal belief in the ‘secular-rational human’ is normally traced back to John Rawls 
and his seminal work: Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. London: Oxford University Press, 1971.  
6 See: Rawls, John. ‘The Laws of People’. Chicago Journals. 20:1 (1993) Pp. 33-68.  
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Holistic Islam, Traditionalism and the Dialogical Approach 
 
 This apparent roadblock between human rights and Islam is unfortunate. It is almost 
impossible to deny the positive potential that the religion and its over one billion adherents have 
in advancing human rights. This is especially the case when one considers the significance that 
Islamic normative texts, such as the Quran and hadith literature, place on establishing justice on 
Earth and the rich 1400-year-old intellectual tradition that accompanies that Divine imperative.7 
For example, the Quran reads: 
 
O ye who believe! stand out firmly for justice, as witnesses to Allah, even as against yourselves, 
or your parents, or your kin, and whether it be (against) rich or poor: for Allah can best protect 
both. Follow not the lusts (of your hearts), lest ye swerve, and if ye distort (justice) or decline to 
do justice, verily Allah is well-acquainted with all that ye do. (4:135) 
 
 It is true that a human rights scheme that is rooted in revelation, Islamic history and traditional 
norms may not sit well with the secular-liberal tradition and its advocates. However, there is no 
‘white man’s burden’ and no duty on those in power to impose what it deems to be good on other 
peoples. If there is a burden, then it is the ‘human burden’ and that is to take the time to 
understand the ‘Other’ and not to accept or reject their beliefs for them.8 This is why this study is 
                                               
7 For an overview of the Islamic intellectual tradition’s approach to justice, see: Khadduri, Majid. The Islamic 
Conception of Justice. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1984.  
8 In other words, this study rejects all hegemonic neo-liberal/neo-colonial readings of the Universal Declaration 
which attempt to use the latter as an instrument of domination. It also rejects the idea the Universal Deceleration 
and its offshoots, at least in their contemporary formulation, adequately represent the different cultural traditions of 
the world.   
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primarily dialogical in nature. Irene Oh aptly describes the benefits of a dialogical model when 
she writes: 
 
The dialogical model aids with understanding persons from different traditions, and 
cultures than one’s own because it recognizes those persons as agents like oneself…To 
understand others as agents requires that we view them as possessing self-understanding 
rather than unilaterally categorize them as mere objects of study… In dialogue that 
promotes understanding, others have voices, and we are required over the course of 
conversation to acknowledge and respond to those voices. Moreover, and just as 
important, we recognize through such dialogue our own assumptions, the limits of our 
knowledge, and the possibilities for understanding, and we therefore present human faces 
to our interlocutors.9 
 
In terms of human rights, this study enters the dialogue as part of the ‘pluralist-universal’ school 
of thought, which attempts to negotiate a middle position between the extremes of universalism 
and cultural relativism.10 This position is based on the understanding that cultural traditions are 
both unique and similar. They are unique insofar as they work within particular worldviews and 
develop according to their own particular socio-historical contexts and they are similar insofar as 
they are human collectivities that develop with common tendencies and are grounded in a shared 
humanity. More specifically, this work is concerned with the relationship between human rights 
and religion in light of the emerging religious typography that is characterized by the so-called 
‘religious resurgence’ and contemporary ‘Islamist’ movements.11 It is true that colonization, 
                                               
9 Oh, Irene. The Rights of God: Islam, Human Rights, and Comparative Ethics. Washington: Georgetown University 
Press, 2007. P. 7. 
10 This study proposes a ‘middle position’ that is created by way of an ‘accidental universality’ as opposed to a 
constructed universality. 
11 In general, see: Berger, Peter L., ed. The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics. 
Washington: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1999.   
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globalization and the pervasiveness of liberalism have replaced traditional Islamic societies with 
‘Muslim-majority nation-states’. Nevertheless, these nation-states and Muslims themselves are 
increasingly looking towards ‘Islamic ideals’ in their attempts at reform and in their critique of 
current international human rights. For this reason, this study argues in favor of the inclusion of 
human rights models grounded in sacred religious texts and traditional normative practices. To 
this end, this study develops an Islamic theory of virtue ethics and addresses the theory’s general 
implications for human rights. Thus, it focuses more-so on ethical theory than human rights as 
such; this is because the former is the starting point and foundation of the latter. Moreover, this 
study focuses on virtue ethics because virtue situates morality within a broader framework of 
discourse; instead of asking about the right way to act, it starts by asking about the right way to 
live. Thus, virtue ethics is concerned with ‘right action’ in light of issues concerning the nature 
of reality, the purpose of human existence and the transformation of character.12 It is the answers 
to these types of questions that ultimately determine what people understand and accept as 
human rights.   
 This study develops its theory of virtue ethics within the theoretical framework of the 
Traditional School of thought.13 The Traditional School developed in the 20th Century with the 
works of its ‘founders’, Ananda Coomaraswamy (d.1947) and Rene Guenon (d.1951).14 
Traditionalism’s central doctrine is that the same metaphysical truths, in different forms and 
expressions, have existed in almost all civilizations before the rise and influence of modernity.15 
                                               
12 For an introduction to virtue ethics, see: Russell, Daniel C., ed. The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 2013. 
13 The Traditional School is also referred to as ‘Traditionalism’, ‘Perennialism,’ ‘Religio Perennis’, ‘Sophia 
Perennis’ and more. For the sake of clarity, this study employs the terms ‘’Traditional School’ and ‘Traditionalism’.   
14 Some other significant members of the Traditional School include: Titus Burckhardt (d.1984), Marco Pallis 
(d.1989), Frithjof Schuon (d.1998), and Martin Lings (d.2005). 
15 For a more in-depth explanation and analysis of the Traditional School’s approach to comparative religions, see 
chapter three, Pp. 94-108. 
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According to Traditionalists, these underlying truths are found in revelation, reiterated by the 
saints and sages, and passed down through unbroken lines of transmission. Moreover, they 
combine to construct a basic yet common worldview that is centered around the Divine and the 
Divine-human relationship. On the human plane, these perennial truths are expressed in different 
religious forms, and inspire all human activity, ranging from religious doctrine to architecture, 
music, and calligraphy.16 Thus, Traditionalists also understand premodern cultural traditions as 
both unique and similar. They are unique because they have flowered in different spacio-
temporal contexts and emphasize different aspects of the Absolute. Nevertheless, these 
differences are understood as providential because they allow for the salvation of different 
‘types’ of people. On the other hand, premodern cultural traditions are also similar due to their 
common essence – in divinnis – and in their expression of the same perennial truths.17 In any 
case, Seyyed Hossein Nasr applies the Traditional School’s perspective to Islam and writes:       
 
Two centuries ago, if Westerners…were to study Islam, they would have encountered but 
a single Islamic tradition. Such persons could have detected numerous schools of 
thought…[and] interpretations… But all that they could have observed…would have 
belonged in one degree or another to the Islamic tradition; that is, to that single tree of 
Divine Origin whose roots are the Quran and the…hadith, and whose trunk and branches 
constitute that body of tradition that has grown from those roots over some fourteen 
centuries in nearly every inhabited quarter of the globe.18 
 
                                               
16 For an introduction and overview to the Traditional philosophy, see: Lings, Martin and Clinton Minnaar, eds. The 
Underlying Religion: An Introduction to the Perennial Philosophy. Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2007. 
17 Traditionalists consider societies based in ‘Western modernity’ as exceptional and therefore, fundamentally 
incompatible with premodern cultural traditions on a whole. However, as this study shows in the case of human 
rights, there are still ‘spaces of convergence’ over which some agreement can be found.     
18 Nasr, S.H. Islam in the Modern World. Challenged by the West, Threatened by Fundamentalism, Keeping Faith 
with Tradition. New York: HarperOne, 2007. P. 1.  
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Similarly, Joseph Lumbard, separates what he calls the ‘ihsani intellectual tradition’ from the 
two modern ideologies of ‘Islamic modernism’ and ‘Islamic neo-fundamentalism’. He writes that 
the latter two  
 
have almost completely abandoned the principles of Islamic thought. Puritanical 
reformists [that is, fundamentalists] do so because they favor an opaque literalism which 
denies the efficacy of our speculative, intuitive and imaginal faculties. Modernists do so 
because they have capitulated to the mental habits of their conquerors, conditioned as 
they are by relativism, scientism and secular humanism. Each side continues to advance 
its position, but there is no room for dialogue; for in the absence of the traditional Islamic 
modes of interpretation, there is no basis for a common discourse among Muslims.19 
 
Thus, Islamic Traditionalism is the Traditional School’s particular synthesis of the Islamic 
intellectual tradition as a whole – that is, 1400-years Islamic philosophical, mystical and 
theological thought – and its explanation of how the tradition’s basic metaphysical, ontological 
and epistemological principles have manifested themselves in the different expressions of Islam 
throughout history.20,21 It is this particular understanding of Islam that I use to critically explore 
contemporary Islamic thought and construct an Islamic theory of virtue ethics. Moreover, it is in 
this context that I use terms such as ‘traditional Islam’, ‘Muslim mentality’, ‘Islamic worldview’, 
and the like. For example, on this perspective, the term ‘Islamic worldview’ refers to the 
common and essential elements that exist in the plurality of ‘Islamic worldviews’ that have 
                                               
19 Lumbard, Joseph E.B. “The Decline of Knowledge and the Rise of Ideology”. Islam, Fundamentalism and the 
Betrayal of Tradition: Essays by Western Muslim Scholars. Ed. Lumbard. Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2009. P. 
41.  
20 It is important to note that this work focuses more on the unified synthesis of Islamic thought than on its various 
expressions throughout history. This is in line with this study’s goal of approaching Islam holistically.  
21 Some contemporary Islamic Traditionalists include: S.H. Nasr, William Chittick, Murata Sachiko, Joseph 
Lumbard, and Reza-Shah Kazemi. 
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developed throughout Islamic history. This includes, for instance, the concept of life and 
judgment after death. In line with Traditionalist thought, it can be argued that the perennial 
concept of the hereafter, among others, determines many Muslims’ general outlook and approach 
to life, that is, the basic ‘Muslim mentality.’  
 There are several reasons why I have situated this study within the framework of Islamic 
Traditionalism. First, it approaches Islam in the unified and holistic manner necessary for any 
dialogical approach. Second, Islamic Traditionalism addresses the basic questions of human 
existence that need to be answered in order to form any theory of virtue ethics and concomitant 
human rights model. Third, the Traditional School accepts virtually all of Islam’s 1400-year-old 
tradition and by extension, understands Muslims as self-understanding agents with the right to 
determine and pursue their own vision of the ‘good.’ Fourth, Traditionalists generally belong to a 
single religious form and thus, they speak as ‘insiders’ from their respective religions.22 Finally, 
Islamic Traditionalism’s working assumption is that it still represents the majority of Muslims 
today – at least in terms of their basic intellectual and behavioral orientation.23 Here, it is 
important to note that this study’s working assumption differs to the extent that it assumes 
Islamic Traditionalism represents just one of the many Muslim voices concerned with the issue 
of Islam and modernity. Nevertheless, this study maintains that the ‘traditional Islamic voice’ is a 
                                               
22 In my opinion, an ‘insider’ perspective is needed in order to fully comprehend a religious tradition because the 
latter is a ‘lived reality’ and not a ‘constructed ideology’. However, the insider vs. outsider debate is beyond the 
scope of this study. For an overview of the issue, see: McCutcheon, Russel T., ed. The Insider / Outsider Problem in 
the Study of Religion: A Reader. New York: The Bath Press, 1999. 
23 Even though Traditionalists argue that Muslim-majority nation-states are no longer traditional in form, these are 
the reasons why Islamic Traditionalism is still an important source to draw on when considering the construction 
and implementation of alternative ‘Islamic’ human rights models. Moreover, the study maintains that the concept of 
human rights, at least in its essence, is a perennial issue that all religions have and continue to address.    
 
 
 9 
substantial and important one among Muslims24, and moreover, that it is underrepresented in 
Western academic institutions. Thus, drawing on Islamic Traditionalism is important because 
many ‘Progressive’ Muslim academics seem to underestimate, or wrongly assume they can 
circumvent the importance that most Muslims place on their traditional heritage as a whole.25 
Thus, they often construct theories that are alien to the Muslim mentality and the net result is that 
their thought is ignored or condemned. Moreover, the authors of these works are sometimes 
perceived as ignorant or willing puppets for Western or Global powers. For example, Abdal 
Hakim Murad – a prominent and popular Muslim figure – reviews Esack Farid’s work26 and 
writes: 
 
The age-old European concern with securing the Europeanization of the earth – 
imperialism, to use a more frank expression – today relies on reshaping the parameters 
accepted by the Other: accession to Western values can only be guaranteed when non-
Westerners think in Western terms. Among secular thinkers this is today a common 
transformation, but in Esack’s case, his tutors have successfully secured a more 
interesting paradigm shift of a theological order… His book…completely lacks the style 
and reverent tenor of Muslim reflection, with its characteristic indigenous terminology, 
and with the deployment of scriptures as sacred archetypes rather than archaic 
problems.27 
  
                                               
24 This working assumption is based on several observations. This includes the popularity of traditional Muslim 
figures such as, S.H. Nasr, Hamza Yusuf Hanson, T.J Winter, Martin Lings and others. It is also based on my own 
interactions with Muslim communities in numerous countries, including, but not limited to, Canada, the United 
States, England, Tanzania, Syria and Lebanon. 
25 For an in-depth explanation of the Traditional and Progressive Schools of thought and their specific approaches to 
Islam in the Modern world, see chapter three’s section on ‘Contemporary Islamic Thought’, Pp. 88-109. 
26 Esack. Farid. Quran, Liberation and Pluralism: An Islamic Perspective of Interreligious Solidarity Against 
Oppression. Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 1997.  
27 Murad, Abdal-Hakim. “Book review of Farid Esack's Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, Oxford: Oneworld, 1997.” 
Masud.co.uk. 25th Feb. 2018.  
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In this light, this study argues that any method that historicizes or simply ignores the 
multifaceted aspects of the Islamic tradition, such as the hadith literature or Sufi metaphysical 
thought, will remain alien to most Muslims and therefore, fail in its goal of ‘reform’. One of the 
Traditional School’s greatest strengths is its ability to navigate Islam’s remarkable plurality, both 
in theory and practice, and yet, synthesize a common unity without dismissing its differences.28 
Nevertheless, in light of recent scholarship, namely in the areas of postmodern and post-colonial 
thought, it is important to address the deeper issues concerning ‘meta-narratives’, ‘absolutism’ 
and ‘essentialism’.29,30 Here, two important points need to be made. First, an extreme anti-
essentialist stance is a counterproductive response to dangerous stereotypical generalizations 
typified by works such as Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations and Benjamin Barber’s 
Jihad Versus McWorld.31 It is counterproductive because instead of attempting to construct 
solutions to real issues, it preemptively puts an end to any meaningful discussion and therefore, 
positive change. In other words, much postmodern and post-colonial thought argues that ‘The 
Truth’ is relative to a subject’s point of view, and moreover, that subjects are limited by, or even 
constructions of, their particular systems of ideology, discourse and language. Thus, a person’s 
                                               
28 Traditionalism is sometimes critiqued for producing an inadequate account of religious differences. However, it 
seems that this critique is based on a misunderstanding of Traditionalism’s theory of the ‘transcendent unity of 
religions’. Moreover, the Traditional school opposes the current academic trend of hyper-specialization and the 
extreme emphasis on difference. Thus, the school sees its intellectual approach as a corrective counter-balance to the 
contemporary academic methodology generally applied in the Humanities and Social Sciences.   
29 For example, see Edward Said’s seminal work: Said, Edward W. Orientalism. 25th Ed. New York: Vintage Books, 
1978. Also, for a comprehensive overview of the subject, see: Ashcroft, Bill, ed. et al. Post-Colonial Studies: The 
Key Concepts. 2nd Ed. New York: Routledge, 2000. 
30 Of course, this is an overgeneralization since postmodernism and postcolonialism are two different schools of 
thought with considerable differences between and within each school. Nevertheless, they both share a common 
tendency towards anti-universal particularism based on an emphasis on difference and the negation of essence.     
31 See: Huntington, Samuel. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. India: Penguin Books, 
1997. And: Barber, Benjamin. Jihad vs. McWorld: Terrorism's Challenge to Democracy: Terrorism’s Challenge to 
Democracy. New York: Random House, 2010.  
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‘truth claim’ does not represent any reality – especially in its totality – beyond the limited self.32 
For example, on the concept of ‘subjectivity’, Tammy Clewell writes: 
 
Despite diverse and sometimes oppositional formulations, postmodernist and 
poststructuralist critics share an impulse to “deconstruct” the humanist subject as the 
intended source of knowledge and meaning.  Such accounts redefine the human self as an 
entity constructed by, and not simply reflected in a culture’s social discourses, linguistic 
structures, and signifying practices.33  
 
Al Hassan Zaidi articulates the problem with this type of approach by quoting Marcel Gauchet 
and then writing 
 
“a global orientation on behalf of smallness, plurality, and marginality, accompanied by 
the proliferation of specializations and the bureaucratic explosion of scholarship"34 does 
not necessarily render the Other more accessible and understandable. It may, in fact, 
serve only to further mystify the Other by highlighting the Other's internal indeterminacy, 
differences and heterogeneity35 
 
On this view of subjectivity, there is no possibility of cross-cultural understanding and no 
method of furthering the cause of peace and justice on a global scale. But again, this view is 
largely alien to Islamic intellectual tradition and its general belief that human beings share a 
                                               
32 It is important to note two things here. First, this is a general critique since both postmodernism and post-
colonialism – in line with their basic assumptions and approaches – are notoriously difficult to ‘pin down’. Second, 
this critique does not intend to dismiss the importance of post-colonial thought in relation to its critical stance 
against modernity’s power structures and the marginalization of the ‘Other’.  
33 Clewell, Tammy. “Subjectivity”. Encyclopedia of Postmodernism. Ed. Taylor and Winquist. New York: 
Routledge, 2001. P. 382.  
34 Gauchet, Marcel. The Disenchantment of the World: A Political History of Religion. Trans. Burge. Princeton, 
Princeton University press, 1997. P. 17. 
35 Zaidi, Ali Hassan. Islam, Modernity and the Human Sciences: Toward a Dialogical Approach. Diss. York 
University, 2007. Pp. 4-5.    
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similar essence (fitrah) and that they have the ability to transcend the relative realm – in degrees 
– and know the Absolute.36 Related to this is the intellectual tradition’s particular emphasis on 
the connection between truth (theory) and justice (practice).37 In general, it is only when one 
knows the truth, that is, the reality of a thing in relation to its whole, that one can implement 
justice, that is, put that thing in order. Along with being counterproductive, the second point is 
that an extreme anti-essentialist stance is also intellectually hypocritical. Simply put, this is 
because anti-essentialism is a meta-narrative itself and therefore falls victim to its own premise. 
It is stuck with the age-old problem of relativism: the contradictory and illogical claim that 
everything is relative except the relative. In this regard, Frithjof Schuon – a central figure in the 
Traditional School – writes: 
 
In short, every idea is reduced to a relativity of some sort, whether psychological, 
historical, or social; but the assertion nullifies itself by the fact that it too presents itself as 
a psychological, historical, or social relativity. The assertion nullifies itself if it is true and 
by nullifying itself logically proves thereby that it is false; its initial absurdity lies in the 
implicit claim to be unique in escaping, as if by enchantment, from a relativity that is 
declared to be the only possibility.38 
 
This study’s response to the dangers of over-generalizations is careful and qualified 
generalizations. The latter is worth the risk, because it is only holistic accounts that can satisfy 
the human need for meaning, understanding and dialogue. As Gauchet writes: 
 
                                               
36 For a discussion of Islamic Traditionalism and its understanding of transcendence, the intellect, truth and justice, 
see chapters three and four. 
37 For example, see chapter four, Pp. 156-160. 
38 Schuon Frithjof. Logic and Transcendence: A New Translation with Selected Letters. Ed. Cutsinger. 
Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2009. P. 6.  
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Let me assure the reader that I recognize the dangers of this enterprise…I am aware of 
the damage caused by the “ideas of totality”. My sole excuse for deliberately taking these 
risks is the need to understand and my conviction that these risks must be taken. This 
does not mean we should yield to the lures of speculation, but that we should respond 
critically to the need for meaning whose main victims are those who naively believe they 
have freed themselves from that need.39 
 
Finally, despite the Traditional School’s prolific corpus of work, there are very few 
comprehensive studies on the subject of justice in general, and almost none carried out on the 
subject of human rights in particular.40 Therefore, this study is also an attempt to fill this lacuna 
of inquiry within the Traditional school. In using this approach, it is important to note that this 
study is not a work in Islamic Law. This is because it argues that the Islamic legal tradition is 
grounded in the basic metaphysical, ontological and epistemological assumptions of the Islamic 
intellectual tradition. Thus, it is the latter that needs to be critically explored in relation to Islam 
and ethics in general and Islam and human rights in particular.41  
 
 
A Note on Sources and Terminology  
 
This work develops its theory of Islamic virtue ethics by way of theoretical analysis and in 
doing so, it uses two main sources. The first and most obvious is the Quran – Islam’s sacred and 
                                               
39 Gauchet, Marcel. The Disenchantment of the World. P.17. 
40 The three principal works on the subject are (1) Shah-Kazemi, Reza. Justice and Remembrance: Introducing the 
Spirituality of Imam Ali. London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2007. (2) Lakhani, Ali, ed. The Sacred Foundations of 
Justice in Islam: The Teaching of ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib. Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2006. And (3) Nasr, S.H. The 
Heart of Islam: Enduring Values for Humanity. New York, HarperCollins Pub., 2002. 
41 The same is also true of current human rights theory which is a product of the assumptions of modern secular-
liberal ethical tradition. 
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central ‘text’. According to most Muslims, the Quran is the verbatim word of God that was 
revealed to the Prophet Muhammad over a span of twenty-three years (709-732 C.E.). Muslims 
generally understand the Quran as a perfect source of guidance for both their individual and 
collective lives. Moreover, according to Fazlur Rahman’s Islam and Modernity, 
 
…the Quranic revelation…lasted for just over twenty-two years, during which period all 
kinds of decisions on policy in peace and in war, on legal and moral issues in private and 
public life were made in the face of actual situations; thus, the Quran had from the time 
of its revelation a practical and political application… This naturally encouraged the 
Muslim jurists and intellectuals to look up the Quran (and model of the Prophet) as a 
unique repository of answers to all sorts of questions. That this approach succeeded in 
practice further strengthened the original belief of the Muslims in the efficacy of the 
revelation in providing true answers to virtually all situations.42   
 
The second major source is the thought of one of Islam’s most significant intellectual figures, Ali 
ibn Abi Talib (d.661) – the fourth Rightly Guided Sunni Caliph and first Shia Imam. I have 
chosen Ali as a source because he is accepted as an authoritative figure by virtually all Muslims 
and a representative par excellence of Islamic Traditionalism. Nevertheless, there is 
disagreement concerning the reliability of the sources attributed to him. For example, this study 
frequently draws on his famous collection of sayings and sermons known as Nahj al-Balagha 
(The Peak of Eloquence).43 This collection of work is generally considered authentic by the 
‘Shiah world’ but inauthentic by most of the ‘Sunni world’. However, in relation to this study, 
                                               
42 Rahman, Fazlur. Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition. Chicago: Chicago University 
press, 1982. P. 2.  
43 Here on, referred to as The Nahj. See: Al-Jibouri, Yasin T. Ed. Peak of Eloquence: Nahjul-Balagha. 7th ed. New 
York: Tahrike Tarsile Quran Inc, 2009.  
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the authenticity of The Nahj is inconsequential.44 This is because Ali’s thought is situated within 
the framework Islamic Traditionalism and the latter’s focus on Islam’s ‘underlying unity’ means 
that the same ideas can be found in any source that is part of the religion’s intellectual tradition.45 
For the same reason, this work cannot exclusively be placed within the Shi’ite school of thought. 
Again, this is because this this study focuses on Islam’s perennial concepts and therefore, Ali’s 
thought can just as easily be found in the work of other Muslim intellectual figures, such as al-
Farabi (d.951), Ibn Arabi (d.1240) and Mulla Sadra (d.1640). 
This study also tackles the issue of human rights’ terminology in general and its use across 
cultures and in a global context in particular. Certain human rights terms, such as ‘freedom’ and 
‘equality’, are fraught with cultural-specific assumptions; however, they have come to possess an 
unquestionable authority. In the eyes of many human rights advocates, these words possess a 
sacred quality, and are therefore beyond the scope of any serious critical inquiry. However, the 
word ‘equality’ for example, carries the secular-liberal assumption that all types of equality – 
gender, race, class, etc. – are the same. To deny one is to deny them all and hence, to be an 
‘enemy of rights and progress’. Poerkson’s work critically examines these types of terms and 
argues that they are ‘plastic words’. That is, they are words that gain prominence by being 
“transmitted into science or some other higher sphere, where they pick up the semblance of 
generally applicable truths. Then they wander back, authorized and canonized, into the 
                                               
44 Nevertheless, for a ‘defense’ of the authenticity of the Nahj, see the ‘prologue’ in: Shah-Kazemi, Reza. Justice 
and Remembrance. Also see chapter three in: Jafri, S.H.M. The Political and Moral Vision of Islam. New York: 
Tahrike Tarsile Quran Inc, 2009. 
45 For example, William Chittick uses the framework of Islamic Traditionalism to explore the thought of Rumi, ibn 
al-Arabi, and Mulla Sadra. In this regard, see: Chittick, William. In Search of the Lost Heart: Explorations in 
Islamic Thought. Ed. Rustom, Khalil and Murata. New York: State University of New York Press, 2012.    
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vernacular, where they become dominant myths and overshadow everyday life”.46 According to 
Poerkson, these words are actually meaningless. He writes:  
 
The precise meaning of plastic words cannot be discerned. All words have many shifting 
meanings. But, through context, an author can be precise about which connotation of the 
word is being used. In contrast, authors have no powers of definition over plastic words; 
they are general, autonomous, vague and toneless.”47  
 
Thus, it can be inferred that the word ‘equality’ gains its authority from the field of mathematics 
where it is used as a value term but lacks any specific meaning when used in the general 
vernacular. What happens when ‘plastic words’ are manufactured and consistently employed? 
Sherman Jackson, drawing on the work of Richard Dryer, observes that   
 
…the real power of American whiteness lays in its effective invisibility. While Hispanics, 
Asians, blacks and others are immediately recognized as raced, whites enjoy the presumption 
of being just “humans.” This raises their perspective above critique, since it presents it as 
being above the biases and limitations of any particular history, ideology or culture. This in 
turn allows whites to speak for “humanity” as a whole… This…is also the secret behind the 
power and pervasiveness of liberalism today. Words like “freedom,” “equality,” “reason,” 
“tolerance” are commonly used without the slightest understanding or hint that their users are 
invoking liberal freedom, liberal equality, liberal reason or liberal tolerance. Faced with these 
deployments, Muslims often find themselves debilitated by the feeling that they are fighting a 
losing battle, stuck in a perpetual mode of apology, hopelessly strengthening and reinforcing 
their inquisitors’ indictments with every would-be response...48 
                                               
46 Poerkson, Uwe. Plastic words: The Tyranny of a Modular Language. Trans. Mason and Cayley. Pennsylvania: 
The Pennsylvania University State Press, 1995. P. 4. 
47 Poerkson, Uwe. Plastic Words. P.8. 
48 Jackson, Sherman. ‘Liberalism and the American Muslim Predicament.’ theislamicmonthly.com. TIM, 08th June 
2015. 
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In light of this, this study pays extra careful attention to the terminology it uses in the context of 
human rights and modernity. It takes extra pains to precisely define what it considers to be ‘key 
words’ and to clarify the unspoken assumptions lurking beneath those same words.  
 
 
Chapter Outline 
 
Chapter one is a critical exploration of popular human rights histories. This undertaking is 
important for two interconnected reasons. The first is that history in general, is not an impartial 
account of past events, communities and people.49 Rather, it is a construct that is influenced by a 
particular historian’s underlying beliefs and assumptions. Popular human rights history is 
generally written by those that assume human rights are a positive, progressive and, in some 
cases, inevitable stage in the human drama. They present the Universal Declaration and its 
offshoots as universally necessary and valid for all peoples. In many cases, they also contrast 
human rights with religion and generally ‘describe’ the latter as an oppressive and incompatible 
ideology.50 The second reason that a critical analysis is necessary is because these histories are 
not simply related to understanding the past; they affect people’s understanding and actions in 
the present. Many advocates of ‘humanitarian intervention’ base their intellectual justification on 
popular human rights history.51 Because of this, chapter one argues that these accounts need to be 
                                               
49 On the issue of power and the construction of history, see: Trouillot, Michel-Rolph. Silencing the Past: Power and 
the Production of History. Boston: Beacon Press, 1995. 
50 In this regard, see: Chapter One, Pp. 29-35; and Chapter Three, Pp. 68-70.  
51 In many cases, ‘humanitarian intervention’ simply acts as a means to justify the economic and political 
exploitation of other – mainly ‘Southern’ – nation-states. Again, the subject of human rights and economics is 
beyond the scope of this paper. For some general works on the subject, see P. 2., footnote 1.   
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demystified in order to open up a space for different human rights visions, particularly for 
visions that are not rooted in the secular-liberal tradition.   
  Chapter two carefully considers the human rights debate surrounding the ‘question of 
foundations’. The latter asks if there is, or even needs to be, a foundation that grounds human 
rights theory. More specifically, it asks, ‘on what basis do human beings have rights and what 
exactly are those rights’? This chapter explores three main schools of thought on the issue: 
utilitarianism, natural law and Postmodernism’s ethical sentimentalism. In doing so, it argues 
that none of the ethical theories provide a satisfactory answer to the question at hand and thus, 
the imposition of rights on a global scale is a form of imperialism. It is important to note that this 
section purposefully leaves aside religion as a possible ‘ground’ for human rights. This is 
because it attempts to highlight the fact that even within the secular liberal-tradition itself, there 
is no agreement on the existence or substance of human rights. This means that there is no 
justification for ignoring alternative visions based on religion and religious norms.   
Chapter three looks at the issue of human rights and religion in general, and human rights 
and Islam in particular. In terms of the latter, it explores the apparent friction between the two 
ideologies in the areas of law, physical punishment, religious minorities and gender. In exploring 
this friction, it also looks at the different contemporary Muslim responses and classifies them 
into four broad groups: liberal, fundamental, progressive and traditional. This study argues that it 
is the Traditional School that carries the most potential for honest and genuine change52 and thus, 
the chapter concludes by situating the Traditional School of thought within the larger framework 
of religious studies.    
                                               
52 Here, ‘honest and genuine’ means that any changes within the framework of Traditionalism would remain faithful 
to the Islamic intellectual tradition as a whole and its basic Islamic worldview. 
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Chapter four develops a theory of virtue ethics by drawing on the Quran and the thought of 
Ali. In doing so, it explores Islamic Traditionalism’s understanding of God as reality; the human 
being as both the servant and representative of God; and the connection between truth and 
justice. It argues that many Muslims understand themselves as primarily responsible to God and 
that this responsibility involves an inward transformation of the soul. Thus, chapter four 
establishes that ‘virtue’ must be the focus of any moral theory that is properly grounded in the 
Islamic intellectual tradition and the basis for any ‘Islamic’ theory of human rights and 
flourishing. 
 Chapter five is specifically concerned with the metaphysical implications of virtue in 
relation to the concepts of freedom and equality. It argues that an ‘Islamic’ society is primarily 
one that is centered around the Sacred and functions to help human beings achieve their primary 
purpose for existence – that is, a virtuous character in this world and felicity in the hereafter. 
Chapter five concludes by exploring the implications of its virtue theory in relation to 
contemporary human rights. It is important to note that these are introductory remarks since the 
main concern of this study is to identify the parameters within which an Islamic theory of human 
rights can function. In any case, the chapter argues that ‘international’ human rights are only 
partially compatible with Islamic Traditionalism and its understanding of the general Islamic 
worldview. Therefore, in line with the ‘pluralist-universal’ school of human rights, chapter five 
argues that there is a minimal overlapping consensus between the two traditions and that any 
differences should be welcomed human rights theorists and advocates.  
Finally, this study concludes with a summary of its main points and reiterates that the global 
implementation of secular-liberal human rights is a form of imperialism. Thus, contemporary 
human rights need to be more inclusive, decentralized and regulated. It is only with these types 
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of ‘checks and balances’ that the ideology of ‘rights’ can work as a catalyst for positive change. 
Otherwise, they will simply be another ideology used by the elite to further their own socio-
political and economic agendas.  
 
 
A Note on Translation, Transliteration and Structure 
 
Finally, in concluding these introductory remarks a brief note on translation, 
transliteration and style is necessary. For the most part, this work relies on Yusuf Ali’s 
translation of the Quran and The Study Quran.53 The latter is of particular importance because its 
method is in line with this study and its focus on a holistic Islam that is explained by way of the 
Islamic Intellectual tradition and its fundamental principles. In this regard, Nasr, the editor-in-
chief, states,  
 
Although we have relied heavily upon traditional sources…we have also consulted 
reliable sources based on both previous and recent academic scholarship in Quranic 
studies. We have, moreover, carried out this task with constant awareness of the biases 
and fashions present in both historical and contemporary writings… We have been fully 
aware that many of these resources suffer…from the fact that they do not accept the 
Quran as revelation, they have a truncated view of the Islamic intellectual tradition, or 
they reject the Islamic worldview as a whole.54 
 
                                               
53 The Quran. Trans. Yusuf Ali A. Lahore: Fine Offset Printing, 1934; Nasr S.H., ed. et al. The Study Quran: A New 
Translation and Commentary. New York: HarperOne, 2015.  
54 Nasr, S.H., ed. et al. The Study Quran. P. xiiv 
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Thus, The Study Quran draws on the Quranic commentary of figures such as Muhammad ibn 
Ahmad al-Qurtubi (d.1272), Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d.1210), Husayn Tabataba’i (d.1981), Umar 
Ibn Kathir (d.1373), and others.55  
Finally, Quranic verses and Ali’s words are italicized, centered and separated from the 
main body of the text so that the two principal sources of this study can be found without 
difficulty. Any changes in emphasis or translation are accounted for in the footnotes. Moreover, 
this study has decided to forgo the use of transliteration for two reasons. The first is that many of 
Arabic words that are used, such as shariah, Sunni and Shia, have already been, or are in the 
process of being, absorbed into the English language. Secondly, it is because this study is not 
solely a work in Islamic studies; it is interdisciplinary and includes, among other fields, that of 
human rights and comparative ethics.
                                               
55 For the comprehensive list, see: Nasr, S.H., ed. et al. The Study Quran. Pp. lvii-lix.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
Human Rights and the Incomplete Development of a Secular-Liberal Ethic 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In 1948, Eleanor Roosevelt – chair of the human rights committee – commissioned a 
group of experts to draft the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).56 The group was 
led by the Canadian lawyer, Chris Humphries, and their goal was to create a single document 
that would be accepted and applied by multiple cultural traditions. However, these traditions 
were based on significantly different worldviews and consequent social structures and behavioral 
norms. If the drafters attempted to construct an ideological synthesis, it would have been 
superficial at best. Thus, they did not seriously address the ‘question of foundations’. That is, the 
drafters did not fashion a theoretical basis that attempted to explain, and thereby legitimize, the 
existence of rights. Instead they formed the document by accepting or rejecting particular articles 
based on relevance and applicability. Jacques Maritian – the French natural law representative – 
later explained the process by stating, “Men mutually opposed in their theoretical conceptions 
can come to a merely practical agreement regarding a list of human rights [based] on the 
condition that no one asks why.”57 Moreover, in the context of events such as World War II and 
the Holocaust, a document that appeared to lack a set of absolute principles must have seemed 
                                               
56 Although the UDHR was adopted as a declaration in 1948, its impact is virtually immeasurable. Grace Kao writes, 
“While the UDHR is only hortatory in character, it has inspired more than sixty human rights instruments and 
legally binding treaties…has arguably obtained the status of customary international law, and remains one of the 
most cited human rights documents today.” See: Kao, Grace. Grounding Human Rights in a Pluralist World. 
Georgetown: Georgetown University Press, 2011. P. 173.  
57 Jacques, Martin. Man and the State. The Catholic University of America Press, 1951. P. 76-77. 
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attractive and even necessary. This is because ‘absolutism’ was used to justify many of the 
horrors witnessed by the twentieth century and the Universal Declaration was largely a response 
to those horrors: 
 
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which 
have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human 
beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been 
proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people…58   
 
Thus, the Universal Declaration is clearly a product of its own history.59 Its culturally relative 
nature is, at least in large part, responsible for the current backlash against international human 
rights. It cuts the lines of cross-cultural communication and leads to calls of Western 
imperialism. This is because the Universal Declaration is steeped in the secular-liberal tradition 
and the latter’s ‘idealistic universalism’ seems to dismiss any divergent religious or philosophic 
approaches. In this regard, Abdulaziz Sachedina writes that 
 
As long as the moral and metaphysical foundations of human rights norms remain 
unarticulated, they will be easily dismissed as yet another ploy to dominate Muslim 
societies by undermining their religiously based culture and value system. Moreover, 
…Muslim authorities…have found it legitimate to dismiss compliance with some articles 
in the Universal Declaration…by labeling them as imperialistic or culturally Eurocentric, 
parallel with the “Asian Values” argument…60 
                                               
58 See Appendix A. (Emphasis added)  
59 Nothing is created in an ideological vacuum. Although no principles were articulated in the Universal Declaration, 
they existed in the form of an (incomplete) theory of secular-liberal rights derived from Christian natural law. See 
chapter two section on ‘natural rights’ and Appendix A, articles 1-24. Moreover, during the drafting process, 
representation was ‘suspect’ and large segments of the world population were left out altogether. In this regard, see 
chapter three, Pp. 73-74. 
60 Sachedina, Abdulaziz. Islam and the challenge of Human Rights. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. P. 5. 
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For this reason, and in light of a new geopolitical order, it is necessary to consider a different 
approach. To this end, this chapter begins by critically engaging popular human rights histories 
and their narrative that religion and human rights are alternative ideologies that present opposing 
paradigms of justice.61 More specifically, it argues against historical narratives that portray 
human rights – in its contemporary formulation - as humanity’s ‘saving’ ideology. In doing so, 
this study maintains that international human rights need to adopt and operate within a paradigm 
of pluralism. Recognizing multiple human rights models is the only way that human rights will 
become truly universal and hence, acceptable to most of the citizens of the world. Moreover, this 
recognition would carve out the desired ‘middle position’ between universalism and relativism. 
However, any overlapping consensus would be accidental and not essential in nature. This type 
of consensus would ensure that a particular human rights paradigm is organic and integral to its 
own particular tradition and not an artificial product that is planted based on an imagined 
Western superiority.62  
 
 
A Popular Account of Human Rights History 
 
 The following is a summary and then critique of popular historical accounts about the 
development of human rights. This is important for two reasons. First, it provides the necessary 
context for the following section on human rights theory. Second, and more importantly, it is 
                                               
61 As this study argues, the view that Islam and contemporary human rights are completely at odds is misleading 
because it ignores the dynamic and complex nature of the two traditions as well as their overlap in theory and 
practice.  
62 In other words, this study is proposing alternative human rights models for different cultural traditions with the 
working assumption that these models will result in an ‘accidental universality’, that is, an ‘after the fact’ minimal 
overlapping consensus. 
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because historical sources arguably play one of the most significant roles in producing 
contemporary attitudes towards human rights. These histories, along with human rights theory, 
need to be demystified before human rights can become truly universal.   
 It is possible to trace the concept of human rights back to the world’s earliest known 
religions. For example, the Vedic scriptures (1500-1000 B.C.E.) and Judaic law both speak to 
social justice, human worth and ethical conduct between individuals. The concept of human 
rights can also be traced back to earlier rational and secular philosophies. This is seen, for 
example, with Hammurabi (d.1750 B.C.E.) and his ‘code of law’; Confucius (d.479 B.C.E.) and 
his vision of ‘common humanity’; and Cyrus (d.530 B.C.E.) and his ‘cylinder’.63 However, these 
early religions and ‘secular philosophies’ worked within the confines of hierarchical societies 
and focused on duties and moral responsibilities as opposed to personal-legal rights. Therefore, 
contemporary human rights – in its specific secular-liberal form – originated with the 
Renaissance and the rise of Protestantism in the West. In this regard, Paul Lauren writes:    
 
The Renaissance of the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth Centuries helped to 
spread ideas about the right to be free from censorship and intolerance by 
emphasizing human reason, individual expression, intellectual freedom and 
worldly experience… The Reformation and emergence of Protestantism in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries…[emphasized] spiritual emancipation, individual 
conscience, freedom of religion and political and social reform. In doing so, all 
these forces combined to mark a shift in natural law, from (mainly religious) 
duties, to rights that were now understood to have a religious or secular basis.64 
 
                                               
63 Human rights theorists often describe Confucius, Hammurabi and Cyrus as ‘secular’. However, this view is highly 
contested. For example, Hammurabi refers to his legal objectives using terms such as ‘righteous’, ‘God-fearing’, and 
‘evil-doers’. 
64 Lauren, Paul G. “History of Human Rights.” Encyclopedia of Human Rights. Ed. Frosythe. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012. P. 6. 
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These ideas continued to be developed during the 17th Century Enlightenment. Most notably, 
Hugo Grotius (d.1645) – known as the ‘father of international law’ – and John Locke (d.1704) – 
known as the ‘father of modernism’ – argued that humans had natural rights and it was the 
government’s duty to institute and protect them.65 This, along with the Habeas Corpus Act (1679) 
and the English Bill of Rights (1687) challenged the monarchy’s claim to absolute rule. During 
the beginning of the 18th Century, philosophers such as Montesquieu (d.1755), Voltaire (d.1778) 
and Rousseau (d.1778), continued to develop concepts that would eventually characterize the 
‘modern’ period: universalism, rationalism, empiricism, individualism and the like.66 These ideas 
made up the philosophy of secular-humanism and the latter provided the ideological foundation 
for the newly established nation-states of America and France.67 This is seen, for example, with 
the American adoption of the Declaration of Independence and the French institution of the 
Rights of Man and Citizen, two documents that were written in highly universal language. 
Despite this universal language, however, many groups of people such as women, slaves and the 
poor, were excluded from the category ‘human’. This changed, at least to some extent, in the 19th 
Century, with the recognition of ‘second-generation’ rights, that is, social and economic rights.68 
This was a byproduct of the industrial revolution, which created poor working conditions that 
resulted in an exploited working class. Marx (d.1883) and his followers argued in favor of 
revolution and the creation of a society free of private property and class struggle.69 Others opted 
                                               
65 In general, see John Locke’s influential work: Laslett, Peter, ed. (1960), Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.  
66 In general, see: Kenny, Anthony. A New History of Western Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.  
67 Modern societies are human rights societies in the same way that pre-modern Western societies were Christian. In 
other words, in pre-modern Western societies the Church formed the foundation of society and its doctrine informed 
the latter’s institutions. However, the human rights revolution inverted this system. Hence, human rights became the 
foundation of society and informed the development of its institutions, including that of the Church. Thus, the rise of 
the Reformation, ‘Christian human rights’ and the Church’s general goal to ‘keep up with the times’. 
68 They are also known as ‘freedom-to’ or positive rights as opposed to ‘freedom-from’ or negative rights. 
69 In general, see: Singer, Peter. Marx: A Very Short Introduction. New York, Oxford University Press, 2000. 
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to address the issue by looking towards the institution of labor unions and their concomitant 
mechanism of collective bargaining. Although the ideal of socialism was never fully realized, 
some human rights’ historians, such as Micheline Ishay, recognize ‘second-generation rights’ as 
the socialist contribution to the global human rights movement.70 However, this understanding 
seems to ignore the fact that neo-Marxists generally understand human rights as an oppressive 
ideology, implemented and used by the economic elite to further their own agendas.71 In the 20th 
Century, the two World Wars largely determined - both in theory and practice - the development 
of international human rights. On the one hand, this period witnessed the violation of more rights 
than any other period in history. This was the result of a combination of factors: colonialism, the 
Great Depression, the rise of nationalism, the regimes of Mussolini (d.1945), Stalin (d.1953) and 
Hitler (d.1945), and perhaps most significantly, the civilian casualties of World War II. On the 
other hand, this period also destroyed old power structures; a space was created for the 
establishment of new institutions based on personal-legal rights. Moreover, groups that were 
previously excluded from having human rights, such as women and slaves, contributed to the 
war campaign and on the basis of their contributions, demanded to have their rights recognized. 
Among other changes, this resulted in the recognition of ‘third-generation’ rights, that is, 
collective or group rights. Thus, by the end of the 20th Century for example, women had the right 
to vote and nation-states were afforded the right to self-determination – at least in theory and to 
some degree. Moreover, the horrors of World War II and the Holocaust evoked the ‘conscience 
of mankind’, and they led to the establishment of the United Nations, and the drafting of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Eleanor Roosevelt assembled a group of ‘experts’ that 
                                               
70 Ishay, Micheline R. The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2004. P.4. 
71 See: Kolakowski, Leszek. “Marxism and Human Rights” The MIT Press. 112:04 (1983): 81-92.  
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represented a wide range of religious and cultural values; they deliberated and debated on a 
number of human rights’ issues until they reached a consensus of sorts. This study argues that 
this ‘representation’ was incomplete because it excluded significant segments of the world’s 
population. It also points out that the drafters exclusively agreed on a practical level and 
therefore, there was little to no consensus on any fundamental issues.72 In any case, the National 
Assembly passed the Universal Declaration in 1948, and thus began the new world order of 
human rights. This brief historical overview is typical of popular accounts concerning the history 
of human rights.73  
 
 
The Construction and Assumptions of Human Rights History 
 
These types of histories generally share some, if not all, of the following assumptions. 
First, they see the development of human rights as linear and progressive. In this sense, they 
perpetuate one of the dominant ideologies of the Enlightenment period. Immanuel Kant (d.1804) 
aptly summarized this view on progress when he wrote that  
 
The history of mankind can be seen, in the large, as the realization of Nature’s secret  
plan to bring forth a perfectly constituted state as the only condition in which the 
capacities of mankind can be fully developed, and also bring forth that external relation 
among states which is perfectly adequate to this end.74 
                                               
72 In this regard, see chapter three, Pp. 73-74. 
73 For example, see: Ishay, Micheline R. The History of Human Rights from Ancient Times; and Lauren, Paul G. 
“History of Human Rights.” The Encyclopedia of Human Rights. Pp. 1-27. 
74 Kant, Immanuel. “Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View”. (1784) Marxists.org. Marxist 
Internet Archive. 08 Dec. 2017.     
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This idea of progress is not always explicitly laid out in contemporary human rights’ narratives. 
This seems to be the case because the idea is becoming increasingly contentious. In other words, 
the belief in progress is being reexamined in light of current world affairs, such as the 
international environmental crisis, and in light of the postmodern thought and its general 
deconstruction of linear-progressive ideologies.75 Nevertheless, the theme is almost always 
discernible in some form and to some degree. For example, Paul Lauren writes that the history of 
human rights did not have a straight line of development and sometimes regression was 
paradoxically needed as a springboard for progress.76 Ishay writes:  
 
That is not to say that reactionary forces have completely nullified each phase of progress 
in human rights. Rather, history preserves the human rights record as each generation 
builds on the hopes and achievements of its predecessors while struggling to free itself 
from authoritarianism and improve its social conditions.77  
  
Even Lynn Hunt’s Inventing Human Rights, which describes the ‘trial and error’ nature behind 
the development of rights, gives the impression that the latter developed according to its own 
inherent, albeit unpredictable, progressive nature.78 It can be argued that the belief in progress 
developed in light of the scientific and industrial revolutions in the West; these revolutions gave 
people the impression that humans possessed an unlimited potential for discovery and 
development. Moreover, in light of increased scientific knowledge and a higher standard of 
living, people generally began to believe that these modern developments were positive and 
                                               
75 In general, see: Sim, Stuart, ed. The Routledge Companion to Postmodernism. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 
2005. 
76 Lauren, Paul G. “History of Human Rights.” The Encyclopedia of Human Rights. P.1. 
77 Ishay, Micheline R. The History of Human Rights from Ancient Times. P. 4.   
78 In general, see: Hunt, Lynn. Inventing Human Rights: A History. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2007. 
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therefore, that they should be pursued by all means and without end. Today however, many 
people, particularly in the fields of science and philosophy, are questioning how much we 
actually know about the world and even if, there is such a thing as objective knowledge at all. 
Furthermore, changes in science, industry and technology have seemingly alienated human 
beings and, in doing so, have created an existential crisis. Hence, it can be argued that this is the 
reason for the rise of mass consumerism as well as the contemporary growth of numerous new-
age spiritual movements. Thus, ‘progress’ has come at a cost and this cost arguably means that 
there has been no ‘positive development’, that is, progress, at all.79 In any case, in relation to 
human rights, Samuel Moyn argues that these ‘celebratory histories’ are religious in nature 
because they interpret every set-back as a necessary stage in ‘furthering the cause’. He maintains 
that history has always allowed for a number of open possibilities and therefore, human rights 
should not be seen as the inevitable, saving-truth of humankind.80 In this regard, Moyn writes:  
 
In recasting world history as raw material for the progressive ascent of international  
human rights, [contemporary historians] have rarely conceded that earlier history left  
open diverse paths into the future, rather than paving a single road toward current ways  
of thinking and acting…historians have been loath to regard [human rights] as only one 
appealing ideology among others. Instead, they have used history to confirm their  
inevitable rise…A different approach is needed to reveal the true origins of this most  
recent utopian program.81 
 
                                               
79 In other words, it can be argued that scientific and material progress have also caused individual and spiritual 
regress and therefore, the notion that humanity collectively progresses over time cannot be taken as a matter of fact.  
80 In general, see: Moyn, Samuel. The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History. London: Harvard University Press. 
2010.  
81 Moyn, Samuel. The Last Utopia. P. 5. 
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The second assumption of popular human rights’ histories is that they generally consider the 
world’s earliest known religions as an important historical stage in the history of human rights. 
For example, Ishay begins her book on human rights with a section on world religions. She states 
that “religions contain the humanistic elements that anticipated our modern conception of 
rights.”82  In a similar fashion, Lauren writes that the “first significant philosophies came from 
religion whose principles would inform later human rights developments.”83 Thus, these histories 
locate proto-human rights concepts in selected passages of sacred scripture as well as in 
exceptional historical cases such as the code of Hammurabi, the philosophy of Confucius and the 
cylinder of Cyrus the Great.84 After connecting religion and human rights, historians generally 
proceed to sever the same connection with the rise of the Renaissance and Protestant revolutions. 
At this point, religion becomes stagnant and even ‘backwards’ and the newly born concept of 
secular-liberal human rights begins to take hold and ‘develop’. Interestingly, religion, at least to 
some degree, was responsible for the birth of human rights, but now, the two approaches are 
apparently irreconcilable. In this regard, Thomas Banchoff and Robert Wuthrow write: 
 
It is common for writers to argue that the modern conception of human rights triumphed 
only as traditional religious authorities eroded… The story usually makes some 
acknowledgement [of religious contributions] … But the dominant story is one of 
traditional religious authority opposed to the secular Enlightenment ideal of rational, 
autonomous individuals as bearers of universal rights… In this view it is legitimate for 
religious people to insist on freedom of belief and worship. But when they join with 
others of like mind about different policy agendas, they should do so as citizens and not 
as people of faith. To engage more broadly in the politics of human rights – to press their 
                                               
82 Ishay, Micheline. The History of Human Rights from Ancient Times. P. 5.  
83 Lauren, Paul G. “History of Human Rights.” The Encyclopedia of Human Rights. P. 2. 
84 These cases are considered ‘exceptional’ because they seem to be secular philosophies in a religious world. 
However, their ‘secularity’ and thus, ‘exceptionality’, is highly contested.  
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own ideas of what those rights mean and how they grow out of their traditions – is to 
inject religion where it does not belong…85  
 
This view concerning the connection between religion and human rights is contested on two 
different fronts. First, it is contested by human rights theorists that argue that ‘religion as a 
historical stage’ is misleading because there is no interdependence between the two ideologies. 
For example, Jack Donnelly argues that religions did not have a word for ‘subjective right’, that 
is, a word that referred to individual rights. Instead, they exclusively focused on ‘objective 
rights’, that is, on the idea of ‘what is right/good’. In other words, Donnelly distinguishes 
between ‘it is right that’ and ‘the right to’ and argues that the latter exclusively came into 
existence with modern political theory.86 Therefore, according to Donnelly, human rights are 
both exclusively Western and modern.87 However, the view of ‘religion as a historical stage’ is 
also contested by human rights theorists that argue that the Renaissance and Enlightenment did 
not produce ‘new ideas’ that formed the foundation of all subsequent human rights 
developments. For these theorists, human rights are a perennial issue that existed, and continue 
to exist, in the world’s religious traditions.88 For example, Bonny Ibhawoh mentions that pre-
colonial African societies had a concept of justice that was informed by rights and supported a 
measure of individualism.89 Therefore, according to this view, human rights are not exclusive to 
                                               
85 Banchoff, Thomas and Robert Wuthrow. “Introduction”. Religion and the Global Politics of Human Rights. Ed.  
Banchoff and Wuthrow. New York: Oxford University Press. 2011. P.4.  
86 For a critique of this position see: Freeman, Michael. “Beyond Capitalism and Socialism.” Human Rights and 
Capitalism: A Multidisciplinary Perspective on Globalisation. Ed. Dine and Fagan. Edward Algar Publishing, 2006. 
Pp. 8-9.   
87 Donnelly, Jack. “Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic critique of Non-Western Conceptions of 
Human Rights”. The American Political Science Review. 76.2 (1982) Pp. 303-316.   
88 On the continuous intersection between religion and human rights, see: Banchoff, Thomas and Robert Wuthrow. 
“Introduction”. Religion and the Global Politics. Pp. 1-22.  
89 Ibhawoh, Bonny. “Restraining Universalism: Africanist Perspectives on Cultural Relativism in the Human Rights 
Discourse” Human Rights, The Rule of Law and Development in Africa. Ed. Zeleza and McConnaughy, 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.  
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the Western liberal tradition or only relevant when mentioned in reference to post-1948 
developments.  
The last common assumption is that the Medieval Age was a ‘dark’ and oppressive time in 
the West. This period is generally painted as being full of disease, poverty and enslavement. It is 
remembered as a time of stark class distinction - from kings down to peasants. This depiction is 
partially true; however, as Norman Cantor points out, the Medieval Age covers a long period of 
history (approximately 476 -1500 C.E.) and therefore cannot be generalized in a single way. He 
argues that along with oft-mentioned events such as the inquisition, this period also saw times of 
unprecedented creativity and growth that was due to, and not despite of, the Church and ruling 
aristocratic system.90 Martin Lings also challenges the assumption and counter-intuitively argues 
that the Middle Ages would have been even ‘darker’ if it had not been for the church and the 
prevailing social structure.91 Finally, S.H. Nasr argues that even if there was sickness and war, 
people still had a profound sense of meaning and purpose - a sense that, according to him, is no 
longer carried by people today.92 In this light, he writes that  
 
Human beings are in need of meaning as much as they are in need of air to breathe and 
food to eat. Modern materialistic reductionism has not only resulted in chemically 
infested food and polluted air, but also the loss of meaning in its ultimate sense. There 
can in fact be no ultimate meaning without the acceptance of the Ultimate in the 
metaphysical sense. It is indeed a great paradox that human consciousness in modern 
times has produced a view of the cosmos which has no room for consciousness. And 
when human beings do seek to find consciousness in the objective world, or experience 
what they consider to be encounters with conscious beings outside of the human realm, 
they are marginalized and condemned to the category of hallucinating men and women in 
need of psychiatric care.93  
                                               
90 Cantor, Norman F. Inventing the Middle Ages. New York: Harper, 1991. Pp. 17-47. 
91 Lings, Martin. Ancient Beliefs and Modern Superstitions. Cambridge: Archetype Chetwynd House, 2001. P. 48. 
92 For Nasr, an ‘Islamic society’ is a society that functions in accordance with traditional customs and laws (‘urf) 
that are rooted in Divine revelation and have been passed down – in different forms – through unbroken lines of 
transmission. 
93 Chittick, William C., ed. The Essential Seyyed Hossein Nasr. Indiana: World Wisdom, 2010. P. 227. 
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Critically challenging popular historical accounts is important because they play a central role in 
determining the attitudes and practices related to international human rights today. For example, 
the belief in progress, culminating in the establishment of a universal human rights regime, 
justifies an ‘us vs. them’ mentality and its closely related practice of ‘humanitarian intervention.’ 
Moreover, these histories can demonize, undermine and/or misunderstand other traditions and 
their particular institutional manifestations in areas such as education, culture, law and gender.  
The next section looks at some of the different theories that attempt to provide a rationale 
for the existence and implementation of universal human rights’ norms. More specifically, it 
critically explores utilitarianism, modern natural rights, and one vision of postmodern rights, that 
is, ethical sentimentalism. It argues that these theories are problematic, even within the secular-
liberal ethical tradition itself, and that this is among the greatest impediments to the 
implementation of rights on an international level. The section then goes on to address the 
question of universalism by briefly discussing some of the human rights’ views coming out of 
the African, Asian and Islamic traditions. 94
                                               
94 Chapter two’s discussion on Islamic views on human rights is limited in scope. This is because the topic is treated 
in full from chapters three through five.      
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CHAPTER TWO 
Human Rights and Their Underlying Ethical Theories 
 
 
Introduction  
 
The American Declaration of Independence (1776) and the French Rights of Man and 
Citizen (1789) both claim that human rights are self-evident. Thomas Jefferson famously wrote: 
“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by 
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit 
of Happiness.”95 However, there is ambiguity and disagreement on virtually every human rights 
issue, including that of their existence. Alasdair McIntyre goes as far as to say that “there are no 
such rights, and belief in them is one with belief in witches and unicorns.”96 Thus, the argument 
of ‘self-evidence’ is insufficient; human rights need to be justified. On what basis do human 
beings have universal, equal and inalienable rights? If this question remains unanswered, the 
implementation of human rights – on a domestic or international level – will be virtually 
impossible. The following section critically engages some of the popular ethical theories that are 
used in an attempt to answer the question of foundations.97 More specifically, it critically 
explores the theories of utilitarianism, natural rights, and postmodern ethical sentimentalism. 
This work goes on to argue that each of these ideologies are deeply problematic and vulnerable 
                                               
95 Emphasis added. 
96 MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. 3rd Ed. Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2007. P. 69.  
97 This section is intended to be precursory and therefore, it leaves out theories that are less common or persuasive. 
It also momentarily leaves out religion as a source of human rights and returns to the subject in the following 
chapters. 
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to objections of relativism. Therefore, the aggressive implementation of human rights based on 
these theories is arbitrary and therefore, a form of cultural imperialism. Moreover, this section 
exclusively focuses on ethical theories within the secular-liberal tradition. This is in order to 
show that there is no good reason that international human rights should be closed off to 
alternative human rights visions. Thus, this section paves the way for the second section, which 
attempts to construct a theory of Islamic virtue ethics and thereby, lay out the parameters for a 
vision of human rights that is grounded in the Islamic intellectual tradition.  
 
 
A Critical Exploration of Utilitarianism  
 
Utilitarianism is a consequentialist political and moral philosophy. It argues that actions 
are morally good or bad depending on the consequences they produce. For act-based utilitarians, 
this normative moral principle should be applied on a case-by-case basis. For example, an act-
based utilitarian would maintain that in some scenarios, taking a person’s life is the right course 
of action, while in other scenarios, taking someone’s life is the wrong course of action. For rule-
based utilitarians however, this normative principle should be applied to general rules that 
produce the greatest utility. For example, a rule-based utilitarian would maintain that, taking 
someone’s life generally produces negative consequences, and therefore, as a rule, it is the wrong 
course of action.98 Within these two strands utilitarianism, there are many variations; however, 
they all agree that actions are intrinsically valueless; their morality depends on the consequences 
they produce. This is in stark contrast to deontological natural rights theory in both its religious 
                                               
98 In general, See: Nathonson, Stephen. “Act and Rule Utilitarianism”. iep.utm.edu. Internet Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy: A Peer-Reviewed Academic Resource. 02 March. 2017.  
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and secular forms.99 Many early ideas concerning utilitarianism came from Christian theologians, 
such as Richard Cumberland (d.1718) and John Gay (d.1745), who believed that promoting 
happiness was an imperative by God and that morally correct behavior would always achieve 
this end.100 However, the classical and formal exposition of Utilitarianism is normally traced back 
to Jeremy Bentham (d.1832). According to him, 
  
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, 
pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to 
determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the 
other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all 
we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our 
subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to 
abjure their empire: but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while. The principle 
of utility recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the 
object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law. Systems 
which attempt to question it, deal in sounds instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, 
in darkness instead of light.101  
 
According to Bentham then, individual behavior as well as governmental laws and policies 
should be based on the attempt to maximize the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest 
number of people. This view is commonly referred to as hedonistic utilitarianism. John Stuart 
Mill (d.1873) - following in Bentham’s footsteps - refined the theory to address a number of 
problems.102 The difference between the two concerned their understanding of the human being 
                                               
99 See the following section on ‘natural Rights’, Pp. 45-52.  
100 In general, see: Driver, Julia "The History of Utilitarianism". plato.stanford.edu. The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. 21 Jan. 2017. 
101 Bentham, Jeremy. An Introduction to the Principles and Morals of Legislation. econlib.org. Library of 
Economics and Liberty. 01 March. 2017.  
102 In general, see: Mill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism. Ed. Waldrep. Dover Publications, 2007.   
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and the nature of pleasure. Mill argued that people intuitively and experientially know that some 
kinds of acts are more pleasurable and fitting than others. For example, he argued that there was 
a significant qualitative difference between sensual pleasures and intellectual pleasures. Thus, 
according to Mill,  
 
It is indisputable that the being whose capacities of enjoyment are low, has the greatest 
chance of having them fully satisfied; and a highly endowed being will always feel that 
any happiness which he can look for, as the world is constituted, is imperfect. But he can 
learn to bear its imperfections…It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig 
satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, 
is of a different opinion, it is only because they only know their own side of the 
question.103  
 
Another important distinction between Bentham and Mill was that the latter placed more 
emphasis on the importance of treating one’s ‘neighbor’ well. Keeping in line with hedonism, 
Mill argued that harming others causes pain to oneself, and conversely, helping others causes 
pleasure to oneself. Therefore, Mill’s adaptive hedonism opened the door to utilitarianism’s 
subsequent connection to human rights; it argued that it is in our own self-interest to protect and 
promote the rights of others. Despite Mill’s best efforts, hedonistic ‘act’ and ‘rule’ based 
utilitarianism were still heavily criticized. One of the most decisive critiques came from Robert 
Nozick (d.2002) and his ‘experience machine’ thought experiment.104 Nozick asked his readers 
to think of a machine that could induce the highest feelings of pleasure. If hedonistic utilitarians 
were correct, then everyone would choose to spend their lives drugged in the machine. However, 
                                               
103 Mill. Utilitarianism. P. 8. 
104 This critique was already popular during Mill’s time; however, Nozick’s ‘experience machine’ was significant in 
its powerful imagery and incisive critique. 
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Nozick argued that most people would not enter the ‘experience machine’ and that they would 
consider it a waste of life. His point was simple: people value many different types of human 
experiences.105 For example, Nozick’s thought experiment suggests that some people may 
consider the experience of reality more valuable than the experience of happiness. After 
Bentham and Mill, a number of theorists attempted to expand utilitarianism in order to include a 
wider range of human experiences. For example, George Edward Moore (d.1958) wrote in favor 
of an ideal utilitarianism based on intuition.106 Moore was an ontological realist and argued that 
we cannot know how we know things; however, this does not mean that we cannot know things. 
His ontological realism extended to his theory of morality. According to Moore, ‘goodness’ is a 
real property that we can know through our common sense. Moreover, it can be attached to any 
number of objects or state of affairs and these can be ranked according to their degree of 
‘goodness’. Hence, according to Moore, an ideal state is one that is good in itself and good to a 
high degree. Therefore, ideal utilitarianism is a moral theory in which “actions are to be ordered 
not to the greatest happiness or pleasure, but to those state of affairs possessing the highest 
degree of good.”107 However, as this section later argues, Moore’s theory does not escape the 
seemingly inherent problems in utilitarianism. The same can be said of contemporary utilitarian 
theories. According to Will Kymlicka, these contemporary theories can be categorized into four 
broad groups: hedonistic utility, non-hedonistic mental-state utility, preference satisfaction and 
informed preferences.108 To provide one example, R.M. Hare’s (d.2002) theory of ‘universal 
                                               
105 Murray, Dale. “Robert Nozick: Political Philosophy”. iep.utm.edu. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: A Peer-
Reviewed Academic Resource. 02 March. 2017.   
106 In general, see: Moore, G. E. G. E. Moore: Selected Writings. Ed. Baldwin, London: Routledge. 1993. 
107 Preston, Aaron. “George Edward Moore (1873-1958)” iep.utm.edu. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: A Peer-
Reviewed Academic Resource. 02 Jan. 2017. 
108 An in-depth study of utilitarianism is beyond the scope of this work. See: Kymlicka, Will. Contemporary 
Political Philosophy: An Introduction. 2nd Ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. P.10-53.   
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prescriptivism’ argues in favor of utilitarianism based on ‘informed preferences’.109 According to 
him, laws should be created in light of overall human welfare and that the latter should be judged 
according to the satisfaction of ‘informed and rational’ human preferences. In explaining Hare’s 
stance, Price Anthony writes:  
 
In their practical force, ideals are equivalent to universal preferences that differ from 
personal preferences in their content, but owe their moral weight to the prevalence and 
intensity of whatever preferences their realization would satisfy… The emergent ethical 
theory is a distinctive variety of utilitarianism, one that identifies the moral good with the 
maximization not of some subjective state such as happiness, but of the satisfaction of 
preferences.110 
 
Closely related to utilitarianism’s ‘informed preferences’ is Amartya Sen’s popular capabilities 
theory.111 According to Sen, the problem with utilitarianism is its lack of attention to the ‘morality 
of means’. In other words, the problem is that it doesn’t evaluate the morality of the process by 
which a good or bad consequence is produced. Thus, Sen argues for a kind of ‘comprehensive 
utilitarianism’. For him, a person’s capability represents “the effective freedom of an individual 
to choose between different functioning combinations – between different kinds of life – that she 
has reason to value.”112 Thus, one of Sen’s underlying concerns is not only to evaluate the means 
that people have access to, but to also evaluate the specific capabilities, that is, ‘functioning 
                                               
109 In general, see: Hare, R.M. Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method and Point. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1993. 
110 Anthony, Price. "Richard Mervyn Hare". plato.stanford.edu. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 11 Sept. 
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111 In general, see: Sen, Amartya. Commodities and Capabilities. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
112 Wells, Thomas. “Sen’s Capability Approach.” ep.utm.edu. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: A Peer-
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combinations’ that people have to use those means. For example, the human right to the ‘freedom 
of movement’ is insufficient if a particular person is handicapped and therefore unable to move.   
Contemporary utilitarianism is an extremely appealing moral theory because it is 
consequentialist and therefore, provides moral objectivity through practical calculation. This 
means that it has the potential to ground rights in absolute values without having to appeal to 
God or any other transcendent entity. Simply put, something is moral if it provides utility and 
immoral if it doesn’t. However, all forms of utilitarianism – from ‘hedonistic’ to ‘informed 
preferences’ – face at least two seemingly insurmountable problems and it is these two problems 
that rightly question utilitarianism’s ability to ‘ground’ human rights. First, utilitarianism, by 
definition, sacrifices the individual – whenever necessary – for the sake of society at large, that 
is, the ‘greater good’. This is obviously antithetical to the concept of individual rights. In this 
regard, Jermome Shestack writes that  
 
Despite the egalitarian pretensions of utilitarian doctrine, it has a sinister side in  
which the well-being of the individual may be sacrificed for what are claimed to  
be aggregate interests, and justice and right have no secure place. Utilitarian  
philosophy thus leave liberty and rights vulnerable to contingencies, and  
therefore at risk113 
 
However, the argument against ‘utilitarian sacrifice’ is not very strong and does not 
unequivocally dismisses the theory as a possible justification for human rights. This is because 
rights are always clashing in practice and therefore, utilitarian calculations are unavoidable. 
Andrew Heard correctly observes that 
                                               
113Shestack, Jerome J. “The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights.” Exploring International Human Rights. 
Ed. Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens. P. 26. 
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…Resources are scarce in any society, and especially limited in some.  This scarcity 
inevitably leads to utilitarian calculation to allocate those resources in a way that will 
maximize the greatest good. In the end, it is argued, all the benefits listed as human 
rights, even life itself, are subject to the promotion of the greatest good within society.  
As such an individual’s benefits claims as a human right may be compromised, diluted or 
even completely denied in specific situations where that right has to be weighed against 
the claim of another individual or society as a whole.114 
 
 Hence, it is really the second argument that undermines utilitarianism as a ‘ground’ for human 
rights. This argument is based on ‘the problem of relativity’ and can be broken down into three 
interrelated parts: First, ‘utilitarian calculation’ assumes that it is possible to know all the 
different effects that a particular act or rule will produce. However, people’s knowledge of effects 
is limited, and therefore, there is no way to unequivocally justify one choice over another. To 
provide an obvious example, in some secular societies, one’s sexuality falls within the private 
sphere; a person’s sexual actions are a matter of the right to freedom and individual choice. 
However, these ‘private actions’ can have great public ramifications. Infidelity often leads to 
broken homes, and these, in turn, have a strong correlation with drug abuse, criminality, and the 
like. Second, a single human rights theory based on utilitarianism is forced to make the 
assumption that human choices are the same across individuals and communities. However, 
‘human utility’ is relative to a person’s or community’s particular worldview and consequent 
lifestyle. To provide another clear example, a religious person would undoubtedly understand 
their highest goal as related to salvation and therefore, would clash with various secular opinions 
concerning the ‘public good.’ Finally, putting aside the first two problems, utilitarianism is still 
                                               
114 Heard, Andrew. “The Challenges of Utilitarianism and Relativism”. sfu.ca. Simon Fraser University, 1997.  
 
 
 43 
left with the problem of qualitative measurement. Even if a society agreed on the ‘general good’, 
it would still be impossible to precisely measure and determine what produces more or less 
utility. Thus, the claim that a universal standard of morality can be known by measuring the 
consequences of common acts or rules is highly problematic and cannot ground human rights in 
a way that allows the latter to be universal, equal and inalienable. 
 
 
A Critical Exploration of Natural Rights 
 
Natural rights theory is the liberal response to utilitarianism. Its religious version can be 
traced back to Christian natural law and its classical representative – saint Thomas Aquinas 
(d.1274). Aquinas argued that God governs the world through Divine Reason and consequently, 
all creatures obey an ‘Eternal Law’. This is because they are given particular natures that incline 
them to act in a particular way. However, according to Aquinas, human beings are special 
because they possess free-will and the choice to follow (or not follow) their God-given essence. 
In order to guide their free-will, God gave humans a share in his Divine Reason and thereby, the 
ability to discern between good (legal) from evil (illegal). Aquinas writes:  
 
Among all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine Providence in the most  
excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by being provident both 
for itself, and for others. Wherefore, it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a 
natural inclination to its proper act and end.115  
 
                                               
115 Morris, Clarence, ed. The Great Legal Philosophers. Selected Readings in Jurisprudence. Pennsylvania: 
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Natural rights theory picked up on the concept that human beings are ‘special’ and thereby, 
‘naturally’ entitled to individual rights. Grounding these rights in a transcendent God gave the 
former a universal and ahistorical character; it legitimized the claim that human rights are held 
by all human beings, irrespective of class, race or gender. However, the traditional concept of 
God did not sit well with the Enlightenment’s program of secular-liberalism. 116 That is, its 
program of lifting reason above faith or revelation and constructing a worldview based on 
science as opposed to tradition. In the words of Kant, the Enlightenment was a process that 
involved “man’s release from his self-incurred immaturity”.117 Thus, Christian natural law needed 
to be modified. Philosophers such as Voltaire (d.1778) and Diderot (d.1784) decided to sever the 
‘Church’s God’ from reason and nature. They believed that the latter two could still provide the 
necessary metaphysical foundation for ethics since they, like God, seemed to operate beyond the 
confines of space and time. It was this change that gave birth to a number of modern natural right 
theories within the secular-liberal tradition.118 
Modern natural rights theory is normally traced back to John Locke and his imaginative 
state of nature.119 According to Locke, all people in a state of nature would be considered equal 
and free; however, they would also lack protection and security from others. Hence, according to 
Locke’s thought experiment, free and equal people would come together and decide to create a 
                                               
116 The Enlightenment is increasingly seen as a complex historical period that was driven by diverse voices and 
affected by different geographical locations. In this regard, see: Outram, Dorinda. The Enlightenment. 2nd ed. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2005. Nevertheless, the Enlightenment’s basic program is generally 
understood as a movement away from traditional authority and towards individual autonomy.    
117 As quoted in: Outram, Dorinda. The Enlightenment. P. 1. 
118 Sachedina argues that this change is largely responsible for the friction between secular-liberal human rights and 
other religious and philosophic approaches. Thus, he argues for a return to Christian natural rights and claims that 
the latter can work with Islamic natural law theories to provide the principles necessary for universal human rights. 
In general, see: Sachedina, Abdulaziz. Islam and the challenge of Human Rights; and, Emon, Enver M. Islamic 
Natural Law Theories. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 2010.   
119 In general, see: Tuckness, Alex, "Locke's Political Philosophy". plato.stanford.edu. The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. 11 Sept. 2017 
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social contract. This contract would establish a government invested with political authority and 
the responsibility to protect people. More specifically, its responsibility would be to protect what 
belonged to people by right of birth, namely, their right to life, liberty and property. Furthermore, 
the same people could rightfully rebel against the government if it failed in fulfilling its 
existential function. Thus, Locke assumed that human rights were grounded in a universal human 
nature and that the government acted as a ‘Law-Enforcer’ to protect those rights. In his second 
treatise, Locke wrote: 
 
To understand Political Power right…we must consider what State all Men are naturally 
in, and that is, a State of perfect Freedom to order their Actions, and dispose of their 
Possessions, and Persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature, 
without asking leave, or depending upon the Will of any other Man.120 
 
And  
 
And that all Men may be restrained from invading others Rights, and from doing hurt to 
one another, and the Law of Nature be observed, which willeth the Peace 
and Preservation of all Mankind, the Execution of the Law of Nature is in that State, put 
into every Mans hands… For the Law of Nature would, as all other Laws that concern 
Men in this World, be in vain, if there were no body that in the State of Nature, had 
a Power to Execute that Law, and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain 
offenders…121 
 
                                               
120 Laslett, Peter, ed. Locke’s Two Treatises. P. 91 
121 Laslett, Peter, ed. Locke’s Two Treatises. P. 92. 
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Immanuel Kant also developed a highly influential secular natural rights theory. His goal was to 
discover a ‘metaphysics of morality’ that is, a set of a priori moral principles, that could be 
applied universally. He did this by developing a theory of ‘transcendental idealism’ that 
distinguished between the world of phenomena (appearances) and noumena (reality).122 
According to Kant, human beings cannot know the world as it is; they can only access it through 
concepts such as cause and effect. However, according to Kant, these mental concepts are 
universal and naturally embedded in every rational mind. Hence, Kant restricted his search for a 
moral imperative to the ‘rational sphere’. He maintained that the principle would have to be an 
‘end in and of itself’ and a moral obligation on all rational agents. Kant ‘discovered’ this 
principle in his famous categorical imperative, namely, “Act only according to that maxim 
whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”123 This, he 
believed, provided the litmus test for ethical action and that it could be further developed and 
applied in all moral contexts.   
It was the concept of natural rights based on nature and reason that became the theoretical 
force behind the French and American revolutions. Locke’s work was widely disseminated 
among the people; it justified rebellion and the establishment of a government that was ‘of the 
people, by the people, and for the people’. Eventually, natural law theory, as articulated by 
philosophers such as Locke and Kant, also became the doctrinal basis for modern societies 
grounded in some form of secular-liberalism. This was despite the fact that their ideas were 
never fully developed and, more importantly, that they were widely criticized and opposed in 
                                               
122 In general, see: Kant, Immanuel. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. 3rd Ed. Trans. Ellington. 
Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993. 
123 Kant, Immanuel. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. P.30. 
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both in theory and practice.124 Moreover, the Universal Declaration was drafted within the 
context of this momentous societal change and hence, it was implicitly underpinned by the same 
incomplete neo-lockean principles. However, the strengths of natural rights theory could not be 
ignored; thus, it was picked up by many contemporary human rights theorists such as John Rawls 
(d.2002), John Finnis (d.1980) and David Gauthier (d.1986). In their own ways, they attempted 
to use natural rights to ground human rights such that the latter could be considered universal. 
For example, Rawls also carried out a thought experiment in which people were placed in an 
‘original position’ of sorts; however, instead of the classic ‘state of nature’, Rawls used what he 
referred to as the ‘veil of ignorance’.125 Behind the veil, people are denied any knowledge of who 
they are; they have no way of knowing their gender, race, and socio-economic status. It is based 
on this ignorance, and therefore assumed impartiality, that people must decide what principles 
constitute a just society. Rawls argued that rational people would choose a ‘politically liberal’ 
society, one where justice is based on fairness and constitutes two principles: 
 
The first principle states that each person in a society is to have as much basic liberty as 
possible, as long as everyone is granted the same liberties… The second principle states 
that while social and economic inequalities can be just, they must be available to 
everyone equally (that is, no one is to be on principle denied access to greater economic 
advantage) and such inequalities must be to the advantage of everyone.126 
   
                                               
124 As expected, their ideas were heavily criticized by their contemporaries. However, they were also opposed on a 
practical level, that is by parts of the population that were witnessing a practical paradigmatic shift within their 
societies. In this regard and in general, see: Hunt, Lynn. Inventing Human Rights.  
125 In general, see: Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice.  
126 Friend, Celeste. “Social Contract Theory”. iep.utm.edu. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: A Peer-Reviewed 
Academic Resource. 01 April. 2017.  
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Finnis, on the other hand, developed a theory of ‘neo-naturalism’ that attempted to move away 
from the classical appeals to God, reason and nature. Instead, he argued that human rights should 
be grounded in the concept of objective goods, that is, goods that are necessary for human 
flourishing. Interestingly however, this change brought Finnis’ ideas closer to utilitarianism than 
to natural rights. This is because his idea concerning ‘necessary goods’ requires assumptions 
about what is valuable and moreover, consensus on these assumptions would most likely require 
(impossible) calculations about the vague concept of ‘human flourishing’. In this way, many neo-
natural rights theories have lost their classical appeal, that is, the appeal of a human rights 
grounded in a transcendent and objective source.  
In any case, despite the strengths of natural rights theories, they all seem to face the same 
two-fold problem of universal consensus and practical application. For example, in terms of 
universality, Locke’s idea that life, liberty and property are natural, equal and inalienable seems 
to be heavily influenced by the absolutism of the 17th and 18th Centuries. Carrying out the same 
thought experiment in different social contexts would produce different sets of rights, and the 
latter could just as easily be considered natural, equal and inalienable.  Moreover, and in terms of 
application, the rights to life, liberty and property are general concepts. Even if people agreed on 
the substance of basic rights, they would undoubtedly disagree on the ways in which these rights 
should interact with each other, and other rights, when put into practice. Critiques of 
contemporary natural rights theories point to the same two problems. For example, Alison Rentln 
argues that ‘natural’ human rights are wrongly considered universal because people have a 
psychological predisposition to generalize from their own particular perspectives; they have a 
tendency to project their moral categories onto others. In arguing this point in relation to Rawls, 
she writes that  
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It is plausible that individuals from the same culture might agree to the same 
principles…But if one transposes the scenario of the original position to an international 
setting, it becomes doubtful whether all the participants will acquiesce. The 
presupposition is that individuals stripped of their cultural and political heritage would be 
pure rational being and would thus dutifully elect liberal democratic principles of justice. 
The premise that individuals could negotiate for fundamental principles in the absence of 
culture is quite fantastic. And this is precisely the root of the problem: underlying the 
presumption of universality is the belief that all peoples think in a similar fashion.127 
 
Similarly, in the case of Finnis’ objective goods theory, Michael Freeman writes, “claims about 
objective goods are either too vague to be useful or too controversial to be objective. Even those 
who agree there are objective goods do not agree on what those goods are.”128. Thus, it seems 
that that the movement away from a transcendent God, was a movement towards relativity and 
the loss of universality. Despite this however, some human rights theorists, such as Johannes 
Morsink, argue that the Universal Declaration cannot be criticized on the same grounds because 
it decidedly distanced itself from the secular-liberal conception of natural rights.129 However, this 
view is also rightly criticized by theorists such as Prakash Sinha, who argue that the Universal 
Declaration’s separation from Western liberal values was incomplete and thus, partial at best. 
For example, Sinha’s study aims to show how the Western concept of social order that underpins 
human rights is not shared by non-Western civilizations. According to Sinha, 
  
                                               
127 Renteln, Alison D. “The Concept of Human Rights”. Anthropos Institute. 83:04 (1988). P. 349.  
128 Freeman, Michael. Human Rights. P. 70.   
129 For example, see: Morsink, Johannes. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent. 
Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999.  
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There are three basic tenets that are inherent in the present formulation of human rights. 
One, the fundamental unit of society is the individual, not the family. Two, the primary 
basis for securing human existence in society is through rights, not duties. Three, the 
primary method of securing these rights is through reconciliation…not legalism.’130  
 
Sinha argues that these basic tenets are not found in Chinese, Japanese, African, Muslim, and 
Hindu societies. To provide one example, Sinha describes the process of Japanese law in the 
following way: 
 
However, in reality, the law made in imitation of the West governs a very small segment 
of social life which constitutes the presupposition of the Western law, namely, middle 
class individuals fashioning their relations on the basis of freedom and liberty. The 
majority of people still live according to the former ways and follow the Confucian idea 
based on natural order… since the notion of rights puts all persons on an equal basis, 
which is contrary to the Confucian hierarchy, it is deemed to depersonalize human 
relations. In the area of settlement of disputes, it is reconciliation which still enjoys a 
central place.131 
 
In any case, the inability of nature and reason, or human dignity and needs, to provide a universal 
foundation for human rights is clear. This leads to one of two possibilities. The first is the 
acceptance of plural human rights schemes, including those grounded in religion, and the 
acceptance of the differences this paradigm would entail. The second option, is to embrace the 
concept of relativity and to argue in favor of a single human rights model based on practical 
                                               
130 Sinha, Prakash. “Human Rights: A Non-Western Viewpoint”. Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social 
Philosophy archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy. 67:01 (1981). July 08. 2017. P. 88.  
131 Sinha. A Non-Western Viewpoint. P.84. Emphasis added.  
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results. The next section looks at this second possibility in the form of the postmodern concept of 
ethical sentimentalism.  
 
 
A Critical Exploration of Postmodern Ethical Sentimentalism 
 
As mentioned, ‘modern’ philosophers, such as Voltaire, Locke and Kant, severed the 
connection between the traditional understanding of God from human nature and reason. They 
attempted to demonstrate that the latter two concepts were also transcendent and therefore, 
universal. However, once human nature and reason were cut off from their ahistorical source in 
God, their presumed universality was heavily criticized. Following in the footsteps of Nietzsche 
(d.1900),132 it did not take long for ‘postmodern’ philosophers, such as Foucault (d.1984) and 
Derrida (d.2004), to expose nature and reason as human constructs – relative and limited to their 
socio-historical contexts.133 Some human rights theorists, such as Jack Donnelley and Richard 
Rorty, argue that this postmodern shift in epistemology is not problematic in relation to human 
rights. For Donnelley, this is partly because there is no such thing as an essential human nature. 
Rather, according to him, human nature is a social project wherein humans construct their 
essential nature vis-a-vi social action. On this view, human rights is a prescriptive moral account; 
that is, it is a substantive model which provides a set of practices that allow people to develop 
their deeper ‘moral nature’.134 In addition to this, Donnelley also argues that postmodern thought 
                                               
132 For Nietzsche’s socio-historical and relative approach to morality, see: Nietzsche, Friedrich. On the Genealogy of 
Morals and Ecce Homo. Trans and Ed. Kaufmann. New York: Random House, 1989.     
133 In general, see: Foucault, Michael. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and other Writings 1972-1977. Trans 
and Ed. Gordon. New York: Pantheon Books, 1997; and, Derrida, Jacques. Writing and Difference. Trans. Bass. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.     
134 Donnelly, Jack. Universal Human Rights: In Theory and Practice. 2nd ed. New York: Cornell University Press. 
2003. Pp.7-23.   
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is not problematic for human rights theory because there is no such thing as an objective 
theoretical foundation for any belief. In this regard, he writes:  
 
Moral and political arguments require a firm place to stand. But that place appears firm 
largely because we have agreed to treat it as such. ‘Foundations’ ‘ground’ a theory only 
through an inescapably contentious decision to define such foundations as firm 
ground…There is no strong foundation for human rights – or, what amounts to the same 
thing, there are multiple, often inconsistent, ‘foundations’…This is less of a problem than 
one might imagine.135  
 
According to Donnelley, “this is less of a problem than one might imagine” for three reasons. 
First, this is because human rights are already ‘relatively universal’. That is to say, in practice, 
most nation-states have ratified international human rights law and consider it to be legally 
binding. However, a central claim of this work is that a lack of theoretical justification makes it 
impossible, and morally arrogant, to try and implement a single model of human rights on an 
international level. It is exactly this problem that stops cross cultural communication and incites 
calls of cultural hegemony and imperialism. Moreover, the problem with Donnelley’s argument 
is that it ignores the immense political pressure placed on nation-states to accept human rights. In 
other words, some nation-states, formally endorse human rights in public international discourse 
because they cannot afford to do otherwise. This ‘insincerity’ is reflected in the countless human 
rights abuses carried out by countries that purportedly uphold international law. For example, 
Michael Freeman writes: 
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The Vienna Conference of 1993 reinforced the commitment of the international 
community in principle to universal human rights. Most governments are formally 
committed to human rights. …Yet serious violations continue…Human-rights scholars 
have begun to recognize that the global economy and the global climate may have 
massive implications for human rights.136 
 
Thus, the ‘relative universality’ of human rights is strictly limited to its formal acceptance and 
not, as Donnelley assumes, to its practical application. Secondly, Donnelley argues that a lack of 
justification is “less of a problem than one might imagine” because human rights is a prescriptive 
model that should be judged by practical consequences and not theoretical soundness. Here, 
Donnelley is combining the deontological nature of human rights with the consequentialist 
nature of Utilitarianism. The problem with Donnelley’s argument is that there is a lack of 
tangible proof that human rights produces more positive consequences than negative ones. In 
fact, in the economic sphere, it can and has been argued that international human rights allow for 
the exploitation of ‘Southern’ nation-states. In other words, on this account, human rights are an 
empty bourgeoisie ideology that works to pacify the working class and help international 
institutions, such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and trans-national 
corporations, to freely pursue and further their economic growth. Finally, Donnelley argues that a 
lack of ‘grounding’ is “less of a problem than one might imagine” because it makes human rights 
adaptable in that sense that it gives it the potential to be grounded in virtually every cultural 
tradition. This is based on the false assumption that human rights can be ‘minimalist’ and 
therefore, implemented into different societies without disturbing the latter’s worldview and its 
consequent structures. However, the problem with this idea is its ‘assumption of 
                                               
136 Freeman, Michael. Human Rights. P. 207. Emphasis added. 
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compartmentalization’. Human rights is a theory of justice, and the latter is an integral part of 
every tradition. Thus, changing a society’s understanding of justice would mean changing, at 
least to a large extent, that society’s cultural institutions and behavior norms. As the next section 
shows, the African, Chinese and Islamic traditions have vastly different views concerning justice 
and cannot accept international human rights in their current formulation without displacing their 
own particular cultural heritages. Hence, their contemporary search for a more organic and 
integral human rights schemes in line in line with their respective traditions.       
 Richard Rorty, to a large extent, adopts the same views as Donnelley. He also argues that 
there is no such thing as an essential human nature and that human rights should not be judged 
by theory, but rather, by consequence. According to Rorty, postmodernists are made up of two 
general groups, that is, the cultural left and the progressive left. He criticizes the former for not 
providing alternatives to the structures they have deconstructed and for denying the possibility of 
progress.137 Rorty places himself among the progressive left, or the school of pragmatic 
postmodernism, and puts forth a theory of human rights based on sentimentality. In discussing 
Rorty’s view, Michael Freeman writes:  
 
Rorty has argued that there is no theoretical foundation for human rights, because there is 
no theoretical foundation for any belief. This is not, however, something we should regret 
because it is a necessary philosophical truth, and because the cause of human rights does 
not require theory for its success, but, rather sympathy.138  
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Rorty’s shift from theory to sympathy is in line with his general philosophical outlook. 
According to him, science and philosophy simply form a set of ‘vocabularies’ that change in 
relation to social convention and practicality; there is no reason to believe that our knowledge 
accurately represents a world that is independent from it. Defending the view that ‘we can’t 
know anything’ but ‘we should still be moral’ is a problem that postmodern philosophy faces in 
general; this is because the knowledge of ‘anything’ includes the knowledge of morality. In other 
words, what authority does morality have if it has no basis in a transcendent and knowable 
reality and is therefore, is simply a product of changing social conventions? This essentially 
means that what is ‘right’ in a particular socio-historical context can also be ‘wrong’ in another. 
This view of morality clearly undermines human rights’ claims to universality. Rorty’s answer to 
this question is to approach human rights with the postmodern theory of ethical sentimentalism. 
The latter is the argument that ethics are a product of feeling in general and empathy in particular 
and have nothing to do with ‘knowledge’. Accordingly, Rorty argues that human rights should be 
established through sentimental education – an education that creates a feeling of empathy for 
other people’s suffering.139 Interestingly, Lynn Hunt’s book Inventing Human Rights maps the 
historical process by which social practices in 17th and 18th Centuries allowed people to 
empathize with ‘others’. According to Hunt, these changes allowed for the human rights 
movement and the French and American revolutions. She writes: 
 
Yet the newfound power of empathy could work against even the longest held 
prejudices…Neither autonomy nor empathy were fixed; they were skills that could be 
learned, and the ‘acceptable’ limitations on rights could be - and were - challenged. 
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Rights cannot be defined once and for all because their emotional basis continues to 
shift…The human rights revolution is by definition ongoing.140  
 
She continues,  
 
My argument will make much of the influence of new kinds of experiences, from viewing 
pictures in public exhibitions to reading the hugely popular epistolary novels about love 
and marriage. Such experiences helped spread the practices of autonomy and 
empathy…Each in their way reinforced the notion of a community based on autonomous, 
empathetic individuals who could related beyond their immediate families, religious 
affiliations, or even action to greater universal values.141   
 
The problem with ethical sentimentalism is its continually shifting point of reference. If human 
rights depend on what we feel, then it is only natural to ask what our feelings depend on. 
Although Hunt seems to ‘celebrate’ the shifting attitudes of the 17th and 18th Centuries, it is 
obvious that these changes were, and continue to be, dangerously liable to manipulation by those 
who have control over public information.142 For example, the media, whether in the form of an 
epistolary novel in the 17th Century or specific news outlets in the 21st Century, can dictate who 
and what we feel and do not feel empathy towards. According to George Soros:  
 
…social media companies influence how people think and behave without them even 
being aware of it. This has far-reaching adverse consequences on the functioning of 
democracy… [In addition, social media companies] deceive their users by manipulating 
their attention and directing it towards their own commercial purposes [and] deliberately 
                                               
140 Hunt, Lynn. Inventing Human Rights: P. 28-29.  
141 Hunt, Lynn: Inventing Human Rights. P.32. 
142 For example, see: Mitchell, Peter R., and John Schoeffel, eds. Understanding Power: The Indispensable 
Chomsky. New York: The New Press, 2002. 
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engineer addiction to the services they provide. The power to shape people’s attention is 
increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few companies. It takes a real effort to assert 
and defend what John Stuart Mill called ‘the freedom of mind’. There is a possibility that 
once lost, people who grow up in the digital age will have difficulty in regaining it. This 
may have far-reaching political consequences.143 
 
Ethical sentimentalism aside, the greatest obstacle to the ‘foundationless foundation’ argument – 
much like utilitarianism and natural rights – is the ‘problem of relativity’, that is, the notion that 
the only the relative is absolute. If there is no theoretical foundation for anything then the same 
argument applies to human rights. Moreover, if human rights are to be judged by their 
consequences, then it raises the question: ‘what particular consequences will be judged and how 
will those be measured?’ According to most postmodern theorists then, there is no good reason to 
apply the concept of human rights; there is only the seemingly arbitrary decision to apply them. 
Moreover, the idea that there is no sound basis for any theoretical belief is based on an 
epistemological reductionism that limits human modes of knowing. It is based on a particular 
concept of the human mind and reason that developed approximately between the 15th and 18th 
Centuries in the West. The second part of this study develops a theory of Islamic ethics and 
argues that, according to the Islamic intellectual tradition, it is possible to ‘know reality’ and 
hence, an ‘objective ground’ does exist and the latter is independent of the any particular 
person’s decision to treat it as such.   
This study carried out a critical exploration of some of the ethical theories that claim the 
ability to objectively underpin human rights and hence, argue that the latter is applicable to all 
human beings in all contexts. However, this study argues that these theories do not adequately 
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respond to the ‘question of foundations’ and the ‘problem of relativity’. Moreover, this work 
supports the popular argument that international human rights are still a product of the secular-
liberal worldview that developed out of the Renaissance and Enlightenment periods in the West. 
Further testimony about the relative nature of human rights – in its current international 
formulation – is provided by critics from the African, Chinese and Islamic traditions. The next 
section briefly looks at these critiques and the alternative visions they provide. It then goes on to 
the second part of the study that deals with human rights in relation to religion in general, and 
Islam in particular. 
 
 
Human Rights and the ‘Question of Universality’ 
 
 This study has shown that international human rights are far from universal. It has done 
this by pointing to the on-going debate from within the secular-liberal tradition concerning the 
foundations of human rights. This wide spread disagreement is sufficient evidence concerning 
the latter’s relativity. This evidence is strengthened when it is combined with criticism being 
produced from outside of the secular-liberal tradition. In particular, the concept that human rights 
are universal has found opposition from activists and theorists working within the African, Asian 
and Islamic traditions. Many of these places are part of the ‘global south’ and their arguments are 
based on both economics and culture. Rhonda Callaway and Julie Harrelson-Stephens sum up 
their position by writing: 
 
Developing countries are quick to dispute the universality of human rights, arguing three 
main points. First, developing countries had little input in the drafting of the document 
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due to their colonial position at the time. Second, these same countries contend that the 
rights outlined in the declaration are ethnocentric, reflecting Western conceptions and 
omitting non-Western views on human rights.144 Last, critics contend that too much 
emphasis is placed on the rights of the individual often at the expense of the rights of 
groups and collectivities.145 
 
In the case of Asia for example, some critics argue that the liberal emphasis on the primacy of the 
individual and autonomy runs against the Asian emphasis on the primacy of the family and 
stability.146,147 In light of this, they argue in favor of a strong centralized government that 
establishes order. According to proponents of ‘Asian values’, order is necessary for economic 
success and the actual freedom and enjoyment of rights. In this regard, Lee Kuan Yew (d.2015), 
the former prime minister of Singapore, stated: 
 
We used the family to push economic growth, factoring the ambitions of a person and his 
family into our planning…The government can create a setting in which people can live 
happily and succeed and express themselves, but finally it is what people do with their 
lives that determines economic success or failure. Again, we are fortunate we had this 
cultural backdrop, the belief in thrift, hard work, filial piety, and loyalty in the extended 
family, and, most of all, respect for scholarship and learning.148  
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The values that he mentions are based on Confucianism – a worldview that has dominated much 
of the Far-East and highly influenced its people and their way of life. Yew, like other proponents 
of ‘Asian values’, also connects the issue of international human rights with the perceived moral 
decay of the West. In relation to American society, he said:  
 
As a total system, I find parts of it totally unacceptable: guns, drugs, violent crimes, 
vagrancy, unbecoming behavior in public – in sum, the breakdown of civil society. The 
expansion of the right of the individual to behave or misbehave as he pleases has come at 
the expense of orderly society. In the East the main object is to have a well ordered 
society so that everybody can have maximum enjoyment of his freedoms.149   
 
Therefore, critics of universalism argue that the wholesale implementation of rights, as expressed 
in the International Bill of Rights, would effectively debase the Asian tradition and its rich 
cultural history. The same or similar arguments are given by some groups from the African and 
Islamic traditions. In the case of Africa for example, Shashi Tharoor writes:  
 
…in Africa it is the community that protects and nurtures the individual. One African 
writer summed up the African philosophy of existence as: "I am because we are, and 
because we are therefore I am." Some Africans have argued that they have a complex 
structure of communal entitlements and obligations grouped around what one might call 
four "r's": not "rights," but respect, restraint, responsibility, and reciprocity. They argue 
that in most African societies group rights have always taken precedence over individual 
rights, and political decisions have been made through group consensus, not through 
individual assertions of rights150 
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Thus, the preamble to the African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples Rights states: 
 
“Taking into consideration the virtues of their historical tradition and the values of 
African civilization which should inspire and characterize their reflection on the concept 
of human and peoples’ rights” and considering that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms 
also implies the performance of duties on the part of everyone”151  
 
Finally, the same arguments, that is, of economics and cultural values, is made by Middle-
Eastern theorists in general, and those influenced by the Islamic tradition in particular. This study 
provides a more in-depth analysis of the issue of ‘Islam and human rights’ in the following 
chapters. For the moment, it suffices to point out that many Middle-Eastern societies in the past 
were based on Islamic principles that were derived from the Quran and generally developed by 
Muslim scholars (ulama).152 Nasr, writing in light of Islamic Traditionalism, states: 
 
In today’s world everyone speaks of human rights and the sacred character of human life, 
and many secularists even claim that they are the true champions of human rights…But 
strangely enough, often those same champions of humanity believe that human beings are 
nothing more than evolved apes…If the human being is nothing but the result of ‘blind 
forces’…then is not the very statement of the sacredness of human life intellectually 
meaningless and nothing but a hollow sentiment of expression?153  
 
Thus, the preamble to the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights states:  
                                               
151 See Appendix E: The African Charter, preamble.  
152 It is true that the Quran was interpreted differently across and within different spacio-temporal boundaries. 
However, according to Islamic traditionalism, different interpretations emphasize different aspects of the Divine 
revelation and are integrated into an underlying unity within the ‘heart of Islam’. Thus, these interpretations are 
valid as different expressions of the Islamic tradition as a whole. 
153 Nasr. S.H. The Heart of Islam. P. 275. 
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“Whereas Allah (God) has given mankind through His revelation in the Holy Quran and 
the Sunnah of His blessed Prophet Muhammad an abiding legal and moral framework 
within which to establish and regulate human relationships” and “Whereas by virtue of 
their divine source and sanction these rights can neither be curtailed, abrogated or 
disregarded by authorities, assemblies or other institutions, nor can they be surrendered or 
alienated.”154 
 
To reiterate, according to Sinha, all three of these traditions have a worldview with at least three 
things in common. First, they agree that the fundamental unit of society is the family and not the 
individual. Second, they believe that the primary basis for securing human existence is through 
duties and not rights. And finally, they maintain that the primary method of securing rights is 
through reconciliation, repentance or education, and not procedural legalism.155 These claims, 
and their argument that the Universal Declaration is Eurocentric, are furthered by the fact that 
the aforementioned cultural traditions have produced their own human rights treatises: Asian-
Pacific regions drafted and adopted The Bangkok Declaration in 1993; The Organization of 
African Unity (now the African Union) drafted and adopted The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights in 1981; and The Islamic Council drafted The Universal Islamic Declaration of 
Human Rights in 1981. Added to this, is the InterAction Council, which, in response to The 
Universal Declaration’s emphasis on rights, drafted The Universal Declaration of Human 
Responsibilities in 1997.156 As such, it is clear that human rights, in their current formulation, are 
far from being universal. However, this study’s working assumption is that this fact does not 
negate the concept of universality altogether. Many of these traditions point to the uniqueness of 
                                               
154 See Appendix C: The Universal Islamic Declaration, preamble. 
155 Sinha, Prakash. “Human Rights: A Non-Western Viewpoint”. P. 77. 
156 See Appendices.  
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their own cultures but in doing so, they also mention points of convergence. For example, in 
addressing the contemporary African approach to human rights, Bonny Ibhawoh writes, 
 
The Africanist approach to the discourse on the cultural relativism of human rights can 
therefore be broadly dived into two schools. The first of these is the less radical 
approach…Proponents of this school, while arguing the validity of a uniquely African 
concept of human rights, also recognize the universality of a basic core of human rights. 
Kofi Quashigah (1991) for instance, concludes that human rights concepts, which are 
rooted in certain social facts that are peculiar to particular societies, cannot be expected to 
be universal. At the same time, he acknowledges that certain basic needs are indisputably 
ascribable to persons of every…background.157 
 
As mentioned, this work belongs to ‘Pluralist-Universal’ School of human rights and 
attempts to negotiate a ‘middle position’ between Modernism’s universalism and 
Postmodernism’s relativism. Modernism refers to the ideology that grew out of the Renaissance 
and Reformation movements in the West; it is generally characterized by a belief in progress, 
science, and reason. Moreover, Modernism focuses on individual autonomy, and believes in the 
possibility of universal ethics and a unified global society. Therefore, most advocates of 
universal human rights belong to the Modern tradition.158 On the other end of the spectrum is 
Postmodernism, which is largely a reaction to and dissection of Modernism. It is largely 
characterized by its emphasis on relativism and its stance against ‘meta-narratives’, that is, 
theories that claim to give comprehensive accounts based on universal truths. Postmodernism’s 
                                               
157 Ibhawoh, Bonny. “Restraining Universalism: Africanist perspectives on Cultural Relativism in the Human Rights 
Discourse.” In Exploring International Human Rights. P.133-134; also see: An-Na‘im, Abdullahi., ed. Human 
Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1992. 
158 Habermas is arguably the most influential theorist’s belonging to the modern tradition today. For an introduction 
to his work, see: Finlayson, James G. Habermas: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.  
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deconstruction of ‘absolute truths’ is in line with one of its central aims, that is, the 
‘deconstruction’ of power structures that allow for the marginalization of minorities and 
colonization of peoples.159 This, in turn, is also closely related to ‘Saidian Orientalism’ – a post-
colonial philosophy that generally rejects Modernism’s approach to and depiction of the ‘Other’. 
Its criticism is mainly aimed at the ‘West’, and latter’s tendency to essentialize other cultures as 
static, underdeveloped and primitive. For post-colonial theorists, this false construct is 
problematic because it implicitly or explicitly argues for the superiority of ‘Western’ cultures and 
thereby justifies the colonization of other peoples. In Edward Said’s “Islam through Western 
Eyes”, he writes: 
  
How fundamentally narrow and constricted is the semantic field of Islam was brought 
home to me after my book Orientalism appeared last year. Even though I took great pains 
in the book to show that current discussions of the Orient or of the Arabs and Islam are 
fundamentally premised upon a fiction, my book was often interpreted as a defense of the 
“real” Islam. Whereas what I was trying to show was that any talk about Islam was 
radically flawed, not only because an unwarranted assumption was being made that a 
large ideologically freighted generalization could cover all the rich and diverse 
particularity of Islamic life (a very different thing) but also because it would simply be 
repeating the errors of Orientalism to claim that the correct view of Islam was X or Y or 
Z.160  
 
Thus, advocates of culturally relative rights generally belong to the Postmodern and Post-
colonial traditions. This study’s ‘middle position’ challenges both the relativity and universality 
of human rights. Therefore, it adopts the Rawlsian notion of a ‘minimal overlapping 
                                               
159 For example, see: Foucault, Michael. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. 2nd ed. Trans. Sheriden. 
New York: Vintage Books, 1995. 
160 Said, Edward W. “Islam Through Western Eyes” (1980). thenation.com. The Nation. 12 Oct. 2017.   
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consensus’.161 For example, “Rawls…held that only Articles 3-18 represent genuine human rights 
because the other rights are either liberal, and therefore not universizable, or presuppose 
particular institutions.”162 Therefore, as Grace Kao points out, “Rawls’ toleration of a type of 
non-liberal society that he calls ‘decent’ leads him to reject an articulation of human rights that 
would be ‘peculiarly liberal or special to the Western Tradition’.’’163 However, it is important to 
reiterate that any overlapping consensus between cultural traditions should be accidental and not 
essential in nature. This would ensure that rights are not forced onto a particular culture and its 
fundamental worldview. At the same time, any ‘overlapping rights’ would become ‘essential’ in 
the sense that their general acceptance would make up the core of what could rightly be called 
‘universal’ human rights.  
 In concluding, the first part of this work argues that international human rights are not 
actually universal – they are underpinned by the secular-liberal principles of universalism, 
autonomy, secularism and the like. This argument is based on a critical exploration of popular 
human rights histories; contemporary ethical theories; and human rights’ views from other 
traditions, namely, those from Africa, Asia and the Islamic Middle East. This general argument is 
made more specific in the following chapters, which consider the possibility of grounding human 
rights within a religious framework. Thus, this work breaks off from its current discussion and 
moves on to critically explore the relationship between human rights and religion in general, and 
the issue of human rights and Islam in particular.
                                               
161 This study argues that a ‘minimal overlapping consensus’ is both possible and desirable. However, it does not 
agree with Rawls’ assumption that all peoples behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ would choose the same (liberal) 
principles. 
162 Freeman, Michael. Human Rights. P. 75.  
163 Grace, Kao Y. Grounding Human Rights. P. 58. 
 
 
 66 
CHAPTER THREE 
Religion, Islam and Human Rights  
 
 
Introduction 
 
 What is the relationship between religion and human rights? This question generally has 
three answers.164 The first of these is arguably the most common one and it comes from those 
theorists that argue human rights and religion are diametrically opposed to one another.165 This 
view runs parallel to the popular histories describing the rise of international rights: religious 
societies – particularly before the 15th century – were duty-based, hierarchical, and 
undemocratic; they maintained a worldview and subsequent social order that was generally elitist 
and oppressive towards the general public. This is then juxtaposed with modern human rights 
societies.166 These societies, despite their admitted shortcomings, are described as humane, 
progressive, and liberal. Thus, they see the narrative of human rights as “one of traditional 
religious authority opposed to the secular Enlightenment ideal of ration, autonomous individuals 
as bearers of universal rights.”167 Proponents of this view justify their position by pointing to a 
number of ‘progressive modern developments’ such as those in the fields of health science, 
technology and economics. Mostly, however, they point to the rise of the concept of human 
                                               
164 Of course, these ‘answers’ tend to overlap, and therefore, this distinction and categorization is a matter of 
emphasis.  
165 This position is promulgated by figures such as Jack Donnelly, Louis Jenkins and Jacob Burckhardt. On this 
‘dominant narrative’, see: Banchoff, Thomas, and Robert Wuthnow. “Introduction” Religion and the Global 
Politics. Pp. 2-4.  
166 Thus, for example, Paul Lauren’s “History of Human Rights” states: “…The overwhelming majority of all 
human beings who ever lived…did so under some form of…human rights violations… Human bondage was 
common…Prejudice and discrimination prevailed.” P. 2. 
167 Banchoff, Thomas, and Robert Wuthnow. “Introduction” Religion and the Global Politics. P. 4. 
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rights itself; the increasingly fashionable idea that all human beings are inherently equal and 
thereby entitled to the same subjective rights. Donnelley, for example, argues that liberal 
societies and their concomitant human rights norms have superseded religion as the favored 
structure of society and theory of justice respectively. According to him, there are three stages 
that a society goes through before becoming a human rights societies proper. They are (1) 
liberalization: a decrease in human right violations and an inclusion of more minority groups; (2) 
democratization: the process of establishing electoral democracy; and (3) a Rights-Protective 
Regime: making the protection of internationally recognized human rights a central concern of 
that society.168 For Donnelley, this final society is a liberal democracy. In this regard, many 
human rights theorists and activists adopt the Frazarian view of ‘progress’ and maintain that 
religions acted as a ‘stepping stone’ towards the fulfilment of a new international human rights 
regime; a secular regime based on reason and not a religious regime based on revelation. It is 
important to note that Donnelly in particular does not trace back human ‘progress’ to religion; 
rather, he traces it back to the construction of liberal democracies and the Universal Declaration. 
In any case, on this view, the right to ‘freedom of religion’ is reduced to exclude religious actors 
and forces as a source of public policy. Freedom is only applied to private and non-intrusive, 
individual faith. If a particular faith does invoke revelation, they are forced to rationalize their 
invocation and thereby reduce the latter to the rational faculty. In other words, this assumes an 
epistemological model wherein rationality sits at the apex, and revelation falls somewhere below 
it. This political setup follows in the footsteps of Rawls who argued that, in liberal democracies, 
                                               
168 Donnelly, Jack. “The Relative Universality of Human Rights.” Human Rights Quarterly. 29:2 (2007) Pp. 281-
306.  
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‘reasonable people’ would allow everyone to follow their faith, but would rely only on what was 
‘reasonable’ in the public sphere.169,170    
 The second answer about human rights and religion also argues that the two ideologies 
are opposed to one another. However, this answer comes from those theorists who oppose human 
rights as a product of the Western Renaissance and Enlightenment, periods of history when 
organized religion was largely rejected and replaced. For example, Harry Oldmeadow writes:  
 
The Renaissance, the Scientific Revolution, and the Enlightenment were all incubators of 
ideas and values which first decimated Christendom and then spread throughout the 
world… Behind the proliferating ideologies of the last few centuries we can discern an 
ignorance of ultimate realities and an indifference, if not always an overt hostility, to the 
eternal verities conveyed by Tradition.171 
 
It is important to note that these theorists maintain that many of the secular-liberal ideologies 
underpinning the Universal Declaration are anti-religious.172 This includes, for example, 
‘secular-humanism’ and its replacement of faith in God with the autonomous-rational human 
being. Therefore, these theorists do not reject human rights per se or altogether. Rather, they 
argue that human rights based on religious principles would be dramatically different than those 
assumed to be ‘international’ today. This is why proponents of this outlook maintain that human 
rights, even in its ‘minimalist’ form, trespasses on religion’s territory and the latter’s prerogative 
                                               
169 Kao, Grace Y. Grounding Human Rights. Pp. 57-76. 
170 Here, I am referring to Rawls’ ideal public sphere which is characterized by three principal features: liberalism, 
secularism and rationalism. 
171 Oldmeadow, Harry. Frithjof Schuon and the Perennial Philosophy. Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2010. P. 215. 
172 Here I am referring to advocates of the Traditional School that reject the ‘modern mentality’ and its various 
underlying ideologies. Along with Oldmeadow, this includes figures such as James Cutsinger, William Stoddart, 
James Upton and Lord Northbourne.     
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to provide guidance on how to live a moral life and establish a just society.173 Thus, the answer 
that human rights and religion are incompatible can be found on both sides of the divide. 
Henkins, in agreeing with this division, summarizes the differences by categorizing them into 
four sections. He writes that the two ideologies differ when it comes to ‘their sources, basis of 
authority, forms of expression, and substantive norms’. For example, when it comes to their 
foundations and sources of authority, Henkin writes:    
 
Religion and religions…see their moral code as part of a total cosmic order and as 
emanating from a Supreme Legislator. The Supreme Legislator, directly or through 
authorized representatives, has prescribed a moral code of human behaviour in an 
authoritative text…By contrast, in its contemporary articulation, the human rights 
ideology, aiming at universality (and developed during years when half the political 
world was committed to atheism), has eschewed invoking any theistic authority… It has 
avoided rooting itself in any story of human origins, or even in "natural" law or "natural" 
rights. The human rights ideology does not see human rights as integral to a cosmic order. 
It does not derive from any sacred text. Its sources are human, deriving from 
contemporary human life in human society.174 
   
The two aforementioned points of view portray religion and human rights as fixed 
ideologies and ignore their significant overlap in theory and practice. In part, this is because they 
assume that religion cannot add anything to forward the cause of human rights or vice versa. The 
last answer argues that both ideologies are dynamic with boundaries that are constantly being 
negotiated both across and within traditions. In the same light, this study argues for a ‘middle 
                                               
173 This study agrees that there is a significant divide between traditional religious understandings of justice and 
contemporary understandings of human rights. Nevertheless, it argues that this divide can be bridged on the 
condition that international human rights are decentralized and inclusive of alternative models.    
174 Henkin, Louis. “Religion, Religions and Human Rights” The Journal of Religious Ethics 26:02 (1998) Pp. 229-
239. 
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ground’ and insists that the two ideologies can find spaces of convergence on the condition that 
they are willing to engage with one another. A dialogical approach is important because, as Irene 
Oh states, “it aids with understanding persons from different traditions and cultures than one’s 
own because it recognizes those persons as agents” and that “…To understand others as agents 
requires that we view them as possessing self-understanding rather than unilaterally categorize 
them as mere objects of study”175  
Some human rights theorists, such as Ignatieff, argue that any kind of dialogue and 
compromise is unnecessary because the Universal Declaration sufficiently represents the world’s 
religions and cultural traditions. This is because the commission’s primary goal was to create a 
declaration that was global and inclusive in scope. Moreover, the drafters were chosen with this 
goal in mind and they clearly believed they succeeded. The declaration reads: 
  
Now therefore, the GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims this UNIVERSAL 
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all 
peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, 
keeping this declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to 
promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, nation and 
international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both 
among the peoples of the Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories 
under their jurisdiction.  
 
However, this ‘representation’ was highly suspect, and traditional voices were, and also continue 
to be, conspicuously absent. For example, Charles Malik – the Christian-Lebanese representative 
– received his education from a number of Western Universities. He was a philosopher and 
                                               
175 Oh, Irene. The Rights of God. P.2. 
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diplomat that served as the Lebanese minister of Education and Fine Arts and the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. Similarly, Peng-Chun Chan – the Chinese-Confucian representative – graduated 
from Columbia University and taught at the University of Chicago. He was a playwright, 
philosopher and diplomat. This type of background applies to many of the drafters, who 
represented a liberal minority within their respective traditions.176 Of course, the issue does not 
concern the specific education and/or vocation of the drafters. Rather, as Abdulaziz Sachedina 
points out,  
 
It is quite revealing that Muslim participation was minimalist in the sense that there was 
no real effort to expound comprehensive Islamic doctrines to get the sense of the 
tradition’s stance on different articles. Further, as the profile of the different 
representatives from participating Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Syria 
reveals, the representative from Muslim countries were peculiarly educated individuals, 
who had little or no human rights training in the foundational sources of Islamic 
tradition…177 
 
In addition to this, Ignatieff and Morsink, who are both proponents of the Universal 
Declaration’s universality, are forced to admit that its creation was, at least to some extent, a 
one-sided affair. For example, Morsink writes that “this process [of drafting the declaration] 
was dominated by nations from around the North Atlantic…and from Latin America, and that 
large regions of our world, such as Asia and Africa, were grossly underrepresented at the 
drafting table.”178 Ignatieff also admits that the process was directed by Western thinkers and 
norms; however, he argues that this didn’t lead to any form of moral imperialism because 
                                               
176 For a background of the drafters, see: Morsink, Johannes. The Universal Declaration. Pp. 1-28. 
177 Sachedina, Abdulaziz. Islam and the Challenge. Pp. 10-11. (Emphasis added.) 
178 Morsink, Johannes. The Universal Declaration. P. 36. 
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their attitude was “anything but triumphant”179 in light of the World War. Finally, it is also 
important to remember that the drafters did not agree on many foundational issues and thus, 
their ‘consensus’ was strictly limited to the practical plane.  
In any case, the view that religion and human rights are completely at odds is losing its 
dominance. On both sides, there are people attempting to reinterpret and expand their 
respective ideologies in search for a synthesis of sorts. This movement’s importance cannot 
be brushed aside. As Irene Oh writes in the case of Islam:    
 
Although the foundations of human rights may be debated, human rights scholars cannot 
easily dismiss the potential that foundational beliefs, including Islam, hold in advancing 
human rights agendas. After all, approximately one billion inhabitants of this earth 
identify themselves as Muslim. To ignore the values of Islam would be to deny the voices 
of one-fifth of the world’s population in determining what should be “universal” human 
rights.180 
 
This work agrees with the third group of theorists – that is, those that believe to the two camps 
overlap both in history and practice. It further argues that International human rights cannot 
afford to ignore religion for two reasons. The first is that, for religious people, the foundational 
belief in the Absolute is the only thing that can ground and validate human rights. The second 
reason is the so called ‘religious resurgence’ and its testimony that a large part of the world’s 
population still wants to live according to their sacred texts and traditional norms.181 This means 
that international human rights need to be more flexible and inclusive of different human rights 
visions. It also means that religious socities should be free to develop their own models that 
                                               
179 Ignatieff, Michael. “The Attack on Human Rights.”   
180 Oh, Irene. The Rights of God. P. 1. 
181 See: Sinha, Prakash. “Human Rights: A Non-Western Viewpoint.” 
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share the goal of curbing excess of power and entitling citizens to pursue their particular 
conception of ‘the good’. In this regard, this study agrees with the Asean charter, to the extent 
that it stresses the 
  
urgent need to democratize the United Nations system, eliminate selectivity and improve 
procedures and mechanisms in order to strengthen international cooperation, based on 
principles of equality and mutual respect, and ensure a positive, balanced and non-
confrontational approach in addressing and realizing all aspects of human rights182 
 
To this end, my work is specifically concerned with Islamic intellectual tradition and its 
fundamental worldview as expressed within the framework the Traditional School of thought. It 
begins by looking at ‘Islam and the challenge of human rights’ and by critically exploring some 
contemporary Muslim responses to the issues at hand. It then goes on to develop a theory of 
virtue ethics that has the potential to ‘ground’ an ‘Islamic’ model of human rights.   
 
 
Islam and the Challenge of Human Rights  
 
The 18th Century witnessed the beginnings of the end of the Islamic Empire. The Muslim 
world was colonized and their systems of government were replaced by secular institutions 
modeled after the West.183 These models, which remained in place after the ‘independence’ of 
                                               
182 See Appendix D: The Asean Declaration. P. 226. 
183 Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey, never were, strictly speaking, colonized. Nevertheless, they are not isolated from 
the phenomenon of globalization and therefore, they currently face many of the same problems as other Muslim-
majority nation-states. 
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Muslim lands, failed to bring the economic prosperity and social stability they promised.184 This 
was due to internal corruption and hypocritical foreign policy and it resulted in a growing 
resentment of the ‘West’ as well as the search for new answers. One of these answers was the 
return to an Islamic society that was legitimized by the implementation of the shariah. Shariah 
literally means ‘path to water’ and is commonly translated as Islamic law. However, the shariah 
doesn’t exclusively deal with the law; it is much broader and provides guidance and governance 
for every part of a Muslim’s life.185 In this way, for many Muslims, it transforms the mundane 
into the sacred and serves as a reminder of God’s near and everlasting presence.186 Noah Feldman 
aptly explains the phenomenon of ‘Islamism’ by writing: 
 
In essence, then, the call for an Islamic state is the call for the establishment of Islamic 
law. Once we take this demand seriously, we can begin to understand why so many 
people in the Muslim world find themselves attracted to Islamic politics. Looking at their 
own states, they see that power, not law, is structuring political, economic and social 
relations. Law sounds as though it might be the solution. What is more, law seems to hold 
particularly great promise because, in the collective memory of the Muslim world, it is 
still dimly remembered that the classical state was a state that was governed by law and 
that governed through law.187  
  
Here, a brief summary of the development of Islamic law is necessary in order to provide 
the context for the following section on ‘contemporary Islamic thought’ in general and the 
Progressive School’s approach to Islamic law and human rights in particular. 
                                               
184 In general, see: Loomba, Ania. Colonialism/Postcolonialism.   
185 For a general overview see: Stewart, Devin J. “Shari’a” The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political 
Thought. Gerhard Bowering, ed. et al. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013. Pp. 497-505.  
186 Nasr, S.H. Ideals and Realities. Pp. 85-113. 
187 Feldman, Noah. The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008. P. 21. 
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During the lifetime of the Prophet, the Islamic community did not need to develop a legal 
science; the Prophet’s authority as the ‘Messenger of God’ extended over all areas. He was 
considered, the religious political, and moral authority. In this regard, the Qur’an reads:  
 
Those are limits set by Allah: those who obey Allah and His Messenger will be admitted 
to Gardens with rivers flowing beneath, to abide therein (forever) and that will be the supreme 
achievement.  (4:13) 
 
The answer of the Believers, when summoned to Allah and His Messenger, in order that He may 
judge between them, is no other than this: they say, "We hear and we obey": it is such as these 
that will attain felicity. (24:51) 
 
All who obey Allah and the messenger are in the company of those on whom is the Grace of 
Allah,- of the prophets (who teach), the sincere (lovers of Truth), the witnesses (who testify), and 
the Righteous (who do good): Ah! what a beautiful fellowship! (4:69) 
 
Thus, the newly emerging Islamic community generally referred to the Prophet when any issues 
– religious or otherwise – arose. However, the death of the Prophet and the subsequent spread of 
the Islamic empire necessitated the development of an Islamic legal system – the Muslim 
community was looking for answers to questions that were not directly addressed by the Quran 
or the Prophet.188 Initially, there was much debate concerning usul al-fiqh, that is, the principles 
                                               
188 This study’s overview of the development of Islamic law has largely relied on: Hallaq, Wael. The Origins and 
Evolution of Islamic Law. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005; and, Kamali, Mohammad H. Shari’ah 
Law: An Introduction. Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2008.  
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and the sources of law as well as the latter’s relationship to one another. For example, the 
concept of Sunna originally extended beyond the Prophet’s words and actions as recorded in the 
hadith literature. It included the personal opinions (ra’y) and customs (adat) of the Caliphs, and 
the Prophet’s companions on the basis that the latter two had intimate knowledge of the Prophet 
and therefore, could rightly ascertain what he would have done in any given situation.189 Some 
legal scholars extended the same idea to the city of Medina; they believed that the city’s way of 
life was modeled after the Prophet and therefore, it could act as general guide and source of law 
for correct action.190 Eventually, by the 9th and 10th Centuries, Islamic law developed into a 
distinct field; the jurists, for the most part, agreed on the sources of law and consolidated them 
into a working system. Imam Muhammad al-Shafi (d.820) is normally mentioned as one of the 
most significant figures in this movement. He argued that the primary sources of law were the 
Quran and Prophetic Sunna contained within the hadith literature.191 He distinguished and 
elevated the latter’s status by highlighting passages of the Qur’an that placed the Prophet above 
other people as a source of guidance. For example:  
 
Whatever the Messenger gives you, take it and whatever he forbids, abstain from it. (59:07) 
 
Ye have indeed in the Messenger of Allah a beautiful pattern (of conduct) for any one whose 
hope is in Allah and the Final Day, and who engages much in the Praise of Allah. (33:21) 
 
                                               
189 Hallaq, Wael. The Origins and Evolution. Pp. 54-56. 
190 Hallaq, Wael. The Origins and Evolution. Pp. 45-46 
191 Hallaq, Wael. The Origins and Evolution. Pp. 117-119 
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O ye who believe! obey Allah, and obey the Messenger, and those charged with authority among 
you. If ye differ in anything among yourselves, refer it to Allah and His Messenger, if ye do 
believe in Allah and the Last Day: That is best, and most suitable for final determination. (04:59) 
 
Al-Shafi’s main legal concern was centralizing Prophetic hadith as the main source of Sunna, 
and thereby, limiting, as much as possible, human intervention in mediating Divine injunctions. 
If the primary sources did not provide an answer then one could turn to the secondary sources. 
The first of these was the ‘consensus of the scholars’ (ijma) and the second and final source of 
law was analogical reasoning (qiyas) based on the Quran and the hadith. In regard to the 
typology of sources, Wael Hallaq writes: 
 
…There was no question in the legal theory that emerged during the fourth/tenth century 
as to the correct hierarchy of legal sources. The Qur’an came first, at least formally and 
in terms of prestige and sanctity. The Sunna, wholly represented by hadith, formed the 
second material source of the law, followed, in order of importance, by consensus and 
qiyas. The first two may be described as material sources, while the latter two (especially 
qiyas) are procedural, drawing from the former.192  
 
Thus, by the 10th Century, four schools of law (madhabs) crystallized in the Sunni world. Their 
eponyms were the Imams Abu Hanifa (d.767), Malik b. Anas (d.796), Muhammad al-Shafi 
(d.820) and Ahmad b. Hanbal (d.855). In addition to this, there was the codification of the Shia 
or Jaffari school of law that was largely based on the teachings of their sixth Imam, Jaffer as-
Sadiq (d.765).193 The five schools did not place similar emphasis on the legal sources. For 
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example, the Hanbali school was more conservative and generally stayed away from independent 
and analogical reasoning. In any case, the fuqaha, that is, the legal scholars, played an extremely 
significant role in Muslim societies. They provided legitimacy to the ruling power of their time 
and also functioned as a check and balance to that same power. In this sense, they worked as a 
living constitution of sorts. Feldman’s The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State probes into the 
nature of this development. He asks, 
  
How did this arrangement come about? How did the scholars, men with little direct 
political power, no armies, and often no government posts, become the sole keepers of 
the shari’a, and hence the only meaningful check on the power of the ruler? The answer 
goes back to the way Islamic law itself developed alongside the Islamic state.194   
 
Feldman goes on to rightly explain that the Prophet had religious and political power over the 
community and when he died that power was assumed by the Caliphs. Eventually however, the 
Caliphs were unable to provide the religious guidance that the community needed.195 This, in 
turn, opened the door for the religious scholars - men who were well trained in the study of 
hadith, and could tell the people what the Prophet would have done or ordered in similar 
circumstances.196  This system, with its self-balancing structures of power, successfully kept the 
Islamic world functioning for centuries. It is not a surprise then, that today’s Muslims should 
look to it when facing the crisis within their own Muslim-majority nation-states.197 However, 
                                               
194 Feldman, Noah. The Fall and Rise. P. 22. 
195 This generally refers to the Caliphs of the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties and not to the first four Caliphs that 
ruled the Muslim community after the death of the Prophet. 
196 Feldman, Noah. The Fall and Rise. P. 23. 
197 According to Majid Khadduri, the system was a Divine Nomocracy. He writes, “It is therefore the Law, 
embodying the principles of Divine Authority, which indeed rules and therefore the state becomes not, strictly 
speaking, a theocracy, but a form of nomocracy. The Islamic State, whose constitution and source of authority is 
Divine Law, might be called a Divine nomocracy.” Khadduri, Majid. The Islamic Conception of Justice. P. 4.   
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many people, particularly those from within the secular-liberal tradition, remain suspicious of a 
legal system based on religion and its socio-legal norms. Echoing popular sentiments, Elizabeth 
Ann Mayer clearly outlines her assumptions and states: 
  
I believe in the normative character of the human rights principles set forth in 
international law and their universality… This inclines me to be critical of any actual or 
proposed governmental rights policies that violate international human rights law, 
regardless of whether they employ secular rationales or Islamic doctrines as 
justifications… as a supporter of international human law and an advocate for respect for 
human rights, I readily concede that I regard liberal reformist trends in Islamic thought as 
positive developments.198  
 
More specifically, there are at least three areas within the field of traditional Islamic 
jurisprudence that are considered to be antithetical to the concept of contemporary human rights. 
These are its stance on gender, non-Muslims and its penal code. Before proceeding however, it is 
important to note that this work is not a study in traditional Islamic law in all of its nuance and 
complexity.199 It is primarily concerned with comparative ethics in light of Islamic Traditionalism 
and the latter’s concept of virtue. Therefore, this section’s objective is to simply ‘points towards’ 
the general areas of friction between traditional Islamic law and contemporary human rights.   
In the case of gender, the main issue concerns the relationship between men and women, 
and their differential treatment before the law. According to Islamic Traditionalism, men and 
women have different natures and therefore, different God-given roles and duties. On this view, 
justice necessitates understanding these natural differences and then deriving and applying laws 
                                               
198 Mayer, Ann E. Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics. 3rd ed. Colorado: Westview Press.1999. P.xvi. 
199 For a comparative study on Islamic law and Human rights law, see: Mayer’s Islam and Human Rights.  
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accordingly. This traditional Islamic understanding is based on the Quran, hadith and Islamic 
intellectual tradition.200 For example, the Quran reads:  
 
Divorced women shall wait concerning themselves for three monthly periods. Nor is it lawful for 
them to hide what Allah Hath created in their wombs, if they have faith in Allah and the Last 
Day. And their husbands have the better right to take them back in that period, if they wish for 
reconciliation. And women shall have rights similar to the rights against them, according to what 
is equitable; but men have a degree over them. And Allah is Exalted in Power, Wise. (2:228) 
 
Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because Allah has given the one more than 
the other, and because they support them from their means. Therefore, the righteous women are 
devoutly obedient, and guard in (the husband's) absence what Allah would have them guard. As 
to those women on whose part ye fear disloyalty and ill-conduct, admonish them (first), (Next), 
refuse to share their beds, (And last) beat them (lightly); but if they return to obedience, seek not 
against them Means (of annoyance): For Allah is Most High, great (above you all). (04:34) 
 
Many traditional commentaries maintain that these types of verses point to contextual and 
ontological differences between genders. For example, in relation to verse 4:34, The Study Quran 
refers to the commentaries of ibn Kathir, Husayn Tabataba’i and al-Qurtubi and in doing so, 
states: 
 
                                               
200 In terms of Islamic Traditionalism, see chapter five, “The Divine Feminine” in: Laude, Patrick: Pathways to an 
Inner Islam: Massignon, Corbin, Guenon and Schuon. Albany: State University of New York Press. 2010.  
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Many commentaries also claimed…that the [“more”] that God has given to men includes 
spiritual and worldly distinctions not necessarily related to financial matters. Among the 
distinctions they consider to have been given, if not exclusively, at least in many cases in 
greater measure to men are…authority, strength and the responsibility of jihad; some also 
assert that all prophets and most scholars…were men.201 
 
Of course, as the following section on ‘contemporary Islamic Thought’ demonstrates that it can 
and has been argued that these verses are conditional and no longer apply today. However, to 
reiterate, this section is strictly concerned with drawing out the general friction between human 
rights and the traditional Islamic law’s approach to gender, as well as religious minorities, and 
the penal law. Hence, the point remains: Islamic law reflects Islamic traditionalism’s 
understanding of gender difference and this law is in friction with current international human 
rights norms.202  
The second space of friction between human rights and Islamic law concern’s the latter’s 
marginalization and oppression of non-Muslims and religious minorities. Islamic history is full 
of instances where Muslims peacefully coexisted with people of other faiths, and conversely, it is 
also full of instances where Muslims oppressed and subjugated people of other faiths. The 
Quran, due to the fact that it was revealed in different contexts, can be used to justify both 
positions. In terms of differential treatment, for example, verse 9:29 reads: 
 
Fight those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been 
forbidden by Allah and His Messenger, nor acknowledge the religion of Truth, (even if they are) 
                                               
201 Nasr, S.H., ed. et al. The Study Quran. Pp. 206-207.  
202 For an example of this friction, see: Appendix A, articles 2 and 8. 
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of the People of the Book, until they pay the jizya with willing submission, and feel themselves 
subdued. (9:29) 
 
Jizyah was an indemnity or financial tribute that non-Muslims paid to the Islamic state based on 
a mutual contract. Thus, the religious groups that paid the jizyah were also referred to as the 
‘people of the contract’ (ahl al-Dhimmi).203 These groups, which included the Christians and 
Jews, were, in many cases, treated as second-class members of the state. According to Caner 
Dagali’s commentary of 9:29,  
 
the phrase [“feel themselves subdued”] …has been interpreted and applied in more than 
one way... most jurists have interpreted it to apply to the People of the Book generally, 
when they enter into a treaty relationship with a Muslim state. In Islamic history, some 
rulers have enforced a kind of humiliation to accompany the paying of the jizyah by the 
dhimmi communities…204,205  
 
Mayer makes three points about the status of dhimmis in the Islamic state. First, that they were 
tolerated as long as they submitted to Muslim rule and accepted a number of conditions 
concerning their conduct. Second, although dhimmis were generally allowed to follow their own 
religious law, discriminatory practices existed in cases involving interactions between Muslims 
and dhimmis. Finally, Mayer notes that Muslims could not enter into treaties with polytheists and 
idolaters. This is because the latter two groups, at least in theory, were expected to embrace Islam 
                                               
203 Nasr. S.H., ed. et al. The Study Quran. P. 514. 
204 Dagali, Caner K. “Conquest and Conversion, War and Peace in the Quran”. The Study Quran. Nasr, S.H., ed. et 
al. P. 1811. Emphasis Added.   
205 It is important to note that Dagali goes on to write writes that the payment of jizyah with the additional feeling of 
humiliation “has generally gone against most established Islamic precedent and legal opinion”.    
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or face death.206 Again, verses such as 9:29 and the rulings derived therefrom, can and have been 
interpreted differently. For example, Islamic Traditionalism sees different religious forms as both 
necessary and providential. Therefore, it emphasizes the Quranic principles of pluralism, 
inclusivity and free-will. Nevertheless, the issue of dhimmis in traditional Islamic law is clearly 
in conflict with modern human rights standards that maintain 
 
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no 
distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status 
of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, 
non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.207 
 
Finally, in the case of penal code, the main concern from a human rights perspective is 
Islamic law’s use of physical punishment. For example, Katerina Dalacoura notes that many 
people would argue that the Quran’s authoritative status “implies that, for example, …the 
hadd punishments can never be abandoned thereby creating a serious tension with 
international human rights principles”208 Here, the term ‘hadd’ refers to the concept of ‘hudud 
Allah’, that is, the ‘limits of God’. These limits are referred to throughout the Quran and most 
Muslims generally consider them to be non-negotiable. In terms of physical punishment, six 
crimes fall under the rubric of the ‘limits of God’: theft, highway robbery, fornication, false 
                                               
206 Mayer, Ann E. Islam and Human Rights. P. 135. 
207 Appendix A, article 2. 
208 Dalacoura, Katerina. “Islam and Human Rights” Ed. Smith and Anker. The Essentials of Human Rights. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2005. P.208. Cross Ref.  
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accusations of fornication, intoxication and apostasy.209 The following two verses address the 
crimes of theft and adultery respectively: 
  
As to the thief, Male or female, cut off his or her hands: a punishment by way of example, from 
Allah, for their crime: and Allah is Exalted in power. But if the thief repents after his crime, and 
amends his conduct, Allah turneth to him in forgiveness; for Allah is Oft-forgiving, Most 
Merciful. (5:38-39)  
 
The woman and the man guilty of adultery or fornication,- flog each of them with a hundred 
stripes: Let not compassion move you in their case, in a matter prescribed by Allah, if ye believe 
in Allah and the Last Day: and let a party of the Believers witness their punishment (24:2) 
 
According to An-Naimi, “there is…no Quranic authority for abolishing the hadud in principle. 
What can be done from the Islamic point of view, is to restrict their application in practice”210 
Thus, the Quran’s prescription of physical punishment seems to violate a number of international 
human rights laws. In particular, it seems to violate article five of the Universal Declaration, 
which declares, “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhumane or degrading 
treatment or punishment”211  
                                               
209 Intoxication and apostasy are problematic insofar as the Quran does not provide a specific worldly punishment 
for them. For example, An-Naimi points out that “…The Quran does not prescribe any punishment for apostasy in 
this life. Nevertheless, the majority of Muslim jurists have classified apostasy as a hadd punishment punishable by 
death…” See: An-Na‘im, Abdullahi A. Toward an Islamic Reformation. P.109. Moreover, according to the Islamic 
intellectual tradition, ‘apostasy’ cannot be a crime because free-will and the choice to follow (or not follow) the truth 
is what makes one quintessentially human.    
210 An-Na‘im, Abdullahi A. Towards an Islamic Reformation. P.108. 
211 See Appendix A, article 5.   
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How have Muslims responded to the existing tensions between Islamic law and 
international human rights law? The next section looks at contemporary Islamic thought and 
modern Muslim attempts at scriptural interpretation and legal reform in relation to human rights.  
 
 
Understanding Contemporary Islamic Thought 
 
The Muslim responses to the challenge of modernity and human rights is varied. They 
can be generally categorized into for broad groups: fundamentalist, traditional, progressive, and 
liberal.212 The so-called fundamentalist Muslims lie on one end of the spectrum. Their ideology is 
rooted in Salafism, which is derived from the word salaf, meaning the ‘pious ancestors’. Thus, 
they generally call for a return to an earlier and supposedly pristine form of Islam and reject the 
modern world as anti-religious, immoral and imperialistic.213 Most neo-Salafis do not get 
involved in politics; however, a minority believe in an offensive war against perceived threats to 
Islam.214 The ‘fundamentalist mentality’, that is the basic and shared intellectual orientation of 
Salafis, follows in the footsteps of former modern revivalists such as Abu al-A‘la Mawdudi 
(d.1979), founder of Jamaat e-Islami, and Sayyed Qutb (d.1966), member of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Maududi and Qutb generally believed that Islam was a political force with the 
ability to govern a nation-state through the use of Islamic law or Shariah. They insisted that all 
                                               
212 This section mainly focuses on the ‘Traditional’ and ‘Progressive’ Schools of Thought for several reasons. First, 
an in-depth analysis of all major trends is beyond the scope of this work. Second, the Traditional and Progressive 
Schools are the most nuanced and thorough in their respective approaches. Lastly, they also seem to be the most 
popular ideologies in the ‘Western academic world’ concerning the subject of ‘Islam and Modernity’. 
213 In general, see: Haykel, Bernard. “Salafis”. Princeton Encyclopedia. Bowering ed. et al. Pp. 483-484 
214 Haykel, Bernard. “Salafis” Princeton Encyclopedia. Bowering ed. et al. P. 484.  
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people had to make a fundamental choice between two competing and incompatible ideologies: 
(a revived) Islam and ‘the West’. In this regard, for example, Sayyid Qutb maintained that  
 
…Sovereignty rests with God alone and…He is the Lord and Cherisher of the entire 
universe. This means that religion is an all-embracing and total revolution against the 
sovereignty of man in all its types, shapes, systems and states, and completely revolts 
against every system in which authority may be in the hands of man in any form or in 
other words, where he may have usurped sovereignty under any shape. Any system of 
governance in which the final decision is referred to human beings and they happen to be 
the source of all authority, in fact defies them by designating “others than God,” as lords 
over men.215 
  
 On the other end of the spectrum are the so called liberal Muslims. This work distinguishes 
them from Progressive Muslims in so far as the former believe that Western civilization is always 
developing and Muslims need to ‘catch up’. This group gives little to no significance to their 
traditional heritage and advocates for a wholesale adoption of the modern mentality. Some of its 
members include populist authors such as Ayaan Ali Hirsi and Irshaad Manji, who generally have 
little to no formal education in traditional Islam. Hirsi, in her book, Heretic: Why Islam Needs a 
Reformation Now, makes her stance clear. She writes: 
     
We must acknowledge that they [that is, radical Islamists], are driven by a political 
ideology, an ideology embedded in Islam itself, in the holy book of the Qur’an as well as 
the life and teaching of the Prophet Muhammad contained in the hadith. Let me make my 
point in the simplest of terms: Islam is not a religion of peace.216  
                                               
215 Qutb, Sayyid. “War, Peace and Islamic Jihad” Modernist and Fundamentalist Debates in Islam: A Reader. Ed. 
Moaddel, Mansoor and Kamran Talattof. New York: Palgrave, 2000. P.228.  
216 Hirsi, Ayaan Ali. Heretic: Why Islam Needs a Reformation Now. New York: HarperCollins, 2015. Pp. 2-3. 
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Omid Safi, a self-declared progressive Muslim, separates Liberal and Progressive Muslims by 
writing that, “…In our view, ‘liberal Muslims’ have been too eager to identify themselves 
wholeheartedly with European and American structures of power” … Thus, “they have proven 
unable and unwilling to adopt a critical stance against the injustices of both Muslims societies 
and Western hegemony”.217 Therefore, Progressive Muslims, on the other hand, define 
themselves as those united in the goal of establishing the concept that all human life has the same 
intrinsic worth and challenging oppressive practices in Western and Muslim societies – as well as 
those connected to globalization. In 1998, a number of progressive activists and scholars came 
together and created a declaration called ‘Progressive Islam - A Definition and Declaration’. In 
the declaration, they provided the following definition: 
 
Progressive Islam is that understanding of Islam and its sources which comes from and is 
shaped within a commitment to transform society from an unjust one where people are 
mere objects of exploitation by governments, socio-economic institutions and unequal 
relationships. The new society will be a just one where people are the subjects of history, 
the shapers of their own destiny in the full awareness that all of humankind is in a state of 
returning to God and that the universe was created as a sign of God’s presence.218   
 
Progressive Muslims adopt a number of methodologies in their attempts at reform; however, 
these methodologies are almost always fundamentally based on the twin concepts of 
contextuality and subjectivity. In terms of contextuality, they point out that all developments in 
the Muslim world, including the revelation of the Quran, occurred at a particular time and place; 
                                               
217 Safi, Omid. “Introduction: The Times are A-Changin’ – A Muslim Quest for Justice, Gender Equality and 
Pluralism.” Ed. Safi. Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender and Pluralism. Oxford: Oneworld Pub., 2003. P. 17.  
218 Esack, Farid. “In Search of Progressive Islam Beyond 9/11” Progressive Muslims. Ed. Safi. P. 80. 
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therefore, some of these developments are absolute and universal and others are relative and 
contextual. Thus, Progressive Muslims insist on reforming the Islamic tradition through 
contextual interpretation in line with the spirit of the Qur’an as a whole.219 The crux of the 
problem is deciding the standard by which to separate the absolute from the relative or the spirit 
from the letter.220 For example, Abullahi An-Na‘im, following in the footsteps of his teacher, 
Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, argues that the verses revealed in Medina were specifically intended 
for the Muslims at that time.221 They provided guidance on how to construct a new community 
within the context of 7th Century Arabia. Thus, for An-Na‘im, verses about inheritance, divorce 
and the like are no longer relevant today. It is only the verses in Mecca that are universal and 
therefore, apply to all Muslims regardless of their particular contexts. Thus, An-Na‘im attempts 
to create a new foundation for Islamic law based on the legal concept of naskh, that is, 
abrogation. In this regard, he writes:  
 
The basic premise of Ustadh Mahmoud is that a close examination of the content of the 
Quran and Sunna reveals two levels or stages of the message of Islam, one of the earlier 
Mecca period and the other of the subsequent Medina stage. Furthermore, he maintained 
that the earlier message of Mecca is in fact the eternal and fundamental message of 
Islam… [Therefore, when the Meccan message] was violently and irrationally 
rejected…the more realistic message of the Medina stage was provided… [Hence,] 
aspects of the Mecca message…were postponed for implementation under appropriate 
circumstances in the future.222  
 
                                               
219 In doing so, the Progressive School generally argues in favor of constitutional democracy and contemporary 
human rights and argues against hierarchical structures and hegemonic interpretations of Islam. 
220 This is where the Progressive and Traditional Schools differ. The latter, as this study goes on to argue, does not 
emphasize the socio-historical approach and does not base its interpretations on any assumption of ‘human 
progress’.   
221 In general, See: An-Na’im, Abdullahi A. Toward an Islamic Reformation. 
222 An-Na’im, Abdullahi A. Toward an Islamic Reformation. Pp. 52-53. 
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Along with context, many progressive Muslims also insist on the concept of subjectivity, that is, 
the idea that all reality is filtered through a knowing subject, and therefore, all ‘understanding’ is 
colored by that subject’s particularities. For example, Abdolkarim Soroush argues that it is an 
epistemological truth that texts cannot stand alone; this is because texts are understood by 
humans and the latter are conditioned by their own personal experiences and societies. Thus, the 
understandings of texts are framed, and to an extent, determined, by human subjectivity. In this 
regard, Soroush writes: 
 
…one can say that the text does not stand alone, it does not carry its own meaning on its 
shoulders, it needs to be situated in a context, it is theory-laden, its interpretation is in 
flux, and presumptions are at work here as elsewhere in the field of understanding. 
Religious texts are no exception. Therefore, their interpretation is subject to expansion 
and contraction according to the assumptions preceding them and/or the questions 
enquiring them.223  
 
For Soroush, this means that religious knowledge is strictly a human science and as such, its 
‘prior text’ should be based on substantiated theories of the present time. According to him, it is 
only when this happens that Muslims can embrace democracy and the plurality of religions.224 
Thus, Soroush’s litmus test for separating the ‘relative from the absolute’ is ‘substantiated (but 
relative) theories of the time’ and An-Nai‘mi’s test is the distinction between Meccan and 
Medinian verses of the Quran. The twin concepts of contextuality and subjectivity are 
highlighted by the progressive Muslim’s emphasis on the importance of separating shariah from 
                                               
223 Soroush, Abdolkarim. “The Evolution and Devolution of Religious Knowledge” Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook. 
Ed. Kruzman. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, P. 245.  
224 See: Soroush, Abdolkarim. “The Evolution and Devolution of Religious Knowledge” Liberal Islam; and, 
Mahmoud and Ahmad Sadri, ed. Reason, Freedom and Democracy in Islam: The Essential Writing of Abdolkarim 
Soroush. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.  
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fiqh, that is, separating Divine law from Islamic jurisprudence respectively. In doing so, they 
emphasize the difference between sacred law revealed by God, and the understanding and 
development of that law constructed by humans. This idea opens the door to new and different 
interpretations and thereby, the possibility of legal reform. The considerations of contextuality 
and subjectivity are not alien to the Islamic intellectual tradition. For example, in terms of 
contextuality, Islamic scholars have written extensively on the subject of asbaab al-nazul, that is, 
the reasons or occasions for any given revelation. However, according to Islamic Traditionalism, 
the context of a verse, however important, can never exhaust its meaning. Moreover, the idea of 
human subjectivity is always balanced by the Islamic concept of transcendence and hence, the 
possibility of human objectivity.225 For example, in terms of objectivity and knowledge, Schuon 
writes that “Man is intelligence, and intelligence is the transcending of forms and the realization 
of the invisible Essence; to say human intelligence is to say absoluteness and transcendence.” 226 
In short, one of the major problems with the Progressive School is its almost exclusive reliance 
on the socio-historical method and its tendency to dismiss or negate what many Muslims 
consider sacred, such as the hadith literature or shariah as a whole. For example, An- Nai‘mi’s 
suggestion of abrogating verses revealed in Medina seems untenable and fantastical since 
Muslims consider the entirety of the Quran as the verbatim speech of God and therefore, divine, 
absolute and inviolable.227  
In any case, the current climate of islamophpobia and globalization seem to be pushing 
Muslims towards the extremes of liberalism or fundamentalism. This is because an aggressive 
                                               
225 For a thorough treatment of Traditionalism’s perspective on transcendence, knowledge and objectivity, see: 
Schuon Frithjof. Logic and Transcendence. 
226 Schuon, Frithjof. The Transfiguration of Man. Bloomington: World Wisdom, 1995. P.24 
227 In other words, Progressive Muslims have a tendency to reduce Islam to an ideology concerned with social 
justice, and in doing so, bypass questions of truth and spirituality 
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attitude towards any single group of people will always force the latter to either ‘give in’ or ‘dig 
in’. Nevertheless, these two groups make up a small minority of the Muslim population. Most 
Muslims place themselves somewhere in-between these two extremes. It seems that the 
progressive approach to Islam is the most popular among Muslim working in Western academic 
institutions.228 Nevertheless, as mentioned, this study’s working assumption is that many 
Muslims continue to understand their religion through traditional forms and therefore, are most 
closely ‘represented’ by Islamic Traditionalism.,229 As mentioned, this is one of the reasons why 
this study uses the Traditional School as its framework for developing a theory of Islamic virtue 
ethics. This is because in doing so, it approaches Muslims as agents that possess self-
understanding and have the right to self-determination. In any case, in order to provide the 
necessary context, the next section situates the Traditional School of thought – both historically 
and thematically – within the larger field of religious studies.   
 
 
Situating the Traditional School of Thought 
 
 By the 20th Century, Western peoples found themselves living in a new world that was 
increasingly based on the ideals of secular-liberalism and functioned within the societal 
institutions of democracy, capitalism, standardized public education and the like.230 A number of 
                                               
228 This includes academics such as, Abdullahi An-Nai’m, Sadiyya Shaikh, Amina Wadud, Abdulaziz Sachedina and 
Khalid Abou El Fadl.  
229 The question of ‘representation’ as problematized by Postmodern and Post-colonial theory is beyond the scope of 
this work. It is important to note however, that Traditionalists generally identify with a single religion and therefore, 
speak as ‘insiders’ from their respective religions.  
230 Huston Smith divides the history of Western peoples into four major periods that are differentiated by their basic 
assumptions and ways of ‘understanding the world’. These are: the Graeco-Roman or Classical age, European 
Christendom, the Scientific or Modern period, and lastly, the Postmodern age. See: Smith, Huston. Beyond the 
Postmodern Mind: The Place of Meaning in a Global Civilization. 3rd ed. Illinois: Quest Books, 2003. Pp. 3-16.    
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changes, beginning with the Renaissance, coalesced to produce this transition. These included 
European Colonialism; the Scientific and Industrial Revolutions; American and French 
Independence; the Age of Enlightenment; and the rise of Protestantism.231 These were 
revolutionary developments that transformed the human being’s understanding of the self and the 
world. For example, the Scientific and Industrial Revolutions were largely responsible for the 
popular belief in human progress independent of revelation and religion. In this regard, Huston 
Smith writes:  
 
…Progress [is] the hope that has powered the modern world… To set that hope in 
perspective we need only go back to Revolution of Rising Expectations that the Scientific 
and Industrial Revolutions gave rise to. Hegel cashed in on the forward-looking stance of 
those revolutions and fashioned from it a worldview. From the seeming fact that things 
were getting better and stood a good chance of continuing to doing so, Hegel extrapolated 
backward to infer that they had always been improving…Support for this heady scenario 
was welcomed from every quarter…232,233 
 
In any case, these changes and their underlying ideologies, caused friction with the existing 
society and a reaction from some of its members. In the 20th Century, a particularly strong 
reaction came from what would become known as the Traditional School of thought. For 
members of this school, the deterioration of older institutions was simply the symptom of a much 
larger problem: the new modern mentality and its virtual dismissal of eternal truths expressed in 
all traditional civilizations. In other words, they argued that the new ways in which we 
                                               
231 More specifically, within these defining periods, we find monumental changes such as the invention of the 
printing press and growth of popular literacy.   
232 Smith, Huston. Why Religion Matters: The Fate of The Human Spirit in an Age of Disbelief. New York: 
HarperOne, 2001. P.150. 
233 It is important to note that Traditionalists object to scientism and not science as such. The former includes the 
belief that science is the best method for obtaining objective truth and also, that science deals with the most 
fundamental things that exist. See Smith, Huston. Why Religion Matters. P.59-60.  
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understood ourselves and the world was fundamentally flawed and opposed the perennial 
wisdom of the ages. For example, its founding figures, such as Rene Guenon, took a stance 
against the new modern mentality and its various manifestations. He wrote:  
 
…We find it impossible to consider political contingencies, even in the widest sense of 
the term, as being more than outward signs of the mentality of a period; but even though 
we regard them in this light, we cannot altogether overlook the manifestations of the 
modern confusion as they affect the social sphere.234   
 
In writing about the social sphere, Guenon continued, 
 
… Under the present state of affairs in the Western world, nobody any longer occupies 
the place that he should normally occupy by virtue of his own nature; this is what is 
meant by saying that castes no longer exist, for caste, in its traditional meaning, is 
nothing other than individual nature, with the whole array of special aptitudes that this 
carries with it and that predisposes each man to the fulfilment of one or another particular 
function…It is the negation of these differences, bringing with it the negation of all social 
hierarchy, that is the cause of the whole disorder235 
 
Thus, Traditionalists today, oppose almost all modern ideologies, including, but not limited to, 
liberalism, individualism, historicism and scientism.236 However, for Traditionalists, the ‘Modern 
age’ is also an inevitable period in world history. This is because modernity is the period that 
every major religion has foreseen and warned against, that is, the ‘latter days’ that precede the 
                                               
234 Guenon, Rene. The Crisis of the Modern World. Trans. Pallis and Nicholson. Bloomington: Sophia Perennis, 
2001. P. 69. 
235 Guenon, Rene. The Crisis. Pp. 69-70. 
236 Smith describes the present condition as a dark tunnel made up of scientism, higher education, the media and the 
law. See: Smith, Huston. Why Religion Matters. 
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‘end of world.’237 In this regard, Martin Lings – another significant member of the Traditionalist 
School – wrote: 
 
…The tradition of the four ages of the cycle of time which the Greeks and Romans 
named the Golden, Silver, Bronze and Iron Ages, is not merely European but is also to be 
found in Asia, among the Hindus, and in America among the Red Indians. According to 
Hinduism, which has the most explicit doctrine on the subject, the Golden Age was by far 
the longest; the ages became increasingly shorter as they were less good, the shortest and 
worst being the dark age, which corresponds to the Iron Age… The same truth, clothed in 
many different imageries, has come down to us out of the prehistoric past in all parts of 
the world. Religions are in fact unanimous in teaching not evolution but devolution.238 
  
Thus, in light of religious eschatological doctrines, Traditionalists do not perceive themselves 
as socio-political reformers.239,240 Rather, they are primarily concerned with metaphysical 
Truth and the way it expresses itself across and within traditional religions. Charles Upton 
uses Guenon’s definition of Tradition and states that the latter is 
  
The transmission of a perennial wisdom, unanimous in essence, from the beginnings of 
the human race to this present moment, a transmission punctuated and channeled by 
                                               
237 In general, see: Upton, Charles. Legends of the End: Prophecies of the End Times, Antichrist, Apocalypse, and 
Messiah from Eight Religious Traditions. New York: Sophia Perennis, 2005.  
238 Lings, Martin. “The Past in the Light of the Present and The Rhythms of Time.” The Underlying Religion. Ed. 
Lings and Minnaar. Pp. 36-37. 
239 There are a few minority groups that understand and use Traditionalism as part of a socio-political movement. 
For a socio-historical treatment of Traditionalism and its minority factions see: Sedgwick, Mark. Against the 
Modern World: Traditionalism and the Secret Intellectual History of the Twentieth Century. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004.  
240 In line with the Traditionalist School, this work is not an attempt to facilitate any type of socio-political reform. 
Rather, it is an attempt to critically explore human rights and its concomitant theories from the point of view of 
Islamic Traditionalism. Of course, citizens of Muslim-majority nation-states are free to draw on the ideas presented 
as they see fit in their attempts at reform.  
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Divine revelations and continually renewed by the “supernaturally natural” human 
capacity (the phrase is Frithjof Schuon’s) for the intellectual intuition of spiritual Truth.241 
 
Hence, Traditionalism is a school of comparative religion that ‘studies’ religions in order to (1) 
disclose their common essential truths, (2) study the different expressions of those truths in 
traditional societies242and (3) to use those truths to judge and critique the modern world’s 
ideologies and general worldview. This unique approach to religion found its most thorough 
expression in Frithjof Schuon’s work, The Transcendent Unity of Religions.243 In order to 
understand his work, it is important to put it in context with other approaches to the study of 
religion.  
Premodern education was generally interactive, oral, religious and transformative. It also 
had a common ideal: maintaining a structured society based on the ‘nature of things’.244 The idea 
was simple: living according to the ‘laws of heaven’ would ensure a happy, peaceful and orderly 
individual, family and society. Therefore, the teachers or ‘elders’ were responsible for passing 
down ‘Divine laws’ and the latter were generally enshrined within a particular tradition’s 
folklore.245 The intimacy between the student and their object of study was most apparent in ‘the 
field’ of religion. That is to say, students of religion were also religious students and a large part 
of their learning included the practice of sacred rites and rituals.246They did not ‘objectively’ 
                                               
241 Upton, Charles. “What is a ‘Traditionalist’? – Some Clarifications”. Online Articles. Sacred Web: A Journal of 
Tradition and Modernity. 12 July 2017. This is work is significant in that it is a thoughtful response to common 
criticisms aimed at the Traditional School, such as that of, ‘nostalgia’ and ‘elitism’. 
242 This includes everything from metaphysical and cosmological doctrines to scared mythology and art.  
243 In general, see: Schuon, Frithjof. The Transcendent Unity of Religions. 2nd ed. Illinois: Quest Books, 1993. 
244 Of course, this is an overgeneralization. For a more nuanced approach, see, Hinnells, John Ed. The Routledge 
Companion to The Study of Religion. New York: Routledge, 2010. Also see, Casewit, Jane, ed. Education in the 
Light of Tradition: Studies in Comparative Religion. Bloomington: World Wisdom Inc., 2011. 
245 Sharpe, Eric J. “The Study of Religion in Historical Perspective.” Ed. Hinnells. The Routledge Companion. P.22-
23. 
246 Sharpe, Eric J. “The Study of Religion in Historical Perspective.” Ed. Hinnells. The Routledge Companion. P.24. 
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study religion from a ‘detached’ sociological, psychological or historical perspective. They were 
primarily interested in the truth and a student’s level of knowledge (or stage of education) was 
largely determined by their spiritual state and moral character.  In this sense, it can be argued that 
every member of society was a student of religion.247 Moreover, in traditional societies, it would 
be misleading to separate religion from ‘other’ disciplines of study. This is because, in one sense, 
it was the only subject; it unified and directed all ‘other’ disciplines and in doing so, it made 
them religious and thereby gave them their significance. However, education underwent a drastic 
change and by the 20th Century, the subject of religion, like all others, was cut off from any 
overarching sacred principle. Across universities in North America and Europe, the theological 
study of religion transformed into the academic study of religion or what is normally referred to 
as religious studies.248 This is commonly associated with Max Muller (d.1900) who believed that 
religion had governing principles, and that these principles could be discovered through the 
objective and methodic collection of data. This was a direct consequence of the influence of 
scientific Positivism over the epistemological field in general. The goal was to seek “out those 
elements, patterns, and principles that could be found uniformly in the religions of all times and 
places.”249 The discipline sought to answer two main questions: the origin and function of 
religion. Here, the ‘origin’ didn’t refer to a transcendental and primordial moment of creation; 
rather, it referred to the human origin in so far as humans organized into religious groups to a 
number of social ends.250 In attempting to answer these two questions, the field of religious 
studies became highly interdisciplinary; instead of one religious studies field there was a number 
                                               
247 In other words, societies had a spiritual function, namely, to act as an immanent ‘reminder’ of the transcendent 
Reality and thereby, aid people in realizing, in so far as it was possible for each individual, their true natures as 
theomorphic beings.  
248 In general, see: Pals, Daniel L. Nine Theories of Religion. 3rd Ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. 
249 Pals, Daniel L. Nine Theories of Religion. Pp. 1-2.  
250 Segal, Robert A. “Theories of Religion” Ed. Hinnells. The Routledge Companion. Pp. 75-76.  
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of fields that included the study of religion. This meant a number of different approaches with 
their own prior assumptions.  
The modern approaches to religion can be divided and categorized in many ways.251 As 
mentioned, the first and initial division was between the theological study of religion and the 
academic school of religion. The former preserved the concept of objective truth – a concept 
central to every religious tradition. However, in doing so it abandoned the ‘impartial’ stance that 
had become necessary for scholarly research. Thus, within universities, the academic group 
dominated the study of religion. Within this second group there was another division between the 
nominalists and the essentialists. The latter, who are more central to the aims of this work, can be 
divided again into two subgroups, that is, the reductionists and the phenomenologists.252 The 
reductionists were those who maintained that the origin and function of religion can be reduced 
to a non-religious and worldly phenomenon. Most famously, Freud situated religion within 
psychology, Marx examined it through economics and Durkheim explored it through sociology. 
For example, Freud argued that God was nothing but an ‘exalted father.’ In other words, God and 
by extension religion, originated and functioned to fill the psychological need that humans have 
for explanation and comfort - a need that a father would normally provide for their child. In this 
light, he wrote:  
 
If one wishes to form a true estimate of the full grandeur of religion, one must keep in 
mind what it undertakes to do for men. It gives them information about the source and 
origin of the universe, it assures them of protection and final happiness amid the 
                                               
251 This work has relied on two sources for its particular categorization of the approaches to religion. See, Sharpe, 
Eric J. “The Study of Religion in Historical Perspective.” Ed. Hinnells. The Routledge Companion. Pp. 21-36. And 
also, Huston Smith’s “Introduction to the Revised Edition”. Schuon, Frithjof. The Transcendent Unity. Pp. ix-
xxxvii.     
252  
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changing vicissitudes of life, and it guides their thoughts and emotions by means of 
precepts which are backed by the whole force of its authority.253 
 
The phenomenologists, on the other hand, argued humans were religious by nature and they 
wanted to ‘let religion speak for itself’. For them, arguing that religion was something other than 
religion was explaining away the phenomena they were trying to explain.254 In order to keep the 
religious nature of religion intact, phenomenologists searched for a common origin and function 
of religions that was also religious in nature. Thus, for example, Rudolph Otto (d.1937) argued 
that the heart of religion was an experience of the numinous;255 Friedrich Schleiermacher 
(d.1834) argued that it was an intuition or feeling of dependence;256 and Mircea Eliade (d.1986) 
argued that it was in the dichotomy that humans create between the sacred and the profane. 
Eliade readily admitted religion involves "the social man, the economic man, and so forth", 
however he insisted that “all these conditioning factors together do not, of themselves, add up to 
the life of the spirit".257 However, for the phenomenologists, the essence of religion always fell 
on the human side of the God/human divide because studying phenomena meant putting aside 
metaphysical considerations. According to Huston Smith, both approaches to religion, that is, the 
phenomenological and theological, are problematic. This is because the phenomenological 
approach is unbiased, however it is unable to escape the subject’s relative experiences. On the 
                                               
253 Freud, Sigmund. New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis. (1933) Marxists.org. Marxist Internet Archive. 
04 June. 2017.     
254 Pals, Daniel L. Nine Theories of Religion. Pp. 230-231. 
255 In general, see: Otto, Rudolph. The idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-Rational Factor in the Idea of the 
Divine and its Relation to the Rational. (1923) archive.org. The Internet Archive. 04 June. 2017.  
256 In general, see: Barth, Karl. The Theology of Schleiermacher. Trans. Geoffrey Bromiley. Michigan: Eerdmans, 
1982. 
257 Eliade, Mircea. Images and Symbols: Studies in Religious Symbolism. Trans. Mairet. New Jersey: Princeton 
Universoty Press, 1991. P. 32.  
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other hand, the theological approach is absolute, however, it is forced to favor one religion over 
another and is therefore biased. In this regard, Huston Smith succinctly explains the problem: 
 
The two positions, theological and phenomenological, pull in opposite directions… So 
one could predict even before looking that efforts would be made to close the gap, to 
contrive a via media that retains the virtues of both positions (commitment and fair play) 
while eliminating their defects (prejudice and relativism). One can also see a priori the 
formal conditions a middle way must satisfy. First, it must center in something the great 
traditions have in common. But second, this something must be God-ward of the 
God/man divide, for attitudes, sentiments, and experiences, however lofty, are only 
human states and do not elicit worship.258 
 
Enter Schuon, and the Traditional School’s approach to the ‘unity of religions’.  
The Transcendent Unity of Religions 259 
 
                                               
258 Smith, Huston. Introduction to Schuon’s The Transcendent Unity. P. xxii. 
259 Schuon, Frithjof. The Transcendent Unity. P.xii. 
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For Schuon, the essence of religion is metaphysical and transcendent. It lies beyond the exoteric 
and at the apex of the esoteric, that is, the First Principle or the Divine Absolute. This means that 
all religions are ‘paths that lead to the same summit’, however, the ‘lower’ one goes on the 
exoteric plane the more different religions seem.260 This is because, on the exoteric plane, 
metaphysical Truth is expressed by way of forms and latter are, by definition, exclusive to one 
another. Thus, the issue that Schuon’s approach presents is that it is supra-formal and therefore, 
cannot be explained by way of discursive reason. Hence, the ‘essence of religions’, or the 
‘knowledge of the Absolute’, must be directly perceived by the intellect and explained by way of 
sacred symbols and mythology. Here, we come to an important point in Traditional 
epistemology. For Schuon and his ‘followers’, this type of knowledge proceeds from the Intellect 
– that is, the part of the human being that understands reality intuitively, certainly and 
holistically. In terms of the Intellect, Lings wrote:  
 
The meeting point of the two natures [that is, the Divine and human], the summit of the 
soul which is also its center…is what most religions name the Heart…and the Heart is the 
throne of the Intellect in the sense in which Intellectus was used throughout the middle 
ages, that is, the “solar” faculty which perceives spiritual truths directly unlike the 
“lunar” faculties of reason, memory and imagination, which are the differentiated 
reflections of the Intellect.261  
 
                                               
260 According to the Traditional School, the transcendent unity of religions does not lead to the negation of different 
religious forms on the terrestrial plane. On the contrary, religious pluralism is understood as necessary and 
providential.  
261 Lings, Martin. “The Past in Light of the Present”. The Underlying Religion. Ed. Lings and Minaar. P. 51. 
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Thus, the Intellect, by way of ‘intellection’ or ‘Intellectual intuition’, is the faculty that is able to 
know Reality and distinguish the Absolute and eternal from the relative and temporary. 
According to Nasr:  
 
Scientia sacra is none other than that sacred knowledge which lies at the heart of every 
revelation and is the center of that circle which encompasses and defines tradition. The 
first question… [is] how is the attainment of such a knowledge possible? The answer of 
tradition is that the twin source of this knowledge is revelation and intellection, or 
intellectual intuition which involves the illumination of the heart and the mind of man 
and the presence in him of knowledge of an immediate and direct nature which is tasted 
and experienced…262  
 
On the other hand, the mind is the faculty that is responsible for ratiocinating, classifying, 
explaining, and the like. On this view, the Traditional School maintains that reason can be 
tied to the higher, that is, the Intellect, and therefore be rooted in the transcendent, or it can 
be tied to the lower, that is, the passions, and be rooted in the relative. 263 Moreover, 
Intellectual knowledge has two principal sources: The already mentioned Intellect and 
second, the different forms of divine revelation found within the worlds religious traditions, 
such as the Hindu Vedas, Christian Bible and the Islamic Quran. For this reason, 
Traditionalists generally takes a stand against ideologies that overemphasize the concepts of 
‘contextuality’ and ‘subjectivity’ in order to reform religion. It is not because these existential 
limitations do not exist but rather, that they exist on some levels and to some degrees.264 In 
                                               
262 Nasr, S.H. “Scientia Sacra”. The Underlying Religion. Ed. Lings and Minnaar. P.114.  
263 In general, see: Schuon, Frithjof. “The Primacy of Intellection” worldwisdom.com. World Wisdom Library of 
Articles. 01 April 2017. Also see, Guenon, Rene. “Oriental Metaphysics” The Sword of Gnosis: Metaphysics, 
Cosmology, Tradition, Symbolism. Ed. Needleman. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1974. Pp. 40-57.  
264 Chapter four elaborates on the Islamic concept of the Absolute and the ‘Intellect’, that is, the ‘inner Heart’, and 
its critique of the ‘Progressive School’. 
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any case, it is in light of the Intellect’s direct perception of ‘Divine Unity’, that 
Traditionalism explains the ways in which the Divine reveals or expresses itself – through 
different religions – in the formal realm. Schuon illustrates his approach by invoking the 
symbolism of light. It is worth quoting him at length. He writes:  
 
If an example may be drawn from the sensory sphere to illustrate the difference between 
metaphysical and theological knowledge, it may be said that the former, which can be 
called ‘esoteric’ when it is manifested though a religious symbolism, is conscious of the 
colourless essence of light and of its character of pure luminosity; a given religious 
belief, on the other hand, will assert that light is red and not green, whereas another belief 
will assert the opposite; both will be right insofar as they distinguish light from darkness 
but no insofar as they identify it with a particular colour. This very rudimentary example 
is designed to show that the theological point of view, because it is based in the mind of 
believers on a Revelation and not on a knowledge that is accessible to each one of 
them…will of necessity confuse the symbol or form with the names and supra formal 
Truth, while the metaphysic, …will be able to make use of the same symbol or form as a 
means of expression while at the same time being aware of its relativity. That is why each 
of the great and intrinsically orthodox religions can…serve as a means of expression for 
every truth known directly by the eye of the Intellect …265  
 
To provide a more concrete example, according to Traditionalists, the Christian doctrine that 
‘God became man, so that man could become God’ can be found – on an esoteric level – in both 
Christianity and Islam.266 In Christianity, God uses the pure vessel of the ‘virgin’ Mary to reveal 
the Word, that is, Christ, and in doing so, gives the faithful a path to return back to God. In the 
                                               
265 Schuon, Frithjof, The Transcendent Unity. P. xxx-xxxi 
266 This fundamental concept of the ‘human return’ is also seen in Hinduism where Krishna uses the pure vessel of 
the ‘flute’, to play ‘music’ and cause his followers to leave the world ‘dancing’.  In this regard, see: Kinsley, David 
R. The Sword and the Flute: Kali and Krishna: Dark Visions of the Terrible and the Sublime in Hindu Mythology. 
California: University of California Press, 1975.  
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Bible, Christ is reported as saying, “none shall arrive at the Father, except through me.” 267,268 
Similarly, in Islam, God uses the pure vessel of the ‘unlettered’ Prophet to reveal the Word, that 
is, the Quran, and in doing so, gives the faithful a different but equally Divine path to return to 
God. It is reported that the Prophet said, “Truly, I am leaving behind amongst you two weighty 
things…The book of God and my Ahl al-Bayt, they will not be parted from each other until they 
retrun to me at…al-hawd”269,270 Thus, on the esoteric level, Christ and the Quran are two forms 
for the same essence, that is, the ‘The Word’, and it is through the latter, that human can ‘return 
to God’.  
Islamic Traditionalism is the Traditional School’s particular explanation of the Islamic 
intellectual tradition as a whole in light of the perennial truths found in almost all religions. More 
specifically, Muslim Traditionalists are concerned with the perennial truths contained in the 
Quran and the different ways that they have been understood and expressed by Muslims 
throughout Islamic history. In other words, they are concerned with “…the ways of thinking 
about God, the world, and the human being established by the Quran and the Prophet and 
elaborated upon generations of practicing Muslims”271 According to Islamic Traditionalism, this 
involves a remarkable plurality that is held together by an underlying unity. In this regard, Nasr 
writes: 
 
                                               
267 Stoddart, William. “Mysticism” The Underlying Religion. Ed. Lings and Minnaar. P. 237.   
268 On the exoteric plane, ‘me’ refers to the figure of Christ; however, on the esoteric plane, ‘me’ refers to the logos, 
that is, ‘the Word of God’. 
269 Justice and Remembrance. P. 17. The Sunni version of the same hadith reads: I have left among you two weighty 
things, The Book of God and my sunnah” 
270 For an explanation of the function of the Logos in religion, see: Stoddart, William. “Mysticism”. The Underlying 
Religion. Ed. Lings and Minnaar. Pp. 230-242.  
271 Chittick, William. “Can the Islamic Intellectual Heritage be Recovered?” Iqbal Academy Pakistan. 
allamaiqbal.com. 03 Dec. 2017. 
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In the vast world of Islam also, one can gain a better grasp of the whole by separating the 
patterns and seeing how each is related to vertical and horizontal dimensions of Islam 
itself as well as to cultural, ethnic, and linguistic factors. Then reuniting the patterns and 
seeing how they all fit together yields a vision of the total spectrum of Islam, in which 
unity leads to diversity and diversity is integrated into unity. 272,  
 
He goes on to mention that some of the general “factors that create unity” between Muslims 
across spacio-temporal boundaries are the Quran, sunnah and hadith in general, and the belief in 
Divine unity, prophecy and eschatology in particular.273 Moreover, on the human plane, Nasr 
points to the remarkable integration of plurality into unity when it comes to the shariah’s 
religious rites, the Islamic mystical tradition, that is, sufism and Islamic art in all of its forms, 
ranging from architecture to calligraphy.274,275 
This study argues that the ‘perennial standard’ serves as an adequate litmus test by which 
to separate the Quran’s absolute principals from their relative applications and expressions. This 
standard’s basic assumption is that any idea that is found in all religious traditions, which have 
existed for centuries across different spacio-temporal contexts, is ahistorical and therefore, 
absolute and eternal. Moreover, the ‘perennial standard’ has its basis in the Quran and latter’s 
conception of religious pluralism (ahl al-kitab), Absolute Truth (al-Haqq), the primordial 
religion (din al-qayyim), and the primordial human (fitrah). To provide one example, in the case 
of religious pluralism, the Quran reads: 
 
                                               
272 Nasr, S.H. The Heart of Islam. P. 57. 
273 Of course, these sources have given rise to different schools of thought and have been interpreted differently by 
Muslims over the centuries. Nevertheless, these interpretations spring from the essence of the Quran and hadith and 
for that reason, are accepted as part and parcel of the plural but unified Islamic civilization. 
274 Nasr, S.H. The Heart of Islam. Pp. 58-59. 
275  For example, in terms of the underlying unity of Islamic art, see: Burckhardt, Titus. Art of Islam: Language and 
Meaning. Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2009. 
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…To each among you have we prescribed a law and an open way. If Allah had so willed, 
He would have made you a single people, but (His plan is) to test you in what He hath given you: 
so strive as in a race in all virtues. The goal of you all is to Allah; it is He that will show you the 
truth of the matters in which ye dispute (5:48) 
 
Those who believe (in the Qur'an), and those who follow the Jewish (scriptures), and the 
Christians and the Sabians,- any who believe in Allah and the Last Day, and work righteousness, 
shall have their reward with their Lord; on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve. (2:62)  
 
O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you 
into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that ye may despise (each other). Verily 
the most honored of you in the sight of Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you. And Allah 
has full knowledge and is well acquainted (with all things) (49:13) 
 
In addition to having its basis in the Quran, Islamic Traditionalism has the advantage of 
approaching Islam holistically, working from within the Islamic tradition and accepting 
Muslims as agents with self-understanding and the right to determine and pursue their own 
vision of ‘the Good’. Thus, the ‘perennial standard’ is the interpretive methodology that is 
used in in the following chapters – it informs the choices and interpretation of the sources 
employed. Here, it is important to note that the Quran was revealed in a specific context and 
many of its verses were ‘sent down’ in response to particular situations. However, any 
objection to this work based on the ‘occasions of revelation’ (asbaab al-nuzul) misses the 
point. This is because this work is concerned with the ways in which Quranic verses and 
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hadith contributed to the creation of a general Islamic worldview and Muslim intellectual 
orientation that is still very much alive today. It is with this in mind then, that this work 
draws on its two principal sources – the Quran and Ali276 – in formulating its theory of virtue 
ethics.  
  
                                               
276 It is important to note that using Ali as a principal source does not make this study ‘Shi’ite’ in any way. In this 
regard, see the Introduction, Pp. 14-15. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Traditional Islamic Ethics and the Concept of Virtue 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Elizabeth Ann Mayer prefaces her book on Islam and human rights by writing: 
 
This study focuses on the legal dimensions of human rights problems, examining the 
questions within the framework of comparative law and comparative legal history. Given 
the centrality of law in the Islamic tradition, the legal emphasis is warranted. However, 
there is no intention to imply that Islam is exclusively a legal tradition or that 
comparative legal history is the only legitimate way to approach the topic. In a more 
comprehensive study on the relationship of Islamic to human rights, one would ideally 
want to include analysis of how principles of Islamic theology, philosophy and ethics tie 
in with the treatment of human rights… This would carry one into areas beyond the 
comparative legal analysis of civil and political rights that is the sole concern of this 
study.277 
 
However, these types of works, which solely focus on Islamic law, are deeply problematic. This 
is because the Islamic legal tradition is grounded in the general Islamic worldview which is most 
clearly articulated by the Islamic intellectual tradition as a whole.278 According to Smith: 
 
                                               
277 Mayer, Ann E. Islam and Human Rights. P. xvii. 
278 To reiterate, the ‘Islamic intellectual tradition’ refers to the Traditional School’s synthesis of approximately 
1400-years of Islamic philosophical, mystical and theological thought. The following sections explain and draw on 
this unified synthesis in order to develop an Islamic theory of virtue ethics.   
 
 
 108 
The dominant assumptions of an age color the thoughts, beliefs, expectations, and images 
of the men and women who live within it. Being always with us, these assumptions 
usually pass unnoticed… But this doesn’t mean they have no effect. Ultimately, 
assumptions which underlie our outlooks on life refract the world in ways that condition 
our art and our institutions…our sense of right and wrong, our criteria of success, what 
we conceive our duty to be [and so on.]279 
 
 Thus, it is not simply enough to mention that Islam is more than a legal tradition and then 
exclude the ‘more’ from one’s analysis. If the basic Islamic worldview isn’t taken into 
consideration, then Islamic law is judged within an alien paradigm and therefore, it is ipso facto 
nonsensical. This puts many Muslims in an impossible position where they find themselves 
trying to justify laws rooted in completely different underlying assumptions. This often results in 
apologetic, alienating and unproductive dialogue. Sherman Jackson points out the mental 
struggle that Muslims go through in many secular-liberal societies. He writes:  
 
And here we come to “the Muslim predicament,” especially in the West. Because liberals 
have largely succeeded in monopolizing the meaning of the fundamental principles 
through which we negotiate modern life (freedom, equality, tolerance, rationality, etc.), 
Muslims find themselves only able to claim these when their claims comport with liberal 
definitions thereof. And when their scriptural sources or traditional authorities appear to 
be out of sync with these definitions, Muslims find themselves in the position of George 
Orwell’s Winston: “How many fingers am I holding up, Winston?” From here they 
proceed, often on painfully tortuous logic, to try to reconcile every aspect of Islam with 
the reigning liberal paradigm. In this context, Muslims — and especially Muslim children 
— can never simply be themselves.280  
                                               
279 Smith, Huston. Beyond the Postmodern. P. 3. 
280 Jackson, Sherman. “Liberalism and the American Muslim Predicament.” The Islamic Monthly (TIM). 
theislamicmonthly.com. 03 June 2015. 
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Moreover, in an increasingly globalized world, this predicament affects Muslims locally and 
globally. Sayyed Hossein Nasr points out that “In many parts of the Islamic world, particularly in 
those countries where modern education is more prevalent, the younger generation has no 
knowledge of the intellectual and spiritual aspects of Islam and is completely defenseless against 
the onslaught of modernism”.281 The traditional Islamic penal code and its use of corporeal 
punishment provides a concrete example of the problem of cross-cultural understanding. 
According to the Qur’an, the punishment for theft is to ‘cut the hands of the thief’. In this regard, 
the Quran reads: 
 
As to the thief, Male or female, cut off his or her hands: a punishment by way of example, from 
Allah, for their crime: and Allah is Exalted in power. (5:38) 
 
When Muslims are questioned about their belief in this ‘barbaric practice’ many of them are 
apologetic and start a process of mental rationalization. However, this punishment can never be 
justified in a secular-liberal worldview wherein the individual and their body is considered 
autonomous and sacred. Lynn Hunt’s Inventing Human Rights describes the different practices in 
the 17th and 18th centuries that worked towards changing the public conception of the body and 
the meaning of cruel and degrading punishment. This included “changes in musical and 
theatrical performances, domestic architecture and portraiture…”282 Thus, Hunt writes that  
 
Once Enlightenment writers and legal reformers began to question torture and cruel 
punishment, an almost compete turnabout…took place… What was need in addition to 
                                               
281 Nasr, S.H. Ideals and Realities of Islam. P. xxii.   
282 Hunt, Lynn. Inventing Human Rights. P. 83. 
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empathy…was a new concern for the human body. Once sacred in only a religiously 
defined ordered…the body became sacred on its own in a secular order that rested in the 
autonomy and inviolability of humans.283 
 
 However, in terms of the general Islamic worldview, the same punishment, that is, ‘cutting the 
hands of the thief’, can be justified based on the four essential premises of (1) the primacy of 
revelation, (2) pain as purification, (3) the body as God’s property and (4) the family as a single 
unit. Before, proceeding however, it is extremely important to emphasize that this is not an 
argument for or against the ‘reformation’ of the Islamic penal code and its use of physical 
punishment. It is an argument for the importance of understanding worldviews, that is, the basic 
assumptions that determine peoples’ ways of understanding the world, and their direct influence 
over a society’s institutions and norms.284 In any case, the first principle is the primacy of 
Revelation. For many Muslims, revelation is a form of Divine knowledge and therefore, it is the 
Quran – and not (liberal) reason – that should guide and govern the public sphere.285 This is most 
clearly expressed in the verses that invoke the concept of the ‘the limits of God’ (hadud Allah). 
The latter, are generally considered God’s rights over His creatures and are non-negotiable.286 For 
example, the Qur’an reads:  
 
                                               
283 Hunt, Lynn. Inventing Human Rights. P. 81-82. 
284 It should be noted that these principles, in light of contextual differences, can be expressed in many different 
ways. Therefore, to reiterate, my point is that Islamic law cannot be understood or ‘reformed’ without taking into 
account its basic underlying principles and worldview.   
285 This doesn’t mean that the Islamic law was strictly applied in premodern Islamic societies; rather, it means that 
the basic Quranic worldview – in all of its expressions – largely determined, or at least guided, Muslim thought, 
norms and institutions. Even if hadd punishments were simply accepted by Muslims because they were the pre-
Islamic norm, the argument still stands: One’s sense of right and wrong is largely determined by the worldview that 
he or she lives in. 
286Kamali, Mohammad H. Shariah Law. P. 22. 
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Those are limits set by Allah: those who obey Allah and His Messenger will be admitted to 
Gardens with rivers flowing beneath, to abide therein (forever) and that will be the supreme 
achievement. But those who disobey Allah and His Messenger and transgress His limits will be 
admitted to a Fire, to abide therein: And they shall have a humiliating punishment. (04:13-14) 
 
Permitted to you, on the night of the fasts, is the approach to your wives. They are your garments 
and ye are their garments. Allah knoweth what ye used to do secretly among yourselves; but He 
turned to you and forgave you; so now associate with them, and seek what Allah Hath ordained 
for you, and eat and drink, until the white thread of dawn appear to you distinct from its black 
thread; then complete your fast till the night appears; but do not associate with your wives while 
ye are in retreat in the mosques. Those are limits (set by) Allah: Approach not nigh thereto. 
Thus doth Allah make clear His Signs to men: that they may learn self-restraint. (2:187)287 
 
A divorce is only permissible twice: after that, the parties should either hold Together on 
equitable terms, or separate with kindness. It is not lawful for you, (Men), to take back any of 
your gifts (from your wives), except when both parties fear that they would be unable to keep 
the limits ordained by Allah. If ye (judges) do indeed fear that they would be unable to keep 
the limits ordained by Allah, there is no blame on either of them if she give something for her 
freedom. These are the limits ordained by Allah; so, do not transgress them if any do 
transgress the limits ordained by Allah, such persons wrong (themselves as well as others). 
(2:229) 288 
                                               
287 Emphasis added. 
288 Emphasis added. 
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Again, the point is that many Muslims generally consider revelation – despite its varied 
interpretations – a sacred source of knowledge and therefore, a divine source of human guidance 
and governance on both, an individual and collective level. Thus, the ‘primacy of revelation’ is 
the first of the four principles that allowed premodern Muslims to understand the ‘cutting of the 
hands’ as a Divinely ordained punishment, and not a ‘barbaric practice’.289 The second principle, 
in accordance with Islamic Traditionalism, is that pain in almost any form, including physical 
punishment, is a mode of spiritual purification.290 It is important to note that this does not include 
any self-inflicted physical pain, which is generally alien to the tradition’s understanding of 
purification. In any case, according to Islamic Traditionalists, life is a test that aims to ‘cleanse’ 
human beings so that they can return to their ‘pure’ origin. On the subject of purification, Rafik 
Berjak notes, “Self-purity is…a major subject in Islam. The Prophet has said: ‘Allah is pure and 
He shall not accept anything but purity’”291 Thus, in this regard, the Quran reads:  
 
… Say: "Even if you had remained in your homes, those for whom death was decreed would 
certainly have gone forth to the place of their death"; but (all this was) that Allah might test what 
is in your breasts and purge what is in your hearts. For Allah knoweth well the secrets of your 
hearts. (3:154) 
 
                                               
289 The Qur’an invokes the ‘limits of God’ regularly. However, in relation to legal punishments, these ‘limits’ are 
contained to the six crimes of theft, adultery, false accusation of adultery, highway robbery, consumption of alcohol 
and apostasy. The last two are problematic insofar as the Quran doesn’t not prescribe any sort of worldly 
punishment for them. 
290 Pain can be understood as ‘negative’ purification in that it is passive and comes directly or indirectly from God. 
‘Positive’ purification, on the other hand, can be understood as active and involving religious practices such as 
praying and fasting.   
291 Berajak, Rafik. “’Purify”. The Quran: An Encyclopedia. P. 514.  
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Be sure we shall test you with something of fear and hunger, some loss in goods or lives or the 
fruits (of your toil), but give glad tidings to those who patiently persevere (2:155) 
 
According to The Study Quran, “Several ahadith indicate that the Prophet assured repentant 
thieves that had undergone the hadd punishment that they were forgiven by God and had been 
purified of their sin as a result of their punishment.292 In the same light, there are also many 
hadith that explain pain as purification without reference to punishment. For example, Ibn 
Mas’ud is to have reported the following:  
 
I visited the Prophet when he was suffering fever. I said, “You seem to be suffering 
greatly, O Messenger of Allah.” The Prophet replied, “Yes, I suffer as much as two 
persons.” I said, “Is that because you have a double reward?” He replied that that was so 
and then said, “No Muslim is afflicted by a harm, be it the pricking of a thorn or 
something more (painful than that), but Allah thereby causes his sins to fall away just as 
a tree sheds its leaves.”293 
 
Similarly, the Prophet is also reported to have said, “A believer’s suffering removes his sins 
just as a blacksmith’s fire removes slag from iron.”294 Thus, ‘pain as purification’ is the 
second of the four principles that allowed many Muslims in traditional Islamic societies to 
understand the ‘cutting of the hands’ as a punishment with a higher purpose, and not a 
‘primitive practice’.295 The third principle, found in the Islamic intellectual tradition, is that 
                                               
292 Nasr, S.H., ed. et all. The Study Quran. P. 296. 
293 Sahih Bukhari. Book 70; hadith 551. Emphasis added. 
294 Qutbuddin, Tahera, ed and trans. Light in the Heavens: Sayings of the Prophet Muhammad. New York: New 
York University Press, Chapter 12 (12.7).  
295 For a more detailed analysis of pain, punishment and purification in the Quran and Islamic history, see chapter 
four of: Sherwani, Ali A.K. Impact of Islamic Penal Laws on the Traditional Arab Society. New Delhi: M.D. 
Publications, 1993.   
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the body, in a very real sense, belongs to God. According to the Quran, on the day of 
judgment, the body will ‘abandon’ the human being by testifying against the latter in service 
to God. The verse reads: 
 
At length, when they reach the (Fire), their hearing, their sight, and their skins will bear witness 
against them, as to (all) their deeds. They will say to their skins: "Why bear ye witness against 
us?" They will say: "Allah hath given us speech,- (He) Who giveth speech to everything: He 
created you for the first time, and unto Him were ye to return." Ye did not seek to hide yourselves, 
lest your hearing, your sight, and your skins should bear witness against you! But ye did think 
that Allah knew not many of the things that ye used to do! (41:20-22) 
 
Thus, the idea that ‘individuals have the right to do what they please with their own bodies’ is 
alien Islamic Traditionalism’s perspective. Many Muslims generally understand that God has 
given people bodies so that they can use them to achieve success in this world and the hereafter. 
In the same light then, if a person uses ‘their’ body in defiance of Divine laws and norms, then it 
is within God’s right to do what He wills with the body, and the person in question. Again, I am 
not arguing for or against the traditional Islamic penal code and its use of corporeal punishment. 
However, I am arguing that Islamic law can only be judged according to the Quran’s 
fundamental principles and consequent worldview. The ‘primacy of revelation’, ‘pain as 
purification’ and the ‘body belonging to God’ all combine to produce a mentality in the 
premodern world, in which corporeal punishments, such as ‘cutting of the hands’, are not 
‘backward’ practices, but rather, ‘make sense’. This is strengthened by the fourth and last 
principle, that is, the family as a single unit and basic building block of society. According to 
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Islamic Traditionalists, the act of sex symbolizes the complete human being and moreover, the 
ideal and ‘natural’ family structure reflects the harmony of the cosmos. Thus, Sachiko Murata, 
drawing on the work of ibn al-Arabi and his students, writes: 
 
Having explained why gnostic experiences the sexual act as the supreme instance of 
witnessing God in the full splendor of His self-disclosure, Ibn al-Arabi turns to the 
metaphysical and cosmological dimensions of marriage. The marriage act gains its 
nobility from the fact that its archetype is God’s creative act itself… [According to 
Jandi,] Ibn al-Arabi is alluding to the five universal divine marriages that give rise to the 
production of the five worlds: The World of Meanings, [Spirits, Souls, Images and 
Sensory Objects.]296 
 
In more practical terms, and in relation to the importance of the family unit, Nasr argues that  
 
The basic unit of Islamic society is the family, which as a result of the Quranic revelation 
came to replace the Arab tribe as the immediate social realty for the individual. One of 
the most important social reforms carried out by Islam was the strengthening of the 
family and the bonds of marriage.297  
 
This importance of the familial bonds and unity is based on numerous Quranic passages. For 
example:   
 
Permitted to you, on the night of the fasts, is the approach to your wives. They are your garments 
and ye are their garments. Allah knoweth what ye used to do secretly among yourselves; but He 
                                               
296 Murata, Sachiko. The Tao of Islam: A Sourcebook on Gender Relationships in Islamic Thought. Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1992. Pp. 193-194. 
297 Nasr, S.H. The Heart of Islam. P. 183. 
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turned to you and forgave you; so now associate with them, and seek what Allah Hath ordained 
for you… (2:187) 
 
And those who accept Faith subsequently, and adopt exile, and fight for the Faith in your 
company,- they are of you. But kindred by blood have prior rights against each other in the Book 
of Allah. Verily Allah is well-acquainted with all thing (8:75) 
 
It is He Who has created man from water: then has He established relationships of lineage and 
marriage: for thy Lord has power (over all things). (25:54) 
 
Interestingly, the idea that the family is the basic unit of society, renders the current secular-
liberal institution of incarceration incompatible with the Islamic paradigm. This is because it 
would be considered ‘inhumane’ or ‘barbaric’ to separate family members from each other when 
they are a single unit and integral to the proper functioning of society. Therefore, this example 
shows that ‘worldviews’ have serious implications for human rights. The connection between the 
two is more specifically drawn out throughout chapter. All of this is to say that it is not the 
history and science of Islamic jurisprudence that needs to be studied in relation to human rights 
theory, but rather, the deeper metaphysical, ontological and epistemological principles that 
inform Islamic intellectual thought in general and Islamic law in particular. This is why this work 
uses the framework of Traditionalism to explicate Islamic religious doctrine and rituals. In doing 
so, it addresses the foundational questions that need to be answered in order to create any human 
rights model. Undoubtedly, the rights of a human being depend on a tradition’s understanding of 
‘human’, ‘right’ and the ‘good life’. It is only on this level that constructive dialogue can take 
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place, and therefore, it is only on this level that effective and organic reform can take place. This 
point is highlighted by Shackico’s work on gender in Islam when she writes: 
 
The ultimate problem, when we speak of cross-cultural differences in the question of 
relationships among men and women, is that in a very real sense we have been living in 
different worlds. The cultural presuppositions of Westerners about what is important in 
life are profoundly different from the traditional views of Muslims or Japanese… I offer 
no answers as to whether or not Muslim women are any more oppressed than women 
elsewhere. What I do maintain, however, is that generally the role of women in traditional 
Islam - not in any given Islamic society today - is consistent with the Islamic worldview.298   
 
Before proceeding to explore Traditionalist’s synthesis of the Islamic intellectual tradition and its 
concept of ethics and virtue, it is important to reiterate and clarify what this tradition is. In its 
simplest formulation, it is a particular synthesis of fourteen-hundred years of Islamic intellectual 
thought. By ‘intellectual thought’, I am referring to Muslim philosophers, mystics, and 
theologians that asked the question ‘why’ about the nature of things in an attempt to understand 
and explain the deepest levels of reality and the human condition. Within the Islamic tradition, 
this includes figures such as al-Farabi, al-Arabi, and Mulla Sadra. As mentioned, this study 
operates within the framework of Traditionalism and its understanding of the ‘underlying unity 
of religions’ – both across and within religious traditions. Thus, its particular synthesis is based 
on the work of Traditionalists such as Rene Guenon, Ananda Coomarswamy and Frithjof 
Schuon. One of this study’s working assumptions is that the Traditional School of thought 
represents an important and substantial ‘Muslim voice’ on the issue of Islam and modernity. This 
                                               
298 Murata, Sachiko. The Tao of Islam P.1. (Emphasis Added) 
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‘voice’ is based on different ‘traditional understandings’ of Islam that are nevertheless unified in 
terms of their basic intellectual and cultural orientation.299  
The next section attempts to answer some of the fundamental questions posed by virtue 
theory – questions regarding the nature of reality, truth and justice. In turn, the answers to these 
questions are used to construct a theory of virtue ethics that is in line with the basic ‘Islamic 
worldview’ and therefore, can ground an organic vision of human rights in Islam. Although 
today’s Islamic societies are no longer traditional, this approach is advantageous because most 
Muslims are more amenable to concepts based on their own intellectual heritage and traditional 
norms. Thus, they are less likely to understand human rights as a tool for imperialism and 
instead, understand them as integral to furthering the cause of justice and peace within their own 
societies.300    
 
 
Ethics and Virtue in the Quran and Islamic Tradition  
 
 Since the 20th Century, consequentialism, deontology and virtue theory have dominated the 
field of moral philosophy. Consequentialism is based on the concept that ‘what is right’ is 
determined by the consequence of our actions. It argues that deciding how to act should not be 
determined by a rule or set of rules that may or may not lead to positive or beneficial 
consequences. In chapter two, this study critically explored the secular-liberal tradition’s concept 
                                               
299 In this regard, see the Introduction, Pp. 6-8.  
300 Nevertheless, it is important to reiterate that this work is primarily concerned with (1) drawing out the friction 
between Traditional Islam and contemporary human rights and (2) constructing a traditional theory of virtue ethics 
that has the ability to ‘ground’ an ‘Islamic’ vision of human rights. Therefore, this work, despite any appearances to 
the contrary, is not directly concerned with facilitating socio-political reform in Muslim-majority nation-states 
today.  
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of consequentialism in the form of utilitarianism. In some instances, the Qur’an is also 
consequentialist in that it beseeches the believer to act in a way that promotes well-being and 
helps people and their societies to flourish. For example, surah al-Baqarah reads:  
 
They ask you concerning wine and gambling. Say: "In them is great harm, and some benefit for 
men; but the harm is greater than the benefit." They ask you how much they should spend. Say: 
"Whatever is beyond your needs." Thus does Allah make His signs clear to you all: In order that 
you may consider (2:219) 301 
 
Al-Qurtubi’s commentary on this verse mentions both the good and the harm of drinking wine 
and gambling, and, in line with consequentialism, he explains why the two activities lead to more 
negative consequences than positive ones. Later legal philosophy banned all intoxicants in light 
of one of the purposes of the shariah (maqasid al-shariah), namely, to ‘protect human 
intelligence.’302  
 Despite verses such 2:219 however, the Quranic injunction to do good is not generally 
rooted in utilitarian calculations. This is because the Quran repeatedly informs its readers that the 
value of action is wedded to faith. This is clearly expressed, for example, by the numerous verses 
that describe the righteous as people who both believe and do good works. For example:  
 
But give glad tidings to those who believe and work righteousness, that their portion is Gardens, 
beneath which rivers flow…. (2:25) 
 
                                               
301 My translation. 
302 Nasr, S.H., ed. et al. The Study Quran. P. 95. 
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Those who believe (in the Qur'an), and those who follow the Jewish (scriptures), and the 
Christians and the Sabians,- any who believe in Allah and the Last Day, and work righteousness, 
shall have their reward with their Lord; on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve. (2:62) 
 
As to those who believe and work righteousness, Allah will pay them (in full) their reward; but 
Allah loveth not those who do wrong. (3:57) 
 
The idea that the value of action is related to faith is also seen in Quranic verses that speak to the 
works of ‘unbelievers’.303 These verses imply that good action coupled with bad intention is, at 
least in the final determination, wasted and futile.    
 
The parable of those who reject their Lord is that their works are as ashes, on which the wind 
blows furiously on a tempestuous day: No power have they over aught that they have earned: 
that is the straying far, far (from the goal). (14:18) 
 
But the Unbelievers,- their deeds are like a mirage in sandy deserts, which the man parched with 
thirst mistakes for water; until when he comes up to it, he finds it to be nothing: But he finds 
Allah (ever) with him, and Allah will pay him his account: and Allah is swift in taking account. 
(24:39) 
 
Covetous over you. Then when fear comes, thou wilt see them looking to thee, their eyes 
revolving, like (those of) one over whom hovers death: but when the fear is past, they will smite 
                                               
303 ‘Unbeliever’ is an inaccurate translation of the term ‘kafir’. In this regard please see Chapter five, Pp. 187-188. 
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you with sharp tongues, covetous of goods. Such men have no faith, and so Allah has made their 
deeds of none effect: and that is easy for Allah. (33:19) 
 
Thus, the Quranic understanding of morality is not based on any form of consequentialism. A 
person can act, but ultimately, it is the intention behind the act that is of utmost importance. The 
Quranic story of Prophet Abraham provides a further example of this principle. It describes 
Abraham as young boy who snuck into the Kaaba in order to break the idols that were housed 
there. As a punishment, the people of Canaan decided to burn Abraham; however, according to 
the Qur’an, the young boy was saved when God issued a command to the fire and said, “O fire! 
be thou cool, and (a means of) safety for Abraham!”.304 Thus, the evil intention of the people 
subverted the effects of their actions. Of course, the subject of God and his relationship to the 
world has been debated in the Islamic world for centuries.305 Some maintain that verses such as 
21:69 are metaphorical or symbolic, while others maintain they are literal and miraculous. 
Exploring this debate is beyond the scope of this work, however, it is sufficient to note that 
Muslims believe that – in one way or another – ‘God has power over all things’. According to 
Islamic Traditionalists, faith and action are hierarchical, but at the same time, they are self-
reflexive. This because faith or ‘being’ results in good action and good action, in turn, 
strengthens faith. Thus, on the highest level, faith encompasses action and the two cannot be 
separated. In Understanding Islam, Schuon writes: 
 
In the case of Islam, where man is considered as intelligence and where intelligence 
comes “before” will, it is the content or direction of the intelligence which has 
                                               
304 The Quran. Trans. Yusuf Ali. 21:69. 
305 In general, see: Blankinship, Khalid. “The Early Creed”. The Cambridge Companion. Ed. Winter. Also see: Watt, 
Montgomery. Philosophy and Theology. London: Aldine, 1962. 
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sacramental efficacy: Whoever accepts that the transcendent Absolute alone is absolute 
and transcendent, and draws from this the consequences for the will, is saved.306  
 
More concretely, Nasr critiques Renaissance humanism and states that 
 
According to traditional doctrines our actions depend upon our mode of being [that is, 
faith] or, as the scholastics put it, operari sequitur esse. Pico, reversed this relationship 
and claimed that the “being of man follows from his doing.” He thus stated…the primacy 
of action over contemplation and doing over being, which characterizes modern man and 
which has been of the greatest consequence for the destruction of the world of nature”307  
   
The second theory of morality, that is, deontology, is based on the concept that it is one’s 
duty to act rightly and ‘what is right’ is normally determined by a rule or set of rules such as the 
‘golden rule’ or Kant’s categorical imperative. As this study has argued, it is an incomplete form 
deontology - that is, natural law - that underpins the Universal Declaration. The Qur’an takes 
this position to the extent that it sets down the limits of God’s law (hudud Allah). Thus, in this 
case, deontology is a form of Divine command theory because it is God and His will that 
determines the criterion for right and wrong action. This is illustrated by the following Quranic 
verses: 
 
Those are limits set by Allah: those who obey Allah and His Messenger will be admitted to 
Gardens with rivers flowing beneath, to abide therein (forever) and that will be the supreme 
                                               
306 Schuon, Frithjof. Understanding Islam: A New Translation with Selected Letters. Ed. Laude Bloomington: World 
Wisdom, 2011. P. 2. 
307 Chittick, William, ed. The Essential Seyyed Hossein Nasr. Indiana: World Wisdom, 2007. Pp.144-145. 
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achievement. But those who disobey Allah and His Messenger and transgress His limits will be 
admitted to a Fire, to abide therein: And they shall have a humiliating punishment. (04:13-14) 
 
Fighting is prescribed for you, and ye dislike it. But it is possible that ye dislike a thing which is 
good for you, and that ye love a thing which is bad for you. But Allah knoweth, and ye know not. 
(2:216) 
 
The Messenger believeth in what hath been revealed to him from his Lord, as do the men of faith. 
Each one (of them) believeth in Allah, His angels, His books, and His messengers. "We make no 
distinction (they say) between one and another of His messengers." And they say: "We hear, and 
we obey: (We seek) Thy forgiveness, our Lord, and to Thee is the end of all journeys. (2:285) 
 
Thus, these verses seem to point to the fact that an action is good because God wills it and 
not vice versa. However, this position was contested and the question of ‘what makes an action 
good?’ was one of the first debates between the different schools of Islamic theology.308 
Nevertheless, after the death of the Prophet, deontology, or divine command theory, virtually 
dominated the field of Islamic ethics. This is particularly true when it comes to the Islamic legal 
tradition and the jurists (fuqaha) who presided over it. This is because Islamic societies, at least 
in principle, are nomocracies. In this regard, Majjid Khadduri’s (d.2007) The Islamic Conception 
of Justice reads:  
 
In a society which presupposes that man is essential weak and therefore incapable of 
rising above personal failings…a superhuman or divine authority is invoked to provide 
                                               
308 In general, see: Stelzer, Steffen. “Ethics”. The Cambridge Companion. Ed. Winter. Pp. 161-179. 
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either the sources or the basic principles of the public order under which a certain 
standard of justice is established… The justice which flows from such a high divine 
source is considered applicable to all men and forms another category of justice. In 
contrast with positive justice, it may be called Divine or revelational justice… It is 
therefore the Law, embodying the principles of Divine authority, which indeed rules and 
wherefore the state becomes not, strictly speaking, a theocracy, but…might be called a 
Divine nomocracy.309  
 
The centrality of Islamic law, expressed in the form of ‘God’s will’, was also caused by a number 
of contextual factors; arguably, the most important of these was the rapid growth of the Islamic 
empire and the concomitant need to provide order for the growing population. Despite this focus 
on divine command theory however, there are many verses in the Qur’an seem to oppose the 
view that ethics is exclusively restricted to acting in accordance with God’s will as expressed in 
the Quran. As the following verses indicate, the Quran is also concerned with something above 
and beyond outward obedience to the Divine law:  
 
The desert Arabs say, "We believe." Say, "Ye have no faith; but ye (only) say, 'We have submitted 
our wills to Allah,' For not yet has faith entered your hearts. But if ye obey Allah and His 
Messenger, He will not belittle aught of your deeds: for Allah is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful. 
(49:14) 
 
Call them by (the names of) their fathers: that is juster in the sight of Allah. But if ye know not 
their father's (names, call them) your Brothers in faith, or your maulas. But there is no blame on 
                                               
309 Khadduri, Majid. The Islamic Conception of Justice. Pp. 3-4. Khadduri contrasts this view with what he calls 
‘Positive justice’, that is, justice based on the assumption that people are capable of determining their own interests 
and needs based on their experience and reasoning.  
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you if ye make a mistake therein: (what counts is) the intention of your hearts: and Allah is Oft-
Returning, Most merciful. (33:5) 
 
The Day whereon neither wealth nor sons will avail, but only he (will prosper) that brings to 
Allah a sound heart (26:88-89) 
 
According to ibn Kathir’s commentary on verse 49:14, “belief is of a higher rank than 
submission” and that the ‘dessert Arabs’ in this verse, “had simply not yet attained faith” through 
submission.310 Similarly, according to al-Qurtubi’s commentary on verse 26:29, a ‘sound heart’ 
refers to the heart’s knowledge that “God is real, that the Hereafter will come, and that God will 
resurrect what is in the Graves.”311 Other commentators take the concept of a ‘sound heart’ 
further, and maintain that it refers to spiritual healthiness; a heart emptied of the world and filled 
with the love of God.312 Thus, according to these verses, it can be argued that the Quran places 
more importance on ‘being’ than on ‘doing’. In other words, the Quran seems to imply that the 
most important aspect of good action is that it is transformative. That is, it transforms human into 
virtuous and intellectual beings who use their Intellect/’inner Heart’ in conjunction with any 
expression of God’s will. An interesting example of ‘transformative ethics’ can be found in the 
Quran’s narrative relating the meeting between Moses and Khidr. According to this narrative, 
Khidr was a chosen servant of God who was blessed with ‘knowledge of the heart’. Wanting to 
learn from him, Moses asked: “May I follow thee, on the footing that thou teach me something 
of the (Higher) Truth which thou hast been taught?”.313 Khidr was hesitant and responded: 
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“Verily thou wilt not be able to have patience with me! And how canst thou have patience about 
things about which thy understanding is not complete?”314 Upon hearing this, Moses promised to 
be patient, obedient and accept Khidhr’s actions without question or objection. Nevertheless, on 
three different occasions, Moses – by virtue of his ethical character – was unable to stay silent. 
Hence, Khidhr told his companion: “This is the parting between me and thee: now will I tell thee 
the interpretation of (those things) over which thou wasn’t unable to hold patience.”315 Khidhr 
explained that - despite outward appearances – the inward or unseen reality of his actions were 
good and therefore, in accordance with God’s will. In the context of this narrative then, Moses 
represents the tradition of deontological ethics and Khidr represents the tradition of virtue ethics. 
Khidr – a transformed soul – was able to discern right from wrong using his inward and 
microcosmic divine guide. This view is confirmed by the Islamic intellectual tradition. For 
example, in Nahj al-Balaghah, Ali continuously highlights the importance of inner 
transformation and not only outward action. He says: 
 
A virtuous person is better than virtue and a vicious person is worse than vice.316 
 
The sin which makes you sad and repentant is more liked by Allah than the good deed which 
turns you arrogant.317 
 
Understand information you hear with the reasoning of responsibility  
not the reasoning of the reporter,  
                                               
314 The Quran. Trans. Yusuf Ali. 18:67-68. 
315 The Quran. Trans. Yusuf Ali. 18:78. 
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for there are many reports of knowledge but few are responsible.318 
 
Thus, one can see the primary importance that Islamic Traditional thought in general, and the 
Quran and Ali in particular, place on the state of a person’s soul or ‘inner Heart’. Therefore, from 
this point of view, it is clear that any Islamic theory of ethics and human flourishing must be 
grounded in the concept of virtue and transformation. Virtue theory moves away from the 
preoccupation of determining the right course of action in any given situation and instead, 
situates ethics within a broader framework concerning the nature of reality. It maintains that the 
actions of a ‘good person’ are good actions and the actions of a ‘bad person’ are bad. In other 
words, right action is derived from virtue and not vice versa.319 Thus, virtue theory asks the 
fundamental questions of human existence that need to be answered in order to construct any 
theory of human rights. In the Islamic context then, this study argues that a human rights society 
is one that is organized in a way that allows people to achieve their primary purpose in life – a 
virtuous soul in this world and felicity in the hereafter.  
In concluding this section, it is important to reiterate that contemporary Islamic thought is 
largely devoted to the concept of reform. Its primary goal is to establish a standard of judgment 
that can be applied to the religion’s normative texts and traditional practices in order to separate 
universal religious concepts from their relative and conditional expressions. This, in turn, creates 
a space for reform in light of the changing circumstances of any given society. The following 
section constructs such a standard; namely, a virtue theory based on Muslim Traditionalist’s 
                                               
318 Cleary, Thomas. Living and Dying with Grace. Counsels of Hadrat Ali. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1996. 
P. 14. In other words, Ali is saying that knowledge is about understanding and transformation as opposed to 
memorization and regurgitation.  
319 Although virtue is primary in principle, the two, that is virtue and virtuous action, are also self-reflexive, that is, 
they each function to develop and reinforce the other.   
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articulation of the basic Islamic worldview and its specific understanding of reality, truth, and 
justice. This study argues that any method that dismisses or reduces these essential principles of 
Islamic thought is bound to fail insofar as it will be alien to the Islamic intellection tradition as a 
whole and the basic ‘Muslim mentality’ that this tradition represents. 
 
 
Traditional Islamic Virtue Theory 
 
The idea that human rights are informed by a particular society’s understanding of life cannot 
be overstated. Thus, it is only on this ‘underlying level of thought’ that genuine discourse and 
reform can take place – including reform in the area of Islamic jurisprudence. As Sa’diyya 
Shaikh points out in her attempt to negotiate gender understandings: 
 
Traditional Muslim personal law is constrained by its own underlying notion of human 
nature. From a contemporary Islamic feminist perspective, the limited gender 
understandings of human nature, as developed in different sociohistorical contexts, serves 
as central deficits in various iterations of classical Islamic law. The problematic may be 
called a short-coming in gendered ‘religious anthropology’, a term that addresses 
questions of what it means to be a human being from a religious perspective… In the 
Muslim tradition, Sufi thinkers in particular have provided detailed discussions on the 
human condition… and the ways in which the fundamental theological imperative of 
submission provides the ontological basis for the juridic-ethical legacy and related norms 
of sociability320 
                                               
320 Shaikh, Sa’diyya. “Islamic Law, Sufism and Gender: Rethinking the Terms of the Debate” Men in Charge? 
Rethinking Authority in Muslim Legal Tradition. Ed. Mir-Hosseini, Al-Sharmani and Rumminger. London: 
Oneworld Pub., 2015. Pp. 106-107. This study does not necessarily agree that Islamic ‘religious anthropology’ is 
problematic. However, it does agree that ‘religious anthropology’ is the foundation of Islamic law and needs to be 
explored in any fruitful discussion of Islamic ethics and its relationship to modernity and human rights.      
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Islamic Traditionalists understand Islam as the final expression of the primordial religion (din al-
qayyim) intended for humanity. Its primordiality is attested to by Quranic passages that apply the 
word Muslim to people who came before the Prophet’s time. In this case, the word ‘Muslim’ can 
be understood as a verbal noun that refers to the act of submitting to God. For example, the 
Quran reads: 
 
When Jesus found Unbelief on their part He said: "Who will be My helpers to (the work of) 
Allah?" Said the disciples: "We are Allah's helpers: We believe in Allah, and do thou bear 
witness that we are Muslims. (3:52) 
 
And strive in His cause as ye ought to strive, (with sincerity and under discipline). He has chosen 
you, and has imposed no difficulties on you in religion; it is the cult of your father Abraham. It is 
He Who has named you Muslims, both before and in this (Revelation); that the Messenger may 
be a witness for you, and ye be witnesses for mankind! … (22:78) 
 
On the other hand, Islam’s ‘finality’ is based on the Quranic verses that refers to the Prophet as 
the seal of the Prophets (khatim an-nabiyyin). The Quran reads:  
 
Muhammad is not the father of any of your men, but (he is) the Messenger of Allah, and the Seal 
of the Prophets: and Allah has full knowledge of all things. (33:40) 
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These verses are further strengthened by the hadith literature. For example, in a well-known 
saying, the Prophet describes himself as the final brick completing the building of a beautiful 
house. He is reported to have said:  
 
“My similitude in comparison with the prophets before me is that of a man who has built 
a house nicely and beautifully, except for a place of one brick in a corner. The people go 
about it and wonder at its beauty, but say: 'Would that this brick be put in its place!’ So I 
am that brick, and I am the seal of the prophets”321  
 
Thus, according to the Islamic traditionalist’s, guidance from God, in the form of prophecy and 
revelation, ended with the Prophet. In this light, Nasr describes three ways in which Islam can be 
understood by writing:  
 
In its universal sense, Islam may be said to have three levels of meaning. All beings in the 
universe, to begin with, are Muslim, i.e., "surrendered to the Divine Will." (A flower 
cannot help being a flower; a diamond cannot do other than sparkle. God has made them 
so; it is theirs to obey.) Secondly, all men who accept with their will the sacred law of the 
revelation are Muslim in that they surrender their will to that law…Finally, we have the 
level of pure knowledge and understanding. It is that of the contemplative, the gnostic 
('arif), the level that has been recognized throughout Islamic history as the highest and 
most comprehensive. The gnostic is Muslim in that his whole being is surrendered to 
God; he has no separate individual existence of his own. He is like the birds and the 
flowers in his yielding to the Creator; like them, like all the other elements of the cosmos, 
he reflects the Divine Intellect to his own degree. He reflects it actively, however, they 
passively; his participation is a conscious one.322  
 
                                               
321 Sahih Bukhari. Book 56; hadith 735.  
322 Nasr, S.H. Science and Civilization in Islam. Illinois: ABC International Group, 2001. P.23.    
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In any case, Islam – like the religions that preceded it – provides its followers with both a 
doctrine of Reality and a method of transformation to that Reality. The Quran’s central doctrine 
is the existence and oneness of God (tawhid). In this regard, Hussein Abdul-Raof writes: 
 
Tawhid (monotheism) is the cornerstone of Islam. As it is their fundamental doctrine, the 
Muslims are described as the ‘nation of Tawhid’… The doctrine of tawhid signifies total 
obedience and submission to God in worship in deed. Tawhid designates the oneness of 
God (divine unicity), his absolute existence and that He has no equal.323 
  
In terms of the Quran and the ‘concept’ of tawhid, the following verses read:  
 
Say: He is God the one the only, the absolute the eternal. He begets not nor is he begotten and 
there is nothing like him (112:1-4) 
 
All that is on earth will perish: But will abide (for ever) the Face of thy Lord,- full of Majesty, 
Bounty and Honour (55:26-27) 
 
Do they not observe the birds above them, spreading their wings and folding them in? None can 
uphold them except (Allah) Most Gracious: Truly (Allah) Most Gracious: Truly it is He that 
watches over all things. (67:19) 
 
                                               
323 Abdul-Raof, Hussein “Tawhid” The Quran: An Encyclopedia. Ed. Leaman P. 651 
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According to Chittick, the concept of tawhid and its consequences have always functioned 
as a principle instrument of unification within Islamic societies and between Muslims of 
different schools of thought. In this light, he writes: 
 
The intellectual tradition was robust and lively, so disagreements…were common. 
Nonetheless, in all the different schools of thought that have appeared over Islamic 
history…one principle has always been agreed upon: God is one, and he is the only 
source of Truth and Reality: He is the origin of all things, and all things return to him324 
 
 According to Islamic Traditionalists, the Qur’anic message of tawhid is an understanding of the 
fact that God is both absolute and infinite. Here, the quality of absoluteness refers to God’s unity 
and the quality of infinity refers to the God’s creation.325 In other words, Islam’s principal 
doctrine is that there is nothing real except the Real (absolute) and all ‘other things’ issue from 
that Reality (infinity). This means that multiplicity, or in other words, creation, is an illusion on 
the level of metaphysical Truth. Thus, the Traditional School explains the ‘inner dimension’ of 
Islam as directly related to the oneness of Reality and hence, the illusionary or temporary nature 
of the world. For example, Coomaraswamy draws on the symbolism of the sun and writes, 
“From the spiritual perspective what we call the world-process and a creation is … a game that 
the Spirit plays with itself, as sunlight ‘plays’ upon whatever it illuminates and quickens, 
although unaffected by its apparent contacts.”326. Ali also echoes the same understanding of 
reality. When it comes to the absolute unity and dependence of all on things on God, he states:  
 
                                               
324 Chittick, William C. Science of the Cosmos, Science of the Soul: The Pertinence of Islamic Cosmology in the 
Modern World. Oxford: Oneworld Publication, 2007. P.7.  
325 Nasr, S.H. The Heart of Islam. P. 9-10. 
326 As quoted in: Whitall, Perry N., ed. A Treasury of Traditional Wisdom. Louisville: Fons Vitae, 2000. P. 23.  
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The foremost in religion is the acknowledgement of Him, the perfection of acknowledging Him is 
to testify Him, the perfection of testifying Him is to believe in His Oneness, the perfection of 
believing in His Oneness is to regard Him Pure, and the perfection of His purity is to deny Him 
attributes, because every attribute is a proof that it is different from that to which it is attributed 
and everything to which something is attributed is different from the attribute. Thus whoever 
attaches attributes to Allah recognizes His like, and whoever recognizes His like regards Him 
two; and whoever regards Him as two recognizes parts for Him; and whoever recognizes parts 
for Him mistook Him; and whoever mistook Him pointed at Him; and whoever pointed at Him 
admitted limitations for Him; and whoever admitted limitations for Him numbered Him. 
Whoever said: “In what is He?”, held that He is contained; and whoever said: “On what is 
He?”, held He is not on something else.327 
 
And in relation to creation and the world, Ali says:  
 
Remember that this world which you covet so ardently and attempt to acquire so earnestly, and 
which sometimes annoys you and sometimes pleases you so much, is neither your home nor a 
permanent destination. You have not been created for it, nor invited to it as your resting-place. It 
shall neither remain with you forever, nor will you remain in it eternally. If it has enticed you 
away with its charms, it has also warned and cautioned you of real dangers lurking in its folds. 
Take account of the warnings it has given you and do not be seduced or deceived by its 
allurements. Let these warnings frighten you from being too greedy to possess it. Try to advance 
                                               
327 The Nahj. Sermon 1.  
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towards the place where you are invited for eternal bliss and turn your face away from the 
vicious world.328 
 
It is important to note that this is not a pantheistic worldview but rather, it is a mystery in the 
sense that it is a ‘transcendent truth’ that cannot be grasped by an ‘immanent mind’. According to 
Schuon, a mystery is  
 
the essence of truth which cannot be adequately conveyed through language – the vehicle 
of discursive thought – but which may suddenly be made plain in an illuminating flash 
through a symbol, such as a key word, a mystic sound, or an image whose suggestive 
action may be scarcely graspable.329  
 
Thus, he separates the ‘tawhidi’ worldview from pantheism by writing that the world is not God 
but instead, that the former is “mysteriously plunged into God”.330 In any case, a corollary to 
creation or the God’s Quality of infinity, is Islamic Traditionalism’s doctrine of the degrees of 
Reality. From this point of view, a person that reflects Reality (al-Haqq) is more real than a 
person that does not. This is because Reality is absolute and eternal while all else is relative and 
temporary. This means that one’s degree of existence ‘grows’ in relation to their conformity with 
the Real. This is why, in reflecting on Schuon’s teachings, James Cutsinger writes, “…The 
infinitude of the Supreme Reality results inevitably in an irresistible radiation by which it lends 
degrees of its Being to all things”331 An example of the degrees of reality on the ‘terrestrial plane’ 
                                               
328 The Nahj. Sermon 173. 
329 Oldmeadow, Harry. Frithjof Schuon and the Perennial Philosophy. Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2010. P.112. 
330 Oldmeadow, Harry. Frithjof Schuon. P. 177.  
331 Cutsinger, James. Advice to the Serious Seeker: Meditations on the Teaching of Frithjof Schuon. Albany: State 
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can be seen in the difference between dreaming and wakefulness or in the difference between 
drug induced states and sobriety. In any case, it would not be an overgeneralization to say that 
the loss of the concept of degrees of reality or the concomitant notion of transcendence is one of 
the central distinguishing features of the modern and postmodern periods. Today, people 
generally seem to understand quantitative comparisons as objective and factual and qualitative 
comparisons as subjective and aesthetic. This is not surprising since, science, which is primarily 
concerned with matter and therefore quantity, has established itself as the academic field 
dedicated to the ‘objective study of reality’.332  
Degrees of Reality333 
 
                                               
332 In this regard, see P. 95, footnote 221. 
333 Graphic from: Smith, Huston. Forgotten Truth: The Common Vision of the World’s Religions. New York: 
HarperOne, 1992. P.62. 
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 The doctrine of the degrees or reality begs the questions, ‘can humans know reality’? And 
if so, ‘how can they conform themselves to it’? This brings this study to Islamic Traditionalism’s 
understanding of human nature and the human-Divine relationship. This in turn, raises the issue 
of the ontological reality of God’s Names and Qualities and their role in transformation and 
virtue. Again, this is extremely important in terms of understanding the overlap and friction 
between Islam and contemporary secular-liberal human rights. This is because, as this study has 
continuously emphasized, rights are derived from a particular people’s understanding of reality 
and their orientation towards it. 
 The Quran describes the human condition in terms of a polarity. On the one hand, 
humans are the noblest of creatures (ashraf al-makhluqaat) that dwell on Earth with the ‘Spirit of 
God’ within them. In this regard, the Quran reads:  
 
Behold, thy Lord said to the angels: "I am about to create man from clay: "When I have 
fashioned him (in due proportion) and breathed into him of My spirit, fall ye down in obeisance 
unto him." (38:71-72) 
 
We have honoured the sons of Adam; provided them with transport on land and sea; given them 
for sustenance things good and pure; and conferred on them special favours, above a great part 
of our creation. (15:29) 
 
On the other hand however, The Qur’an also describes human as created from dust and inclined 
towards ingratitude, heedlessness and ignorance. In this regard, the Quran states: 
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Among His Signs in this, that He created you from dust; and then,- behold, ye are men scattered 
(far and wide)! (30:20) 
 
(It is) the promise of Allah. Never does Allah depart from His promise: but most men understand 
not. They know but the outer (things) in the life of this world: but of the End of things they are 
heedless. (30:6-7) 
 
It is He Who has created for you (the faculties of) hearing, sight, feeling and understanding: 
little thanks it is ye give! And He has multiplied you through the earth, and to Him shall ye be 
gathered back. It is He Who gives life and death, and to Him (is due) the alternation of Night and 
Day: will ye not then understand? (23:78-80) 
 
Oliver Leaman argues that the concept of redemption has its basis in the Quran and is not, as 
some may argue, a ‘Christian reading’ of Islamic doctrines. In the regard, he writes:  
 
It is often said that Islam believes that humankind is basically good and so there is no 
need for God to redeem us... However, the angels suggest that if humans were given their 
head, they would succumb to corruption and shed bled (2.30) …[Moreover,] The Quran 
notes that Satan tempts the ‘Children of Adam’ (7.26-27), and describes us as feeble 
(4.28), despairing (11.9), unjust (14.34), quarrelsome (16.4) tyrannical (96.6) and lost 
(105.2)…The rather pessimistic conclusion to all this is that ‘Most men are not believers’ 
(12.103) … [and] ‘If God were to punish humans for their wrongdoing, He would not 
leave a single creature’(16.61).334 
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In any case, this duality is captured by the general the Islamic intellectual tradition’s view that 
humans have the potential to be better than angels or worse than animals. This is possible 
because God gave humans the gift of free will and therefore, they are the only creatures that can 
choose to obey or disobey God.335 Schuon’s poetry refers to these two human poles:  
 
Most animals are horizontal, since 
Their homeland is not other than this Earth; 
But man's essential stance is vertical; 
Free will to choose Salvation proves his worth.336 
 
Ali’s constant admonitions also generally presuppose that duality and thus, free-will, are inherent 
to the human state. More specifically, however, a report attributed to the Imam reads: 
 
…Somebody asked Imam Ali whether they had been destined to fight... Imam Ali replied if by 
destiny you mean a compulsion through which we are forced to do a thing then it is not so. Had it 
been an obligation of that kind there would have been no question of reward for doing it and 
punishment for not doing it…then the promised blessings and punishments in life after death will 
have no meaning. The Merciful Lord has given his creatures (human beings) complete freedom to 
do as they like, and then prohibited them from certain actions and warned them of the 
consequences of such actions. These orders of Allah carry in them the least trouble and lead us 
towards the most convenient ways of life and the rewards which He has promised for good deeds 
are many times more than the actions actually deserve. He sees people disobeying Him and 
                                               
335 On the early debates concerning freewill and predestination, see chapter 8 in: Denny, Frederick M. An 
Introduction to Islam. 4th Ed. Routledge, 2016.   
336 Schuon, Frithjof. Road to the Heart: Poems. Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2003. P. 62. 
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tolerates them not because He can be overruled or be compelled to accept human supremacy 
over Him. He did not send His prophets to amuse Himself or provide amusement for them. He 
did not reveal His orders without any genuine reason nor has He created the galaxies and the 
earth without any purpose… Hearing this the man asked Imam Ali, “Then what kind of destiny 
was it that we had?” Imam Ali replied: “It was an order of Allah to do it like the order He has 
given in His Holy Book: You are destined by Allah to worship none but Him, here ‘destined’ 
means ‘ordered’ it does not mean physical compulsion.337 
 
In terms of the two human poles, the Qur’an continuously instructs, warns and encourages 
humans to achieve their higher nature. In fact, being one’s highest self is the purpose of life; it is 
the intended ‘destination’ for humanity. Hence, the doctrine of human duality and its 
consequences must be at the core of any Islamic concept of human rights and ‘human 
flourishing’. Moreover, and therefore, concepts such as justice, freedom and equality must be 
understood, first and foremost, in relation to the Islamic goal of spiritual perfection.  
 The Quran also speaks about the relationship between God and humans in two ways. 
First and foremost, the human being is the servant of God (abd-Allah). According to the Quran, 
God assembled the children of Adam and asked them: ‘Am I not your Lord?’. They testified in 
the affirmative and it is because of this testimony that human beings cannot plead ignorance on 
the Day of Judgment (yawm al-qiyamah). Of course, many people would generally question this 
perspective and claim that they do not remember anything of the sort. In response, Islamic 
Traditionalism, drawing on the Quran, places particular emphasis on the connection between 
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forgetfulness and evil and maintains that the Prophets, Scriptures and other signs of God (ayat-
Allah) only operate to remind us of what we already know.338 For example, the Quran says,   
 
Almost bursting with fury: Every time a Group is cast therein, its Keepers will ask, "Did no 
Warner come to you?" They will say: "Yes indeed; a Warner did come to us, but we rejected him 
and said, 'Allah never sent down any (Message): ye are nothing but an egregious delusion!'" 
They will further say: "Had we but listened or used our intelligence, we should not (now) be 
among the Companions of the Blazing Fire!" (67:8-10)339 
 
And is it not enough for them that we have sent down to thee the Book which is rehearsed to 
them? Verily, in it is Mercy and a reminder to those who believe (29:51) 
 
And who doth more wrong than one who is reminded of the Signs of his Lord, but turns away 
from them, forgetting the (deeds) which his hands have sent forth? Verily We have set veils over 
their hearts lest they should understand this, and over their ears, deafness, if thou callest them to 
guidance, even then will they never accept guidance. (18:57) 
 
This is why, throughout Islamic history, many Muslims have paid particular attention to the 
significance of the remembrance of God (dhikr-Allah). In this regard, Ali tells his listeners:  
 
                                               
338 Shah-Kazemi, Reza. Justice and Remembrance. Pp. 150-151. 
339 Here, in line with Traditionalism, ‘used our intelligence’ refers to the human heart and its realization by way of 
remembrance. 
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Increase your remembrance of Allah, for it is the best of remembrances, and desire what has 
been promised to those who live their lives fearing Him - for his Promise is the truest of 
promises…340 
 
Perpetuate the dhikr, for truly it illumines the heart and it is the most excellent form of worship341 
 
This remembrance is at the center of all Islamic rituals from the five daily prayers to the yearly 
pilgrimage to Mecca. In any case, according to the Quranic narrative, humanity not only testified 
to the existence of God but also willingly accepted the ‘station of servanthood’. The verse of 
‘The Trust’ reads: 
 
We did indeed offer the Trust to the Heavens and the Earth and the Mountains; but they refused 
to undertake it, being afraid thereof: but man undertook it;- He was indeed unjust and foolish; 
(With the result) that Allah has to punish the Hypocrites, men and women, and the Unbelievers, 
men and women, and Allah turns in Mercy to the Believers, men and women: for Allah is Oft-
Forgiving, Most Merciful. (33:72-73) 
 
Although humans were ’unjust and foolish’, God provided them with the ability to fulfill their 
trust and this leads us to the second relationship between God and humans; namely, that the latter 
are God’s representatives on earth (khalifat-Allah). The Quran explains this relationship through 
its narrative of the Prophet Adam, who is considered to be the prototype for humanity. According 
to the narrative, God breathed His Spirit into Adam and taught him the ‘name of things’:     
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Behold, thy Lord said to the angels: "I am about to create man from clay: 
"When I have fashioned him (in due proportion) and breathed into him of My spirit, fall ye down 
in obeisance unto him." So the angels prostrated themselves, all of them together: Not so Iblis: 
he was haughty, and became one of those who reject Faith. 
 (38:71-74) 
 
In terms of 38:27, al-Tabari understands “My Spirit” as God’s power, while others, such as al-
Razi, maintain that the ‘Spirit’ refers to the creation of the human soul and moreover, since the 
‘Spirit’ is ‘of God’, then the human soul is a heavenly, noble and holy faculty.342 In terms of the 
‘name of things’, the Quran reads: 
 
And He taught Adam the names of all things; then He placed them before the angels, and said: 
"Tell me the names of these if ye are right." They said: "Glory to Thee, of knowledge We have 
none, save what Thou Hast taught us: In truth it is Thou Who art perfect in knowledge and 
wisdom." He said: "O Adam! Tell them their names." When he had told them, Allah said: "Did I 
not tell you that I know the secrets of heaven and earth, and I know what ye reveal and what ye 
conceal?" (2:31-33) 
 
According to ibn al-Arabi:  
 
Adam was capable of knowing all the Divine Names, unlike the angels who “did not 
possess the synthesis possessed by Adam and were not aware of the Divine Names by 
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which it [namely, Adam’s synthetics reality] is set apart such that they could glorify the 
Real and proclaim him holy through them. Nor did they know that God possess names to 
whose knowledge they did not attain, not glorifying Him with them no proclaiming them 
Holy as did Adam”. Thus, Adam could know God in ways that the angels could not.343  
 
The narrative goes on to say that Iblis, that is, Satan, tempted Adam and Eve to eat from the 
‘forbidden tree’ and in doing so, they were banished from heaven and sent down to Earth:  
 
In the result, they both ate of the tree, and so their nakedness appeared to them: they began to 
sew together, for their covering, leaves from the Garden: thus did Adam disobey his Lord, and 
allow himself to be seduced. But his Lord chose him (for His Grace): He turned to him, and gave 
him Guidance. He said: "Get ye down, both of you,- all together, from the Garden, with enmity 
one to another: but if, as is sure, there comes to you Guidance from Me, whosoever follows My 
Guidance, will not lose his way, nor fall into misery. (20:121-123) 
 
In the end, God forgave Adam and Eve, and assured them that he would send guidance to their 
‘children’ and help whomsoever followed that guidance. Thus, human beings have the 
responsibility to follow God’s guidance and fulfill their trust to represent God on Earth by living 
in submission to the Divine will. They are able to do this because of the ‘Divine Breath’ and their 
knowledge of Reality, that is, the ‘Name of things.’ In other words, humans have the 
responsibility to live in this world in accordance with truth and justice, and in doing so, live in 
peace and harmony. In this regard, the Quran reads:  
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The word of thy Lord doth find its fulfilment in truth and in justice: None can change His words: 
for He is the one who heareth and knoweth all. (6:115) 
 
The most beautiful names belong to Allah: so call on him by them; but shun such men as use 
profanity in his names: for what they do, they will soon be requited. Of those We have created are 
people who direct (others) with truth. And dispense justice therewith. Those who reject Our 
signs, We shall gradually visit with punishment, in ways they perceive not (7:180-182) 
 
Islamic Traditional thought generally maintains that the imperative to carry out the Divine will, 
that is, establish truth and justice, begins with one’s self. This is because the human being is 
made of many parts – physical, psychological and spiritual – that need to be put in order. In this 
regard, Ali states: 
 
The intellect is a king and characteristics are its subjects, so if it is weak in governing them, 
disorder takes place.344 
 
For those who put in order was is between them and God, God will put in other what is between 
them and other people.345 
 
The Divine imperative subsequently moves on to the basic family unit and then finally, to society 
at large. In this light, Nasr writes: 
  
                                               
344 Haeri, Fadhlalla. The Sayings and Wisdom of Imam Ali. Chapter 6.   
345 Cleary, Thomas. Living and Dying. P. 71. 
 
 
 145 
This trust from whose acceptance all of creation shied away, is precisely the burden of 
vicegerency of God on earth, of faith itself in its profoundest sense. To have accepted this 
trust means to have accepted freedom and also responsibility toward both God and all 
creatures. It means the freedom to transcend all degrees of existence and reach the Divine 
Presence even above the state of the angels, as Islamic texts assert.346 
 
It is because of this two-fold relationship of servanthood and vice-regency that humans have 
control and power over their surroundings. From the Traditional School’s point of view, many 
modern problems such as the large-scale destruction of the environment, stems from humanity’s 
‘forgetfulness’ of their duty to represent God on earth.347 On the basis of this view, it can be 
argued that human responsibilities stem from the first and primary relationship, that is, 
servanthood, and rights stem from the second and corollary relationship, that is, vice-regency. 
The first principle, that is the ‘principle of servanthood’ is essential to the basic ‘Muslim 
mentality’ and the Muslims’ understanding and orientation towards life. It is also this principle, 
as this study argues, that is one of the main causes for friction between Islam and the secular-
liberal tradition in general, and Islam and international human rights in particular.348  
 Thus far, this chapter has pointed to the fact that Islamic Traditionalism understands God 
as the sole reality and the world as an illusionary and temporary place. For this reason, then, the 
Traditional School in general, and the Quran and Ali in particular, place primary importance on 
the concept of virtue and the ‘transformation of the soul’ in preparation for the hereafter. Thus, as 
this paper has argued, an Islamic human rights society is one that functions to allow Muslims to 
                                               
346 Nasr, S.H. “Who is Man? The Perennial Answer of Islam” The Sword of Gnosis. Ed. Needleman. P. 209.  
347 In general, see: Nasr, S.H. Man and Nature: The Spiritual Crisis in Modern Man. Illinois: ABC International 
Group, 1997. 
348 Although Islamic Traditionalism tends to approach these issues from an ‘esoteric’ point of view, it also explains 
how these ideas are ‘translated’ into the common ‘Muslim mentality’. For example, this study argues that many 
traditional Muslims – despite their varied understandings of Islam – believe in the Truth of revelation and prophecy, 
and ultimately see themselves as responsible to God for their beliefs and actions in this world.    
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achieve their purpose in life – to serve and represent God on Earth – and thereby, climb, in 
degrees, the ‘ladder of reality’.349 This chapter now proceeds to look at these fundamental 
concepts in more detail. More specifically, it explores and elaborates on Traditionalism’s 
metaphysics of truth and justice and their implications in relation to freedom and equality.  
 Human beings play a central role in the cosmic drama precisely because of their ability to 
know reality and their duty to conform themselves as well as society to it. According to the 
Quran, objective Truth exists in the first place, because God refers to Himself as the Truth or 
Reality as such. For example:  
  
This is so, because Allah is the Reality: it is He Who gives life to the dead, and it is He Who has 
power over all things. (22:6) 
 
Therefore exalted be Allah, the King, the Reality: there is no god but He, the Lord of the Throne 
of Honour! (23:116) 
 
That is because God, He is the Truth, and whatsoever they call upon other than Him is false, and 
God is the Exalted, the Great (31:30) 
 
According to Husayn Tabatabai’s commentary on 31:30: 
 
This verse is thus understood as an affirmation that God is the Ultimate Reality beyond 
and behind all of creation and that all of the things to which anyone ascribes ultimate 
                                               
349 That is, to the extent that it is possible for each individual. As the Quran asserts: “On no soul doth Allah Place 
a burden greater than it can bear… (2:286) 
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power…are entirely dependent upon God, possessing no reality in and of themselves. 
God is the only reality or being that is necessary, while all other things are contingent.350  
 
This view that God is Truth or Reality itself is further supported by Ali, and his answer to 
questions concerning the nature of God. He states:  
 
He is Allah, the Clear Truth, truer and clearer than the eyes perceive. The intellects cannot reach 
Him by any definition…and the imagination cannot reach Him by any evaluation. There is no 
beginning to His primacy and there is no end to His eternity. He is the First and the Eternal, and 
He is the Everlasting without end… He have all things limitations when He created them, so as 
to make it clear that He is not like them351 
 
In addition to the fact that that there is objective Truth, Islamic Traditionalists also maintain that 
it is possible for humans to know the Truth. This is seen, for example, in the following Quranic 
verses:  
 
And that those on whom knowledge has been bestowed may learn that the (Qur'an) is the truth 
from thy Lord, and that they may believe therein, and their hearts may be made humbly (open) to 
it: for verily Allah is the Guide of those who believe, to the Straight Way. (22:54) 
 
And He taught Adam the names of all things; then He placed them before the angels, and said: 
"Tell me the names of these if ye are right.” They said: "Glory to Thee, of knowledge We have 
                                               
350 Nasr, S.H., ed. et al. The Study Quran. P. 1007. 
351 Haeri, Fadhlalla. The Sayings and Wisdom of Imam Ali. Chapter one.  
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none, save what Thou Hast taught us: In truth it is Thou Who art perfect in knowledge and 
wisdom." He said: "O Adam! Tell them their names." When he had told them, Allah said: "Did I 
not tell you that I know the secrets of heaven and earth, and I know what ye reveal and what ye 
conceal?" (2:31-33)352  
 
In the Law of Equality there is (saving of) Life to you, o ye men of understanding; that ye may 
restrain yourselves. (2:179) 
 
According to The Study Quran’s commentary on verse 2:179, “men of understanding” literally 
translates into “possessors of the kernel”, and thus, this verse uses symbolism in order to allude 
to the fact that true knowledge penetrates beyond outward forms and into the heart or inward 
reality of things.353 Similarly, Ali, in his collection of sermons and sayings, also maintains that 
humans have the ability to possess objective knowledge, and moreover, that this knowledge 
comes by way of Divine grace and inspiration. He states: 
 
There are three sorts of people…A divinely inspired Knower; the person who is 
seeking…knowing along the path of salvation; and the riffraff and rabble, the followers of every 
screaming voice, those who bend with every wind, who have not sought to be illuminated by the 
Light of …Knowing and who have not had recourse to a solid support.354 
 
                                               
352 For Ibn-Arabi’s commentary on verse 2:31-33, see Pp. 146-147.  
353 Nasr, S.H., ed. et al. The Study Quran. P. 78. 
354 The Nahj. Saying number 147. 
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Thus, these verses and hadith clearly show that Truth or Reality exists and that humans have 
the ability to discern the Real from the relative. Moreover, it clearly shows that many Muslims 
place a great deal of importance on the Truth and cannot accept a theory of justice, that is, human 
rights, unless it is rooted in the Real.355 In the modern world, the ability to know the truth is 
generally attributed to the mind and the human ability to reason and experience. This 
understanding gained prominence with the rise of modern movements, such as the Reformation 
and Enlightenment, and modern philosophies, such as Descartes’ dualism and Spinoza’s axioms. 
However, this point of view is alien to the Islamic intellectual tradition. According to the latter, 
the human ability to know the Truth is located at the ‘center’ of human being and needs to be 
‘awakened’ by the theurgic power of religious acts and by the descent of Divine grace. The 
Qur’an refers to the ‘center’ of the human being and seat of Absolute knowledge as the ‘Heart’.356 
For example:        
 
Do they not travel through the land, so that their hearts (and minds) may thus learn wisdom and 
their ears may thus learn to hear? Truly it is not their eyes that are blind, but their hearts which 
are in their breasts. (22:46)357 
 
Nay, here are Signs self-evident in the hearts of those endowed with knowledge: and none but the 
unjust reject Our Signs. (29:49) 
                                               
355 In other words, in the Muslim world, there seems to be popular support for human rights in general; however, it 
also seems that specific human rights articles will continue to problematic unless they are grounded in the Islamic 
Tradition and some of its truth claims. This argument is supported by the fact that alternative Islamic human rights 
models are always qualified by the condition that they do not violate the shariah. For example, see appendix C. 
356 According to Islamic Traditionalism, the ability to use one’s reason is extremely important. Nevertheless, reason 
is understood as a ‘secondary’, ‘derivative’ or ‘supportive’ mode of knowing that needs to be ‘grounded’ in 
revelation and virtue. On this view, without this ‘grounding’, reason quickly descends into rationalization based on 
changing circumstances and sentimentalities.   
357 The translator’s inclusion of the word ‘mind’ seems to be influenced by modern epistemological assumptions.  
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Imam Ali’s words mirror the Quranic understanding of the ‘knowing heart’. He states:  
 
Righteous struggle is of three types: the first thing to be overcome in this struggle is the hand, 
then the tongue, then the heart, Once the heart cannot recognize good or decry evil, it is upended 
and turned topsy-turvey.358 
 
The eyes cannot perceive Him with the sense of sight, but the heart can perceive Him through the 
realities of trust…359 
 
According to Shiah’s, Dua Kumayl is a supplication that Ali personally taught to his disciple, 
Kumayl ibn Ziyad Nakha’i. Here, while imploring God for forgiveness, the supplicant refers to 
the heart’s ‘knowledge of God’ and its ‘verification of Divinity’. The passage reads: 
 
…Can You see Yourself tormenting me with Your fire after I have professed Your Unity. And after 
the knowledge of You my heart has embraced, And the remembrance of You my tongue has 
constantly mentioned…Would that I knew, my Master, My God and my Protector. Whether You 
will give the Fire dominion over faces fallen down prostrate before Your tremendousness, …And 
over hearts acknowledging Your Divinity through verification…360 
 
                                               
358 As Quoted in: Qutbuddin, Tahera. Ed and Trans. A Treasury of Virtues and One Hundred Proverbs. New York: 
New York University Press, 2013. P. 29. 
359 Haeri, Fadhlalla. The Sayings and Wisdom of Imam Ali. Chapter one.   
360 “Complete text of Du’a’ Kumayl in Arabic with Transliteration and English Translation.” Ahlul Bayt Digital 
Islamic Library Project. al-islam.org. 02 Sept. 2017. 
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According to Islamic Traditionalism the locus of the human being is the ‘inner Heart’. It is the 
‘part’ of the human that knows wholly, certainly and intuitively. Thus, the inner Heart, functions 
to distinguish Reality from illusion, and therefore, it is a salvific ‘organ’. In other words, the 
Heart, being of a higher order than discursive reason and bodily senses, has the ability to 
comprehend the Divine Absolute. It allows humans to orient themselves in accordance with the 
Truth and the latter’s manifestation throughout different levels of creation. Writing from this 
perspective, Lakhani points out that 
 
…Truth, being of a universal order, is inscribed within our deepest selves - that within us 
which is transcendent and universal, our primordial nature, the core of our very being…. 
The faculty which is capable of discerning reality in its more subtle nature…[is] the 
transcendent faculty of the supra-rational Intellect, the core of our discerning self…361 
    
And in the same light, Guenon connects the intellect with metaphysics and writes: 
 
Metaphysic is a supra-rational, intuitive and immediate knowledge…There is an 
intellectual intuition and a sensory intuition; one is above reason, but the other is below 
it; this latter can only grasp the world of change and becoming, namely, nature, or rather 
an inappreciable part of nature. The domain of intellectual intuition, by contrast is the 
world of eternal and immutable principles, to is the domain of the metaphysic362 
 
As mentioned, this type of knowledge – which is the duty and right of every human – is a 
product of religious acts and Divine grace. In the Islamic tradition, this includes both acts of 
worship (ibadaat) and interactions with others (muamulaat). Islamic rituals and laws of conduct 
                                               
361 Lakhani, Ali M. “The Metaphysics of Human Governance” The Sacred Foundations. Ed. Lakhani. P. 6. 
362 Perry, Whitall N. A Treasury of Traditional Wisdom. P. 733.  
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are especially ‘valid’ to the extent they are transformative and able to re-awaken the human heart 
and its ‘memory’. This awakened state, in turn, allows humans to return to their primordial, 
virtuous and theomorphic selves (insaan al-kamil). This is possible because the inner Heart is 
essentially human and Divine in essence; therefore, it is the place where the knower and the 
known converge. In other words, knowledge of the heart is inseparable from being itself; one 
cannot know God without knowing and therefore, being one’s divine self. Chittick distinguishes 
between outward and inward knowledge by writing:  
 
…Intellectual knowledge…is achieved by tahqiq, which is to know things by verifying and 
realizing their truth and reality for oneself. One cannot verify the…reality of things without 
knowing them…in one’s own soul. …If knowledge is based on the words of the “authorities” or 
“experts,” it is not realized knowledge, but imitative knowledge [that is, taqlid].363  
 
On this journey of realization or tahqiq, Ali provides much counsel:          
 
Whoever remembers Allah, glory be to Him, Allah enlivens his heart and illuminates his intellect 
and the innermost core of his heart.364 
 
Perpetuate the dhikr, for truly it illuminates the heart and is the most excellent form of 
worship.365 
 
                                               
363 Chittick, William C. Science of the Cosmos. P. 22. 
364 Rayshahri, Muhammadi M. The Scale of Wisdom: A Compendium of Shi’a Hadith. Ed. Bilingual. London: ICAS 
Press. P. 412. 
365 As quoted in: Shah-Kazemi, Reza. Justice and Remembrance P.138. 
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Everyone who lacks self-restraint and piety will have a dead heart; whoever have a dead heart 
will enter inside the Hell.366 
 
Thus, Islamic Traditionalists, based on their spiritual epistemology, maintain that there is 
objective knowledge; God’s names and qualities, such as the Truth, are not mental concepts but 
rather, they are knowable and therefore, realizable, ontological realities. For example, The Study 
Quran’s commentary on verse 7:180, which encourages the faithful to call on God by His most 
beautiful names, states:  
 
…Each Name is understood to possess a real Divine Presence or Quality, for as al-Tabrisi notes 
there are no empty titles for God. In fact, in Islamic metaphysics, the whole of the cosmos is 
considered to be in reality nothing but reflection or theophanies (tajalliyat) of the Divine Names 
and Qualities… [Moreover] in Islamic esoterism, God and His Names are considered one. God is 
understood to be present in His sanctified Names, each of which is a ladder leading to Him.367 
 
 The discussion of Truth inevitably brings up the question of justice. The Universal 
Declaration was largely constructed by circumscribing questions concerning the fundamental 
nature of reality. However, according to the Quran and Ali, the twin realities of truth and justice 
are inseparable from one another. This is because justice is derived from truth and therefore, the 
former draws its justification and authority from the latter. For example, verses 7:159 and 7:181 
describe groups of people who carry out justice on the basis of truth. The verses read: 
 
Of the people of Moses there is a section who guide and do justice in the light of truth (7:159) 
                                               
366 The Nahj. Number 324. 
367 Nasr, S.H., ed. et al. The Study Quran. P.472. 
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Of those We have created are people who direct (others) with truth. And dispense justice 
therewith. (7:181) 
 
Similarly, Ali explains justice as based on, and derived from, knowledge. He states, 
 
Justice is also based on four disciplines: immersion in understanding, penetration of knowledge, 
brightness in judgment, and firm establishment of thoughtfulness. For one who understands 
knows with penetrating knowledge, and one who knows with penetrating knowledge proceeds 
judiciously from the start. And one who is thoughtful has not been negligent of his trust and lives 
a benign life among the people. 368 
 
According to Islamic Traditionalism, justice is an act of the human will; it is the act of 
conforming – in perfect equilibrium – to Reality. In other words, it is realizing one’s primordial 
state (fitrah) and therefore, mirroring the rest of creation in its total submission. Shah-Kazemi 
connects human intellect/knowledge with the human will/justice by writing: 
 
Being true to one’s intellect…is tantamount to being ‘spiritual’. For Imam Ali, the ‘true 
intellectual’…is one who not only thinks correctly but also acts ethically, and, at the 
deepest level, one who seeks to realize the ultimate Reality. The intellectual is defined by 
one who ‘puts all things in their proper place.’… Only the true intellectual can, therefore, 
be fully just, for only one who sees things as they truly are is able to put them in their 
right place. Thought, action and realization are all the concern of the true intellectual.369  
                                               
368 The Nahj. Saying number 31.  
369 Kazemi. Justice and Remembrance. P. 35.  
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According to the Quran, God’s creation is manifested in complete balance on the different 
existential planes of the cosmos. For example, the following verses state:    
 
And the earth We have spread out (like a carpet); set thereon mountains firm and immovable; 
and produced therein all kinds of things in due balance. (15:19) 
 
And the Firmament has He raised high, and He has set up the balance (of Justice). In order that 
ye may not transgress (due) balance. So establish weight with justice and fall not short in the 
balance. (55:07-09) 
 
Allah is He Who raised the heavens without any pillars that ye can see; is firmly established on 
the throne (of authority); He has subjected the sun and the moon (to his Law)! Each one runs (its 
course) for a term appointed. He doth regulate all affairs, explaining the signs in detail, that ye 
may believe with certainty in the meeting with your Lord (13:02) 
 
He Who created the seven heavens one above another: No want of proportion wilt thou see in the 
Creation of (allah) Most Gracious. So turn thy vision again: seest thou any flaw? again turn thy 
vision a second time: (thy) vision will come back to thee dull and discomfited, in a state worn 
out. (67:03-04) 
 
 
 
 156 
According to the Traditional School, harmony or balance is the imprint of God’s absolute unity 
on His infinite exteriorization.370 In relation to individuals then, the purpose of existence is to 
know the truth (intellect) and to conform to the latter (will) by way of establishing the Divine 
order within one’s self. In relation to human collectivities, this goal is extended, and includes the 
imperative to establish harmonious societies based on the ‘nature of things’. According to the 
Quran, Moses speaks to Pharaoh and explains God as ‘the Truth leading to justice’: 
 
…(Pharaoh) said: "Who, then, O Moses, is the Lord of you two?" He said: "Our Lord is He Who 
gave to each (created) thing its form and nature, and further, gave (it) guidance." (20:49-50) 
 
In a similar light, the following verses read:  
 
So set thou thy face steadily and truly to the Faith: (establish) Allah's handiwork according to 
the pattern on which He has made mankind: no change (let there be) in the work (wrought) by 
Allah: that is the standard Religion: but most among mankind understand not. (30:30) 
 
And there is not a thing but its (sources and) treasures (inexhaustible) are with Us; but We only 
send down thereof in due and ascertainable measures.  And We have provided therein means of 
subsistence, - for you and for those for whose sustenance ye are not responsible. (15:20-21) 
 
The Study Quran’s commentary on 15:21, states “Many Islamic thinkers…have conceived of the 
treasuries metaphysically as the archetypes or unmanifested essences of all things in God’s 
                                               
370 Nasr, S.H. The Heart of Islam. P. 243. 
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Knowledge”.371 In line with the Quran, Ali also describes justice in terms of knowledge, nature 
and harmony. He says:  
 
Justice puts things in their places.372 
 
As soon as things came into existence, every one of them was allotted properties and their place 
in nature…Thus every creature and very object had a place permanently fixed, was assigned 
position in nature which none can change.373 
 
Be informed that people consist of classes who prosper only with the help of one another and 
they are not independent of one another…Allah has fixed the share of each one of them and laid 
down His precepts about the limits of each in His Book (Holy Quran) and in the Sunnah of His 
Prophet by way of a settlement which is preserved with us.374 
 
 The school of Islamic Traditionalism envisions God and the world as a synthesis of 
polarities.375 In relation to God, these polarities are captured in the traditional categorization of 
the Divine names. That is, the names of Immanence and Transcendence or, in a different 
formulation, the names of Beauty and Majesty. Of course, it is important to note that this 
‘polarity’ only exists in God at the level of being – that is, at the level of human knowledge of 
                                               
371 Nasr, S.H., ed et al. The Study Quran. P. 645. Also see The Study Quran and its commentary on the verse, “Truly 
we have created everything according to measure” (54:49) P.1307. 
372 Cleary, Thomas. Living and Dying. P.64. 
373 As quoted in: Lakhani, Ali M. The Sacred Foundations. P.18. 
374 The Nahj. P.795.  
375 Chittick, William C. The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn Al-Arabi's Metaphysics of Imagination. State University of 
New York press, 1989. Pp. 286-288. 
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God. At the level of beyond-being, God’s is complete and absolute unity. In this regard, Nasr 
writes:  
 
From the metaphysical point of view it can be said that the Divine Nature is one and 
completely itself. It has in fact no parts that need to be put in their appropriate place 
though justice. If justice means to place everything in its place according to its nature and 
in following Divine cosmic and human laws, the Divine Nature is pure justice in the 
highest sense, being the One without any parts which could be out of place and needing 
justice according to their nature to return to their appropriate state.376 
       
On the level of being, God is understood as both merciful and just, apparent and hidden, 
beautiful and majestic etc. Humans – created as theomorphic beings – also ‘put things in their 
right place’ by ‘being’ a synthesis of both sets of Divine names.377  A virtuous heart then, is a 
heart that knows God, and thereby, reflects His Names and Qualities in proper measure. Of 
course, there are many virtues, however, Islamic Traditionalists separate them into three 
overarching categories from which all other virtues can be derived. These are the three virtues of 
humility, charity and veracity.378 Humility means to know oneself as a created being that is 
nothing before God; charity means to love one’s neighbor and transcend the dichotomy of self 
and other; and finally, truthfulness means to love the Truth to the extent that the former two 
virtues are based in objective reality and don’t trespass into subjective excessiveness. According 
to Schuon’s explanation of the three spiritual virtues: 
 
                                               
376 Nasr, S.H. “Introduction” The Sacred Foundations. Ed. Lakhani. P.1. 
377 Traditional Islamic thought emphasizes that some Names of God, such as the Holy (al-Quddus) are restricted to 
God alone.  
378 Schuon, Frithjof. Spiritual Perspectives and Human Facts: A New Translation with Selected Letters. Ed. 
Cutsinger. Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2007. Pp. 181-228 
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Humility means looking at oneself in the limiting state of individuation; it means turning 
one’s gaze on the ego, limitation, nothingness. Charity means looking around oneself: it 
means seeing God in one’s neighbor and also seeing oneself there, though this time not as 
pure limitation but as a creature of God made in His image. Veracity means looking 
toward Truth, submitting and attaching oneself to it, and becoming penetrated by its 
implacable light. Each of the three virtues must be found again in the others; they are the 
criteria of one another.379  
 
 According to the Quran, God manifests different Names and Qualities depending on His 
absolute knowledge as well as the particular circumstances of any given situation. For example, 
at times, God turns towards His creatures in mercy and at other times, He turns towards them in 
judgement:  
 
But ye turned back thereafter: Had it not been for the Grace and mercy of Allah to you, ye had 
surely been among the lost. (2:64) 
 
(their plight will be) no better than that of the people of Pharaoh, and their predecessors: They 
denied our Signs, and Allah called them to account for their sins. for Allah is strict in 
punishment. (3:11) 
 
These differences are the result of the fact that morality operates on the terrestrial plane and thus, 
it must take into account the latter’s relative and ephemeral nature. Similarly, a virtuous heart 
functions as a microcosmic Divine guide that allows one to act in truth and justice in a world of 
                                               
379 Schuon, Frithjof. Spiritual Perspectives. Ed. Cutsinger. P.184. 
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change and becoming. In other words, it is virtue that gives morality its transcendent authority 
and its ability to correctly judge between right and wrong. If there is no virtue, then morals are 
cut from their heavenly source and laws simply become constructed moralities based on 
sentiment with no ground in objective truth. This is why Leaman states that, “Character 
pertains…to the innate motivation and virtues of the soul and is a guide to moral conduct.”380 It is 
also why Tage Lindbom states: 
 
Virtue stands thus “midway” between God and moral imperatives. It is virtue…that gives 
men their scale of moral values and their standards of behavior, and virtue must take 
precedence over morality, defining and determining it. But it is not…an outward 
ordinance of acts and attitudes. Its life is an inward one… In this sense, virtue is 
ontological reintegration, not the product of subjective aspirations.381 
 
Thus, according to the Islamic intellectual thought, both virtue and revelation, work together to 
decide the right course of action in any particular situation.382 In the words of Schuon: 
 
…there are two poles for the manifestation of Divine Wisdom and they are: firstly, the 
Revelation “above us” and secondly, the Intellect “within us”; the Revelation provides 
the symbols while the Intellect deciphers them and “recollects” their content… 
Revelation is an unfolding and Intellect a concentration; the descent coincides with the 
ascent.383  
 
                                               
380 Leaman, Oliver. “Character” The Quran: An Encyclopedia. Ed. Leaman. P.139.  
381 Lindbom, Tage. “Virtue and Morality” The Underlying Religion. Ed. Lings and Minnaar. P. 286. 
382 According to Islamic Traditionalists, virtue is not a substitution for Revelation in general and Islamic law in 
particular. Rather, Islamic law and virtue are self-reflexive, that is, they reinforce and orient each other.   
383 Schuon, Frithjof. Understanding Islam. P.48.  
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According to this perspective then, today’s ‘religious moralities’ generally make the error of 
assuming moral laws are absolute and universal. On the other hand, today’s ‘secular moralities’ 
generally make the error of ignoring the Absolute principles behind laws.384 The former leads to 
religious dogmatism and the latter leads to secular relativity. Schuon’s poetry reads: 
 
One Should not confuse true virtue 
With morality —purely outward acts 
That change with land and custom, 
And do not transform the substance of the soul. 
 
Virtue is inward — it resides in the nature 
Of things; its values are the same 
From people to people, and in every religion; 
Humility magnanimity and devotion are the paths 
 
That lead from the earthly world to heaven385 
 
 
 In conclusion, the traditional Islamic intellectual tradition maintains that God and His 
Divine names are not theoretical abstractions, but rather, they are objective realities. Moreover, it 
argues that the goal of human existence is the attainment of a virtuous heart, that is, a heart that 
knows and therefore embodies and reflects the Divine Names in due measure. On this account, 
justice is the application of truth – known by revelation and virtue – in light of the ‘nature of 
things’. It is important to note that many people are not ‘naturally inclined’ to pursue the goal of 
                                               
384 Both the Traditional and Progressive School would agree with this statement in general. However, they would 
disagree concerning what is absolute and universal and what is relative and contingent.  
385 Schuon, Frithjof. Songs without Names: Volumes I-VI. Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2006. P.279. 
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human perfection. Nonetheless, the point remains: most Muslims generally believe in the truth of 
revelation and understand that they are ultimately responsible to God for their beliefs and 
actions. As the next chapter demonstrates, this particular Muslim understanding of life is 
sometimes at odds with the secular-liberal conception of human rights. This is because the latter 
situates truth on the level of justice by primarily focusing on moral theory and the liberal 
ideologies of rights, freedom, and equality.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Traditional Virtue Theory and its Implication for Human Rights 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 This final chapter engages in a critical discussion concerning the general implications of 
Islamic virtue ethics in the area of human rights. This is followed by some introductory remarks 
concerning the specific issues of Islamic law, religious pluralism, the penal code and gender. 
First however, it is important to reiterate why it is important to understand ‘Islamic 
Traditionalism’ even though traditional societies – largely due to colonization and globalization – 
no longer exist today. First, the traditional Islamic worldview, that is, basic ways of 
understanding the world, which has characterized Islamic civilizations for over a thousand years, 
is still a part of the ‘Muslim mentality’ today. Thus, Muslims are generally more inclined to 
adopt ‘new’ concepts if they understand them as part and parcel of their religious heritage. 
Second, the de-secularization of some societies and rise of so-called ‘Islamism’ means the 
possibility of an Islamic nation-state that is, at least to some extent, structured in accordance with 
traditional socio-legal and political norms. According to Adis Dudrija, The concept “of Islamism 
(islamiyyun/islamiyyin)…emerged in the context of a modern, postcolonial nation-state in the 
Muslim majority world [and]… refers to political movements who oppose the authoritarian 
"secular" political establishments in the Middle East on the basis of some kind of "Islamisation" 
of society platform.386 Duderija goes on to argue in favors of a ‘progressive Islamism’, that is, a 
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form of political Islam that is based on progressive ideals. That is, one that is “cosmopolitan in 
outlook, embraces constitutional democracy and contemporary ideas on human rights, gender 
equality and vibrant civil society”387 
            
 
 According to Islamic Traditionalists, the foundation or objective reality of everything, 
including human rights, is God. More specifically, it is God as He has revealed Himself in the 
Quran, and also, albeit secondarily, in nature and humanity itself. This is why the Universal 
Islamic Declaration begins by stating:  
 
Human rights in Islam are firmly rooted in the belief that God, and God alone, is the Law 
Giver and the Source of all human rights. Due to their Divine origin, no ruler, 
government, assembly or authority can curtail or violate in any way the human rights 
conferred by God, nor can they be surrendered.388 
    
This is important because it means that rights exist by way of sovereign authority and are not a 
set of constructed and sentimental moralities that change in accordance with circumstance. 
Rather, as this study argues, they should be based on the perennial principles of a sacred text and 
the knowledge of a virtuous heart. These principles, which can be found in virtually every 
religious tradition, have grounded and guided human collectivities for thousands of years.  
 
 
Human Rights and the Principle of Servanthood 
                                               
387 Duderija, Adis. “Why I am a Progressive Islamist” ABC Religion and Ethics. abc.net.au. 10 March 2018. 
388 See Appendix C. 
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The way in which people understand reality and their relationship to it determines their 
existential orientation in general and their understanding of human rights and its concomitant 
ideologies in particular.  Chapter four argues that, according to the Islamic Traditionalism, many 
Muslims primarily see themselves as servants of God and therefore, responsible to Him and the 
Divine law. It is only on the basis of this servanthood (‘abd-allah), that Muslims understand 
themselves as representatives of God on Earth and in this respect, entitled to certain human 
rights. This ‘principle of servanthood’ –- in its numerous iterations – is ingrained in the basic 
Muslim consciousness, and it is the reason for much of the tension with the secular-liberal 
understanding of human rights, and the latter’s emphasis on justice as individual freedom and 
equality.  
 The first and most obvious implication of the principle of servanthood is that Muslim 
Traditionalists believe that the contemporary focus on human rights is misguided. This is 
because it ignores or pays little attention to the reason for existence itself; namely, the duty or 
responsibility to worship God in the deepest sense of the word. The Qur’an states: 
 
But teach (thy Message) for teaching benefits the Believers. I have only created Jinns and men, 
that they may serve Me. No Sustenance do I require of them, nor do I require that they should 
feed Me. (51:55-57)  
 
And remember We took a covenant from the Children of Israel (to this effect): worship none but 
Allah; treat with kindness your parents and kindred, and orphans and those in need; speak fair to 
the people; be steadfast in prayer; and practice regular charity. Then did ye turn back, except a 
few among you, and ye backslide (even now). (02:83) 
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Did I not enjoin on you, O ye Children of Adam, that ye should not worship Satan; for that he 
was to you an enemy avowed?-"And that ye should worship Me, (for that) this was the Straight 
Way? "But he did lead astray a great multitude of you. Did ye not, then, understand? (36:60-62) 
 
Umar al-Zamakhshari (d.1144) argues that verse 51:56  
 
points to the purpose for which human beings were created, even if most of them do not 
fulfil this function. From this perspective, God only created human beings to worship 
Him by choosing to worship freely and not being constrained to do it, because He created 
them as contingent beings…389 
 
Similarily, The Study Quran notes that the terms ‘enjoin’ in verse 36:60 has the same root as ‘ahd 
meaning ‘vow’ or ‘covenant’ and therefore , “it relates to the covenant that all human beings 
made with God before coming into this world, for in acknowledging that God is their Lord, they 
acknowledge only He is worthy of worship”390 In any case, these type of verses show that faith 
and responsibility towards God and therefore, his creatures, are at the core of the Muslim 
understanding of the purpose of life. This is also why most of Ali’s sermons begin by reminding 
his listeners to remember God and fulfill their duty to Him. For instance, in the Imam’s 
correspondence with Malik al-Ashtar, Ali reminds the governor that his attitude and behavior 
towards his subjects should be determined by the remembrance of God, and in particular, 
remembrance that ultimately, all “power and majesty” belongs to God alone:  
 
                                               
389 Nasr, S.H., ed. et al. The Study Quran. P.1280. 
390 Nasr, S.H., ed. et al. The Study Quran. P.1080. 
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Do not say: “I am your overlord and dictator, and that you should, therefore, bow to my 
commands”, as that will corrupt your heart, weaken your faith in religion and create disorder in 
the state. Should you be elated by power, ever feel in your mind the slightest symptoms of pride 
and arrogance, then look at the power and majesty of the Divine governance of the Universe 
over which you have absolutely no control. It will restore the sense of balance to your wayward 
intelligence and give you the sense of calmness and affability. Beware! Never put yourself 
against the majesty and grandeur of God and never imitate His omnipotence; for God has 
brought low every rebel of God and every tyrant of man. Let your mind respect through your 
actions the rights of God and the rights of man, and likewise, persuade your companions and 
relations to do likewise. For, otherwise, you will be doing injustice to yourself and injustice to 
humanity. Thus both man and God will turn unto your enemies. There is no hearing anywhere for 
one who makes an enemy of God himself. He will be regarded as one at war with God until he 
feels contrition and seeks forgiveness. Nothing deprives man of divine blessings or excites divine 
wrath against him more easily than cruelty. Hence it is, that God listens to the voice of the 
oppressed and waylays the oppressor.391 
 
Accordingly, any theory of human rights in Islam needs to be understood and formulated as a 
theory of human responsibilities. This study argues that this is the only way that it will be 
accepted by most Muslims as an integral part of their own intellectual heritage as a whole. 
Moreover, it is important to point out that this perspective is not alien to the modern world for 
two reasons. First, it is because every duty entails a right and vice versa; they are two sides of the 
                                               
391 The Nahj. Letter number 52.  
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same coin.392 For example, the duty to respect others corresponds to the human right to dignity 
and the duty not to take a life corresponds with the human right to life. Second, in practice, 
secular nation-states enforce a number of laws wherein responsibilities precede rights. In this 
regard Nasr, writes:  
 
…Even in the modern West, in many cases responsibilities precede rights. For example, 
we have to be responsible drivers before we are given the right to drive on public roads 
and we have to accept the responsibility of mastering the laws of the land before being 
given the right to practice law. In Islam, this relationship in not a matter of expediency, 
but of principle, and its acceptance dominates the cultural and intellectual landscape.393  
 
Some human rights theorists disagree with the existence of a correlative relationship between 
duties and rights; however, this argument seems to be more so a matter of semantics than facts.394 
Moreover, as Alison Renteln points out, establishing this relationship is important insofar as it 
allows international human rights to be more flexible and inclusive. She writes: 
 
The importance of demonstrating the logical correlativity of rights and duties does not lie 
so much in any explanatory power it has for Western human rights theories, but rather in 
the flexibility it affords the formulation of international human rights standards. 
Correlativity is crucial because it means that the framing of moral claims in terms other 
than rights is not necessarily problematic. The recognition of an obligation may well 
signify the presence of an implicit right.395    
 
                                               
392 This is known as the ‘logical correlativity doctrine’. In general, see: Renteln, Alison D. “The Concept of Human 
Rights”.  
393 Nasr, S.H. Heart of Islam. P.278. Emphasis added. 
394 For example, see: Hohfeld, Wesley N. Fundamental Legal Conceptions. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1964. 
395 Renteln, Alison D. “The Concept of Human Rights”. 
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Thus, many Muslims feel at odds with any theory of justice that does not consider one’s duty 
towards God as central and is solely focused on expounding all the ‘rights’ that humans are 
owed. On the other hand, the notion of duty or responsibility is already part of the Muslim 
intellectual orientation and needs to be applied in order to further the cause of justice and peace 
in Muslim societies.     
 Another implication of the Islamic ‘principle of servanthood’ is that it is at odds with the 
contemporary emphasis on the right to liberty. Of course, the Islamic tradition, both in theory and 
practice, has allowed for individual freedoms and distinguished between private and public acts. 
Thus, the issue is not about freedom in general, but rather, it is about the type of freedom that is 
being emphasized. According to Muslim traditionalists, human rights’ over-emphasis on the 
liberal understanding of freedom misses the point of existence. This is because, according to the 
Islamic intellectual tradition, freedom is not primarily an extrinsic quality but rather, it is an 
intrinsic virtue. In other words, freedom can be perceived in one of two ways. The first is 
outward; it is the freedom from bondage from the ‘other’ and the second is inward; it is freedom 
from the bondage of the Egoic self. In Lord Northbourne’s words’, “we can aspire to freedom for 
our terrestrial nature, or we can aspire to freedom from our terrestrial nature”. 396 According to 
Islamic Traditionalism, it is liberation from the Egoic self that is of the utmost importance 
because it is this type of freedom that is Absolute in nature and hence, mirrors its Divine form. 
According to Lings:  
 
The desire for freedom is above all the desire for God, Absolute Freedom being an 
essential aspect of Divinity…It was clearly above all to this freedom that Christ referred 
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when He said: ‘Get knowledge, for knowledge will make you free’, inasmuch direct 
knowledge, Gnosis, means union with the object of knowledge, that is, with God.397         
 
Of course, some may object on the basis that an individual must be free from external restrictions 
in order to overcome the oppressive nature of the ego. However, this is only a partial truth 
because, one needs certain external ‘constraints’, such as Divine laws and rites, to actualize 
freedom on the spiritual plane. It is in this light that verses such as 5:6 can be understood: 
 
…Allah doth not wish to place you in a difficulty, but to make you clean, and to complete his 
favour to you, that ye may be grateful. (5:6) 
 
 On the other hand, outward liberty is somewhat of myth, because there is no way to completely 
escape from the ties of a relational and relative world. According to Northbourne: 
 
Progress achieved towards the satisfaction of terrestrial needs, desires and fancies 
contributes nothing by itself towards inward freedom; on the contrary, when pursues 
beyond what is necessary, it tends more and more to supplant and to suppress the search 
for inward freedom, thereby defeating its own ends.398 
 
In the same light, Ali also emphasizes and gives primary importance to internal freedom, that is, 
freedom from one’s own ‘lower’ self:399  
 
The Strongest people are those who are strongest against their own souls. 
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The ultimate battle is that of a man against his own soul 
 
Truly, one who fights his own soul, in obedience to God and does not sin against Him, has the 
rank of the righteous martyr in God’s eyes.  
 
Thus, first and foremost, the human right to freedom needs to be understood from its 
metaphysical perspective, that is, intrinsically. This is because transcendence towards Absolute 
liberty is the purpose of human existence; it is both a human duty and right. In this light, it is 
necessary for an Islamic human rights theory to place certain religious restraints on individual 
liberty. According to the secular-liberal tradition, these restraints exist at the point where the 
‘other’ begins; from the Traditional Islamic perspective, they exist from the outset, that is, at the 
point where the ‘self’ begins. Of course, enforcing these religious restraints is generally an 
individual’s prerogative. Nevertheless, the point remains: the over-emphasis on the secular-
liberal understanding of freedom is alien to the traditional Muslim’s cultural and intellectual 
orientation. It is ‘inward freedom’ that is central to the Quran’s and Islamic intellectual tradition’s 
spiritual ethos. 
Another space of friction between the Islamic ‘principle of servanthood’ and contemporary 
human rights lies with the liberal conception of equality. The Islamic intellectual tradition, much 
like in the case of freedom, has always emphasized the divine dimension of equality over its 
terrestrial one. From the metaphysical perspective, equality is considered to be “the need to be 
adequate once more to the Divine Presence”.400 According to Lings, it is “…the greatest of all 
Mysteries [and] is expressed in Islam in the words: Neither My earth no My heaven hath room 
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for Me, but the heart of my believing servants hath room for me”401 Similarly, Nasr writes that in 
an Islamic society, equality exists to the extent that 
 
All…are priests and stand equally before God as his vice-gerents on earth. But he who is 
more able to realize his real nature and function is qualitatively superior to one for whom 
being in the human state is only accidental. The equality of [humans] is not in their 
qualities…but in the fact that for all…the possibility of realizing their theomorphic nature 
and fulfilling the purpose of human existence is ever present.402 
 
Thus, equality is the human potential, insofar as humans contain the ‘Divine Breath’, to mirror 
the Absolute Names and Qualities. In other words, it is to become God-like. Again, from the 
traditional Islamic perspective, this is the purpose of human existence and therefore, it is a 
human duty and right. Hence, it must form the foundation of an Islamic theory of human rights. 
Furthermore, the spiritual understanding of equality is closely related to justice and the Divine 
balance (mizan). From the traditional Islamic point of view, liberal equality ignores the ‘Divine 
balance’ and thereby, tends towards reducing things to their lowest common denominator. In 
other words, it ignores the Quranic view that God “hath created…and gave order and 
proportion.”403 and it also ignores Ali’s words that “justice puts things in their place”404 According 
to Islamic Traditionalism, people have different natures, and therefore, different divine ‘callings’. 
On this view, hierarchal structures are a precondition for balance and harmony and do not 
necessarily lead to oppression.405 According to Traditionalists, it is the loss of hierarchy – based 
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on Divine archetypes and human ‘talents’ – that has resulted in the loss of balance and harmony 
and is therefore responsible for the disorder and chaos in the Modern world. To reiterate, Guenon 
states:    
 
…Under the present state of affairs in the Western world, nobody any longer occupies the 
place that he should normally occupy by virtue of his own nature… Since the undertaking 
of a function, no matter of what sort, is no longer dictated by any legitimate rule, the 
inevitable result is that each person finds himself obliged to do whatever kind of work he 
can get, often that for which he is the least qualified… It is the negation of these 
differences, bringing with it the whole negation of all social hierarchy, that is the cause of 
this whole disorder…406  
 
 This study’s discussion of the Quranic principle of ‘servanthood’ clearly demonstrates 
why there is friction between the basic Muslim mentality and the modern conception of human 
rights. For most Muslims, any theory of justice, that is, human rights, must be rooted in God’s 
revelation, and expounded in light Islam’s principle imperative, that is, submission to the Divine 
will in all of its consequences. In other words, according to the Islamic intellectual tradition, any 
concept of human rights and human flourishing must take into account, first and foremost, the 
concept of the ‘inner human’, virtue, and the goal of self-realization. This means that the existing 
friction with human rights is not about the concepts of freedom and equality as such; rather, the 
friction is about the primary and exclusive emphasis on a particular understanding of freedom 
and equality. From the Traditional Islamic perspective, all social norms and laws are valid 
‘rights’ insofar as they allow humans to achieve their purpose of existence. Of course, many 
Muslims have and will continue to fall short of this ideal. However, it is a matter of degrees; the 
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closer one is to self-realization, the closer one is to a harmonious self, family and society. 
Moreover, the secular space is not a vacuum. It is always filled with a system of beliefs that 
influences human states and dispositions. Thus, this study argues that a society is ‘un-Islamic’ to 
the extent that it is centrifugal, this is, it draws people away from their ‘absolute centers’, that is, 
their ‘certain inner hearts’ towards their ‘relative peripheries’, that is, their relative thoughts and 
desires. This is the case with many of today’s secular spaces which, in the name of external 
freedom and equality, are filled with the ideologies of individualism and consumerism. 
According to Islamic Traditionalism, societies that have lost any sense of the Divine Presence no 
longer function as a means to salvation and are, to that extent, illegitimate.  According to the 
Qur’an, communities that disobey and/or forget God are eventually led to ruin:407 
 
How many were the populations We utterly destroyed because of their iniquities, setting up in 
their places other peoples? (21:11) 
 
What! Are they better than the people of Tubba and those who were before them? We destroyed 
them because they were guilty of sin. (44:37) 
 
See they not how many of those before them We did destroy? - generations We had established on 
the earth, in strength such as We have not given to you - for whom We poured out rain from the 
                                               
407 It is important to reiterate that the Quran was revealed in a specific context and many of its verses were revealed 
in response to specific situations. These following verses, for example, should not be taken out of context to imply 
that the Quran is ‘irrationally violent’. According to the Islamic intellectual tradition, these verses are an expression 
of Divine justice and point to the fact that any society that turns away from the Real and chases the illusionary will 
inevitably be ruined.    
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skies in abundance, and gave (fertile) streams flowing beneath their (feet): yet for their sins We 
destroyed them, and raised in their wake fresh generations (to succeed them). (06:06) 
 
On the other hand, a society is ‘Islamic’ to the extent that it is centripetal, that is, it draws people 
away from the illusions of multiplicity towards the reality of unity. This is possible in a public 
sphere that is filled with reminders of the Divine; reminders of the human testimony to God’s 
existence and the human’s acceptance of ‘the Trust’ to represent God on Earth by living in truth 
and justice. In this way, society functions as a ‘silent theology’. According to Lings:  
 
The purpose of religion as a whole is to knit together all looseness in man by setting up in 
his soul an impetus towards the center which will bring it once more within range of the 
attraction of the Heart… Here lies the essence of a sacred civilization, to be forever 
demanding…that it should pull itself together and keep itself together. 408  
 
Throughout Islamic history, religious law has been applied to different extents and by way of 
different expressions. However, traditional Islamic societies have always carried a palpable 
presence of the Sacred – as revealed in the Quran – and in doing so, have sculpted the thought 
and behavior of Muslims for over a thousand years. To reiterate, this cultivated ‘Muslim 
mentality’ is the reason for the friction between the Islamic tradition and the contemporary 
human rights tradition. This friction is not simply theoretical; it has practical implications, and in 
terms of the latter, none is more controversial than the general implementation of Islamic law.  
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Islamic Law, Pluralism, the Penal Code and Gender  
 
At the outset, it is important to restate that the goal of this study is to explore the Islamic 
intellectual tradition – as expressed by the Traditional School of thought – in search for the 
fundamental principles that must ‘ground’ any Islamic theory of human rights. It is specifically 
concerned with the Islamic notion of virtue and its metaphysical implications in relation to truth, 
justice, freedom and equality. Moreover, this study has suggested that an ‘Islamic’ society is 
primarily one that is centered around the Sacred and functions to help human beings achieve 
their primary purpose for existence. In this sense, Islamic law is secondary, and only important 
insofar as it acts as a means towards individual, familial and societal unity and not as an end in 
and of itself. Nevertheless, this study will conclude this section with some introductory 
comments on the more specific issues of Islamic law, religious pluralism, the penal code and 
gender. In doing so, it intends to point towards potential areas of overlap and consensus between 
the Islamic and human rights traditions.   
According to the Progressive School, one of the greatest challenges facing the 
implementation of human rights – both in Islamic thought and practice – is the traditional 
understanding of Islamic law. Progressive Muslims generally argue that this traditional 
understanding is based on thee false assumptions. First, that the Quran’s purpose is to govern, as 
opposed to guide, Muslim lives and Islamic societies. Second, that Islamic law is Divine and 
therefore, not a human construct. And third, that humans have objective access to the Divine will 
and therefore, their duty is to simply accept and execute the law. For example, Khaled Abou El-
Fadl, writing on the subject of Islam and democracy, states:  
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…Arguments claiming that God is the sole legislator endorse a fatal fiction that is 
defensible… Such arguments pretend that some human agents have perfect access to 
God’s will, and that human beings could become the perfect executors of the divine will 
without inserting their own human judgments and inclinations in the process.409 
 
El-Fadl continues and states, “If we say that the only legitimate source of law is the divine text 
and that human experience and intellect are irrelevant to the pursuit of the divine will, then 
divine sovereignty will always stand as an instrument of authoritarianism and an obstacle to 
democracy.”410 However, according to the Traditional School, this line of argumentation 
misunderstands the importance and function of the shariah in Islamic societies and Muslim life. 
Here, it is first important to remember that Traditionalism’s understanding of Islamic law is 
based on the premise that religions are providential forms that embody different aspects of the 
Divine Will in particular ways.411 They are providential and necessary because different religious 
forms allow people to use their free-will to choose, or not choose, any one of the ‘paths that lead 
to the same summit’. In light of this, the Islamic Traditionalism maintains that the shariah – in 
both its general and concrete injunctions – is the Islamic embodiment of the Divine Will.412 In 
any case, on this view, it can be argued that the shariah is an expression of the principle of tawhid 
because its all-encompassing nature functions to sanctify, integrate and unify all human thought 
and behavior. It is important to note that this is one of the reasons for the friction between Islam 
and contemporary human rights. The latter generally assumes that human rights is solely a theory 
of justice and can remain neutral when it comes to the truth in general and religion in particular. 
                                               
409 Abou El Fadl, Khaled. Islam and the Challenge of Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. P.9. 
410 Abou El Fadl, Khaled. Islam and the Challenge of Democracy. P.9. 
411 For Islamic Traditionalism’s approach to Islamic law, see: Schuon, Frithjof. Understanding Islam. Pp. 1-35 and 
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Underlying this assumption is the fact that human rights are rooted in the Western legal tradition 
and its separation between the Church and state. Nevertheless, the comprehensive nature of the 
shariah does not remove human agency and free-will but rather, it redirects it. In other words, it 
moves the will away from the horizontal or worldly aspects of life and allows it to focus on the 
vertical or spiritual imperatives of religion. In this regard, Nasr writes: 
 
Some may object that accepting the shariah totally destroys human initiative. Such a 
criticism, however, fails to understand the inner workings of the Divine Law… Initiative 
does not come only in rebelling against the Truth…initiative and creativity come most of 
all in seeking to live in conformity with the Truth and in applying its principles to the 
condition which destiny has placed before man. To integrate all of one’s tendencies and 
activities within a divinely ordained pattern requires all the energy which man is capable 
of giving.413 
 
Furthermore, most Muslims have always understood that Islamic law is, at least in part, a product 
of human intellectual endeavor. However, this view is qualified by the fact that this endeavor has 
it basis in the Quran and the latter’s transcendent principles. This means that many Muslims 
understand Islamic law as an extension of the Quran and therefore, Divine in its own right, that 
is, in principle.414 Moreover, as this study has shown, the Islamic intellectual tradition has always 
balanced the reality of human subjectivity with the Islamic concept of transcendence and the 
human ability to ‘know’ by way of revelation and intellection. Dismissing the concept of 
transcendence is equivalent to dismissing the reason for existence itself and ignoring humanity’s 
greatest gift and potential. This study is not arguing that Islamic legal scholars used revelation 
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and the inner heart to develop the law beyond their immediate subjective realities. Rather, it is 
arguing that any objection to Islamic law that is exclusively based on the concept of relativity, is 
alien to the Islamic intellectual tradition as a whole and therefore, unlikely to succeed. Finally, 
the idea that Islam needs to ‘reform’ and ‘catch up’ with society is a modern concept and an 
anomaly in Islamic history.415 This is because traditional Muslims have always sought to conform 
their societies to Quranic laws and norms and not the other way around. For example, Ali 
constantly reminds his listeners about the importance of following the revealed law. He states: 
 
…This world begins in weariness and ends in death. You are accountable for what is lawful in it 
and punishable for what is unlawful… How excellent is the man who performs good deeds and 
undertakes acts of purity, who earns something he can set aside and avoided what he is warned 
against…416 
 
What can I say about a place in which the healthy fall ill and the sick are remorseful. Where the 
poor grieve and the wealthy are seduced, where one is held accountable for what is lawful and 
where unlawful things leads to fire.417 
 
The lawful and unlawful are distinct…The unlawful was not safe for past generations, and it is 
not safe for those yet to come…The law is inviolable.418 
 
                                               
 
416 Whitall, Perry, ed. Treasury of Virtues. P.45. 
417 Whitall, Perry, ed. Treasury of Virtues. P.47. 
418 Whitall, Perry, ed. Treasury of Virtues. P. 157. The full quote clearly shows that Ali is speaking in relation to the 
Quran’s concrete injunctions. He refers to the separation between men and women, marriage between relatives, and 
marriage to multiple wives. 
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Despite the different understandings of Islamic law between the Traditional and Progressive 
Schools, there is also room for some agreement and overlap. This is because Traditionalists are 
open to the idea of legal reform as long as this reform does not contradict the basic Islamic 
worldview and its fundamental principles. This is because they understand that the law operates 
in the world – the realm of the relative – and therefore, the Quran’s principles must be 
continuously reapplied according to changing circumstances. This is why this study has argued 
that it is both revelation and virtue, that allows one to understand and execute the Divine Will. 
For example, the Quran’s specific laws of inheritance are an expression of Islamic principles in 
the context of 7th Century Arabia, where men were financially responsible for maintaining their 
families. However, in the context of societies where both men and women carry the financial 
burden, this particular expression, that is, the laws of inheritance, is open to reform. Finally, it is 
important to note that traditional Islamic law is virtually non-existent today. This is because 
contemporary nation-states are generally governed by modern socio-political institutions and 
modes of discourse and are not properly grounded in the Islamic intellectual heritage as a 
whole.419  
Another area of contention between Islam and human rights concerns the issue of pluralism, 
and the differential and oppressive treatment of minorities in general and non-Muslims in 
particular. Certain Particular Quranic verses and Islamic historical norms, potentially provide the 
ground for the marginalization and oppressive treatment of the ‘Other.’ For example, chapter 
three raised the issue of jizyah based on the following Quranic verse:  
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Fight those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been 
forbidden by Allah and His Messenger, nor acknowledge the religion of Truth, (even if they are) 
of the People of the Book, until they pay the jizya with willing submission, and feel themselves 
subdued. (9:29) 
 
According to al-Razi, there are a number of Jews and Christians that affirm the existence of God 
and the hereafter. Nevertheless, he still maintains that the legal ruling (hukm), that is, to ‘fight 
them until they pay the jizyah’, applies to all ‘People of the Book’. He states: 
 
These [who believe in God] do not fall under [the description of this verse], but the 
requirement of the indemnity holds for them since it is said that, when an indemnity is 
required for some of them one says the same for all of them, since no one [that is, no 
jurist] holds the view that there is separation420   
 
In other words, al-Razi says it applies to all ‘People of the Book’ simply because there is no legal 
opinion to the contrary. According to The Study Quran, “This interpretation characterizes much 
of the mainstream of Islamic legal opinion on the matter.”421 In any case, there are many Quranic 
verses that can and have functioned to construct a mentality of ‘Muslim superiority’. For 
example:  
 
Do not marry unbelieving women, until they believe: A slave woman who believes is better than 
an unbelieving woman, even though she allures you. Nor marry (your girls) to unbelievers until 
they believe: A man slave who believes is better than an unbeliever, even though he allures you. 
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unbelievers do (but) beckon you to the Fire. But Allah beckons by His Grace to the Garden (of 
bliss) and forgiveness, and makes His Signs clear to mankind: That they may celebrate His 
praise. (2:221) 
 
Those who take disbelievers as protectors over the believers: do seek honor through them? Nay, 
all honor belongs to Allah. (4:139)422 
 
It is verses such as these that have sometimes been used to justify the oppressive treatment of the 
‘Other’. However, in my opinion, these types of verses are not absolute principles; they are 
particular regulations that were intended for a society that was divided by religious lines and 
largely at war in accordance with those divisions. However, in keeping line with the 
Traditionalist framework, the two questions that need to be asked are: what are the underlying 
principles of the verses that seem to justify marginalization? And what are the different ways that 
these principles can be understood and expressed? In this light, this study argues that verses such 
as 9:29, 2:221 and 4:139 are based on the perennial principles of truth and justice and the Divine 
command for people and societies to conform themselves to the two virtues. In other words, 
these verses speak out against any person that knowingly denies the truth and attempts to thwart 
justice. This argument is strengthened when one understands ‘unbelief’ (kufr) in its etymological 
sense of ‘intentionally covering up the truth’. In this regard, Chittick writes:  
 
“The original sense of the term kufr is to conceal something. People who are ungrateful 
conceal the good that has been done to them by not mentioning it. A person who has no 
faith conceals the self-evident truths of existence. Kufr, in short, is understood as 
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covering over and a concealing of the truths one knows. Hence…the term (ungrateful) 
truth-concealing.”423   
 
Thus, the distinction between the believer and unbeliever can be reformulated as a distinction 
between sincerity and hypocrisy. Moreover, a corrective to the marginalization of the ‘Other’, 
can be found in the Quran and its metaphysics of pluralism. In this regard, Eric Geoffroy writes: 
 
… In Islam, God alone is One and unique, all that is other than Him, namely, His 
creation, is projected into multiplicity. However, the divine mercy, which ‘embraces all 
things’ ensures that there is no rupture between these two levels…Thus, the recognition 
of Unicity (tawhid) that is required by the faithful Muslim, should, by direct implication, 
bring about in his consciousness the recognition of solidarity and interdependence of all 
realms of creation.424  
 
In other words, and more concretely, the Quran contains a number of principles that can and have 
been used by Muslims to create policies of inclusivity. These include the ideas that all humans 
are children of Adam (bani Adam), that they share a single human nature (fitrah) and that the 
different religious forms (ahl al-kitab) are based on a single, primordial religion (din al-qayyim). 
In this regard, the Quran reads:  
 
So set thou thy face steadily and truly to the Faith: (establish) Allah’s handiwork according to 
the pattern [fitrah] on which He has made mankind: no change (let there be) in the work 
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(wrought) by Allah: that is the standard Religion [din al-qayyim]: but most among mankind 
understand not. (30:30) 
 
Those who believe (in the Qur'an), and those who follow the Jewish (scriptures), and the 
Christians and the sabians,- any who believe in Allah and the Last Day, and work righteousness, 
shall have their reward with their Lord; on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve. (2:82)  
 
In the same light, Ali reminds Malik ibn al-Ashtar that his subjects are also his brothers – either 
in faith or in humanity – and therefore, he should treat them accordingly. In this regard, Ali 
states: 
 
Develop in your heart the feeling of love for your people and let it be the source of kindliness and 
blessing to them. Do not behave with them like a barbarian, and do not appropriate to yourself 
that which belongs to them. Remember that the citizens of the state are of two categories. They 
are either your brethren in religion or your brethren in kind. They are subject to infirmities and 
liable to commit mistakes.425 
 
Thus, the Islamic intellectual tradition contains the perennial principles that are needed in order 
to extend equal civil, political, and socio-economic rights to all of its citizens. This includes the 
right to freedom of religion and conscience because it is this freedom and its responsibilities that 
makes one quintessentially human. As the Quran states: 
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Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear from Error: whoever rejects evil 
and believes in Allah hath grasped the most trustworthy hand-hold, that never breaks. And Allah 
heareth and knoweth all things. (2:256) 
 
to you be your Way, and to me mine (109:6) 
 
However, it should also be noted that these rights are not inalienable. In other words, they extend 
to all citizens, but only on the condition that those citizens do not abuse their rights in order to 
disturb public law and morality. In this light, Nasr writes: 
 
In modern society, the rights of citizens do not change whether those citizens fulfill their 
responsibilities toward God or even believe in God or not… Some in the West have 
contrasted this state of affairs with the situation in the Islamic world, and claim that, from 
the Islamic point of view, such persons would have no rights. This assertion is, however, 
not at all true. If certain Muslims fall into religious and intellectual doubt…their right to 
the protection of their life and property by society still remains as long as they do 
not…act against social norms and laws.426  
 
Nasr continues and notes that, from a traditional perspective, religious and intellectual doubt 
cannot negate a human being’s rights. This is because, according to the Islamic intellectual 
tradition, all human beings contain the ‘Divine spark’ and moreover, they may, during the course 
of their lifetimes, return to their belief in God and act in accordance with that belief.427  
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Chapter four pointed out that the current friction between the Islamic penal code and 
contemporary human rights is a matter of different worldviews and their primary assumptions. It 
argued that, from the traditional Islamic perspective, physical punishment functions on an 
individual, societal and spiritual level.428 On the other hand, it also argued that punishment in the 
form of incarceration, as practiced in many secular-liberal nation-states, contradicts certain 
Islamic principles, namely, the unity of the family and its role as the fundamental unit of society. 
However, many human rights advocates also agree that incarceration as punishment is 
problematic. Here, ‘Western’ and ‘Islamic’ human rights have the ability to etch out a space of 
overlapping consensus. That is, they can find consensus in the concept of rehabilitation. 
According to Leonard Lewisohn, Muslim jurists generally agree that the Quranic ‘eye for an eye’ 
doctrine of retributive justice means “retributive justice as a process of rehabilitation rather than 
a cycle of violence of the sort common in the pre-Islamic tribal culture of revenge.”429 From the 
perspective of Islamic Traditionalism, rehabilitation can be grounded in the perennial principles 
of Divine mercy, and human free-will, that is, the human capacity for change. For example, the 
Quran reads:   
 
Those who sustain the Throne (of Allah) and those around it Sing Glory and Praise to their Lord; 
believe in Him; and implore Forgiveness for those who believe: "Our Lord! Thy Reach is over all 
things, in Mercy and Knowledge. Forgive, then, those who turn in Repentance, and follow Thy 
Path; and preserve them from the Penalty of the Blazing Fire! (40:7) 
                                               
428 Again, it is important to reiterate that this explanation is not an argument in favour of the traditional Islamic penal 
code’s use of physical punishment. Instead, it is an argument about the ways in which worldviews work in the 
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When those come to thee who believe in Our signs, Say: "Peace be on you: Your Lord hath 
inscribed for Himself (the rule of) mercy: verily, if any of you did evil in ignorance, and 
thereafter repented, and amend (his conduct), lo! He is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful. (6:54) 
 
The principle of mercy is also found in Ali’s letter to the governor of Egypt in which he 
emphasizes the importance of love, kindness and forgiveness. In this regard, he counsels:  
 
Develop in your heart the feeling of love for your people and let it be the source of kindliness and 
blessing to them… [The citizens of the state] are subject to infirmities and liable to commit 
mistakes…some indeed do commit mistakes. But forgive them even as you would like God to 
forgive you…. look after those under you and to be sufficient unto them. And you will be judged 
by what you do for them.430 
 
Thus, the Quran and hadith provide Muslims with the principles they need to incorporate 
rehabilitation into their legal systems without betraying the Islamic intellectual tradition and its 
consequent worldview.  
As mentioned, this section is mainly concerned with making some introductory remarks 
on the specific issues concerning Islam and human rights. Hence, this study’s discussion of 
gender is restricted to the male and female and does not address gender in its full spectrum. 
Although the latter is beyond the scope of this work, it should be noted that its absence is not 
meant to ignore its reality or to lessen its importance. In any case, gender is arguably the most 
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contentious and debated area in contemporary Islamic thought. According to most Progressive 
Muslims, the different religious descriptions and prescriptions for men and women in the Quran 
were largely a matter of context, and hence, are no longer applicable in modern societies.431 For 
example, Islamic law maintains that, in cases in which a ‘witness’ (shahadah) is needed, one 
man is equal to two women. This is based on the Quranic verse that reads:  
 
O ye who believe! When ye deal with each other, in transactions involving future obligations in a 
fixed period of time, reduce them to writing Let a scribe write down faithfully as between the 
parties: let not the scribe refuse to write: as Allah Has taught him, so let him write. Let him who 
incurs the liability dictate, but let him fear His Lord Allah, and not diminish aught of what he 
owes. If they party liable is mentally deficient, or weak, or unable Himself to dictate, let his 
guardian dictate faithfully, and get two witnesses, out of your own men, and if there are not two 
men, then a man and two women, such as ye choose, for witnesses, so that if one of them errs, the 
other can remind her. The witnesses should not refuse when they are called on (For evidence). 
Disdain not to reduce to writing (your contract) for a future period, whether it be small or big: it 
is juster in the sight of Allah, more suitable as evidence, and more convenient to prevent doubts 
among yourselves but if it be a transaction which ye carry out on the spot among yourselves, 
there is no blame on you if ye reduce it not to writing. But take witness whenever ye make a 
commercial contract; and let neither scribe nor witness suffer harm… (2:282) 
 
Abdulaziz Sachedina summarizes the issue at state by asking, “Is the conditional commandment 
given for the specific situation in the Medinese society to be interpreted as an unconditional 
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commandment, evincing the probable conclusion that regardless of whether a woman errs or not, 
her evidence is to be reduced to half of a man’s evidence?”432 After citing a hadith that seems to 
confirm the law of shahada, Sachedina goes on to write:  
 
This and other similar hadith raise serious questions not only about the authenticity of 
these narratives that ignored the intertextuality of the daily details of the lives of women 
entrapped in male jurists’ subjectivity and skewed vision of her social role; it also puts in 
doubt the claim by the pious for the validity and applicability of these legal rulings in all 
ages and at all times.433 
   
Thus, for Sachedina, and the Progressive School, many of the Quranic restrictions placed on 
women – and further developed by the Islamic legal tradition – were based on the context of 7th 
century Arabia and therefore, need to be revisited and reformed today. On the other hand, 
according to the Islamic intellectual tradition, the differences between men and women cannot be 
reduced to a matter of biology. This is because they reflect an essential complementarity in the 
Divine principle of creation.434 In other words, they are a manifestation, on the terrestrial plane, 
of the first duality between the Absolute (male) and the Infinite (female). In this regard, Fatima 
Casewit writes: 
 
…Every human being is created “in the image of God.” However, human beings are of 
two types: man and woman, and since we are all created “in the image of God,” our souls 
must be like mirrors reflecting the light of God. The supreme polarity of the cosmos, or 
the macrocosm, is reflected in the human soul, the microcosm. As human beings our 
                                               
432 Sachedina, Abdulaziz. “Woman, Half-the-Man? The Crisis of Male Epistemology in Islamic Jurisprudence” 
Intellectual Traditions in Islam. Ed. Daftary. New York: I.B. Taurus, 2001. P.171.  
433 Sachedina, Abdulaziz. “Woman, Half-the-Man? Intellectual Traditions. P.173. 
434 Sachiko, Murata. The Tao of Islam. P. 14. 
 
 
 190 
souls reflect God’s oneness. As men and women we reflect the supreme polarity: the 
Absolute and the Infinite, and we combine these two divine aspects in the human state.435 
 
On this view, the differences between men and women are essential to the extent that all states 
reflect their higher states throughout the different levels of the cosmos.436 According to many 
Muslims then, men and women have different roles that complement each other; neither sex is 
complete without the other, and neither sex is ‘lesser’ than the other.437 Moreover, according to 
many Sufis, the ‘higher feminine’ is the goal of all ‘seekers on the path’ because it represents the 
hidden or ‘veiled’ Divine Essence. In this regard, Maria Dakake points out:  
 
In Sufi symbolism, and indeed in Islam itself, man (and here I mean human beings in 
general) is surrounded by the feminine in his own existence…The word for mercy…is 
grammatically feminine, and is etymologically related to the word… “womb.” God’s 
Compassion and Mercy can thus be said to encompass and nurture everything in 
existence, just as the womb initially encompasses, nourishes, and protects every human 
being. Thus the mercy of existence itself is symbolized as a kind of “Divine womb” 
which embraces and sustains all being. While the experience of “being in the womb” is 
common to all humanity…the “womb” itself is, of course, a specifically feminine 
concept. Man’s relation to the Divine perceived in this way is the relationship of the child 
to the mother, and so it is a relationship universally understood among human 
beings…while it is also one in which the Divine is considered from the feminine aspect 
of maternity.438  
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Dakake goes on to explain that men and women move between two ‘feminine poles’ of 
existence. These two ‘poles’ are the human ego (nafs) which represents the ‘lower feminine’, and 
the Divine Essence (dhat) which represents the ‘higher feminine’.439 She also points out that, 
according to the Islamic intellectual tradition, the primordial or complete human being is both 
male and female and that either sex can become completely human and thereby, return to their 
original nature.440 Thus, both men and women are entitled to the same dignity because they have 
the same spiritual and moral worth. Nevertheless, Traditionalists emphasize that the issue of 
gender is a matter of the ‘plane of existence’ and the ‘dominant element’ on that plane. In other 
words, spiritual and moral equality does not negate the differences between men and women on 
the terrestrial level. Throughout Islamic history, these differences have expressed themselves in a 
myriad of ways and these expressions are not problematic as long as they do not lead to the 
negation of God-given natures and any consequent disequilibrium. This is because, according to 
Muslim Traditionalists, living in a form of ‘harmony based on nature’ is necessary in achieving 
the goal of human perfection. Thus, Islamic Traditionalism’s understanding of gender is at odds 
with its modern counterpart, and the friction between the two seems insurmountable. It seems 
this way because the Progressive School’s emphasis on ‘context’ and ‘subjectivity’ is not enough 
to displace the view that the Divine Will created men and women with different and 
complementary roles for the sake of familial and societal harmony. This perspective is in line 
with the Islamic intellectual tradition and any effective reform must also be in line with the latter. 
In this light, and in my opinion, the most important work being done on the subject is by Muslim 
women such as Sadiyya Shaikh. This is because she is ‘rethinking the terms of the debate’ by 
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focusing on ‘theological anthropology’.441 Shaikh outlines her project in the area of gender ethics 
in the following way: 
 
In this chapter, I suggest that bringing particular Sufi perspectives to debates on gender in 
the law offers Muslim feminists rich spaces to explore the underlying foundations of the 
law. Such a project directs one’s inquiry to core definitions of the human being, the God–
human relationship and related implications for social ethics, all of which implicitly 
underlie fiqh discussions. I argue that this level of enquiry allows Muslims to re-examine 
critically the formulation of the fiqh canon in light of the deepest existential and religious 
priorities in the Muslim tradition. Such an approach provides important criteria to 
determine whether dominant fiqh concepts reflect the best possible contemporary 
understandings of essential religious and spiritual prerogatives in Islam.442 
 
Thus, the discovery of some common ground in the area of gender is possible. However, whether 
this possibility will become a reality now or in the near future seems doubtful. If it does not 
become a reality, then human rights advocates must remember that Muslims are self-
understanding agents with the right to self-determination; they do not need saving. Any 
disagreements must be approached dialogically, and if all else fails, they must be accepted on the 
basis of mutual respect. In this regard, Coomarswamy writes:  
 
Of all the forces that stand in the way of…a mutual understand indispensable for co-
operation, the greatest are those of ignorance and prejudice. Ignorance and prejudice 
underlie the naive presumption of a civilizing mission… Before a world government can 
even be dreamed of, we must have citizens of the world, who can meet their fellow 
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citizens without embarrassment, as gentlemen meet gentlemen, and not as would-be 
school masters meeting pupils...443  
  
Finally, it should be noted that the ‘Islamic world’ is currently in the process of understanding 
and debating issues related to international human rights – including the issue of gender. For 
example, Sachedina notes: 
 
In the last three decades…there has been sustained interest in the foundations of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its compatibility with Islam. A number of 
books and articles in Arabic and Persian written by some prominent traditionalist 
interpreters of the Islamic revealed texts…underscore the attention and interest the 
international document has attracted…444 
 
Again, Muslims are more than capable of determining what is (and what is not) in line with their 
understanding of the purpose of life. There have already been many changes implemented by 
Muslims themselves and there is no need for any ‘intervention’ on the basis of an assumed moral 
superiority. A single community does not share a single set of views; in every community, there 
is discussion, debate and mobilization. Tensions are inevitable and those tensions, in some way 
or another, are ultimately resolved.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 There seems to be a growing consensus that human rights are a set of universal norms 
that can easily be adopted and applied by all of the different cultural traditions in the world. 
However, this study has argued that this ‘growing consensus’ is unfounded and therefore, 
problematic. This is because human rights, as presented in the Universal Declaration and its 
offshoots, are clearly underpinned by the Western tradition and its concomitant ideologies which 
largely developed during the Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment periods. This 
includes, for example, the ideologies of individualism, liberalism and secularism. This study has 
argued that it is the particular and relative nature of human rights that has resulted in growing 
friction and resistance from different parts of the world. For example, some human rights 
theorists working within the Asian, African and Islamic traditions argue that their respective 
values and ways of life are decidedly different from those underlying ‘international’ human 
rights norms and laws today. According to Sinha’s study, these traditions differ in three main 
ways: they emphasize duties over rights, the group over the individual and some form of 
personal reconciliation over procedural legalism.445  Thus, these theorists argue that the forceful 
implementation of human rights, by way of direct ‘humanitarian intervention’ or indirect 
political, social and/or economic pressure, is a form of intellectual and cultural imperialism that 
cannot be justified. For this reason, this study argues that human rights need to be revisited and 
revised. More specifically, it argues that human rights need to be decentralized and plural if they 
hope to become effective and universal respectively. With this in mind, this study maintains that 
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the various cultural traditions around the world should be free to develop their own human rights 
models as long as they meet the minimum criteria of (1) curbing excess of power and (2) helping 
citizens pursue their societies’ particular understanding of the ‘good.’ If this is done, this study’s 
working assumption is that it will result in a minimal overlapping consensus between cultural 
traditions. It is important to note that this consensus would be the product of an ‘accidental 
universality’ as opposed to one that is constructed and then imposed. This would ensure that 
rights are both integral and organic to each tradition and therefore, not seen as a ploy towards 
economic and/or socio-political domination. In order to open up a ‘space for dialogue’ for 
alternative visions, the first section of this study attempts to ‘clear the ground’ by critically 
surveying human rights history and some of the underlying ethical theories that attempt to justify 
human rights within the secular-liberal tradition.  
 Chapter one critically explores popular human rights histories because these histories are 
directly connected to how people in general, and human rights’ theorists and activists in 
particular, understand and act in relation to human rights today. To this end, chapter one argues 
that popular human rights histories share three interrelated assumptions that are dubious at best. 
The first assumption is that that humanity in general, and human rights in particular, have 
developed in a linear and progressive fashion. In this regard, this study has argued that the ‘belief 
in progress’ was a byproduct of the scientific and industrial revolutions and is no longer tenable 
today. This is because material and technological progress have also resulted in societal and 
spiritual regress. This is seen, for example, in the cult of mass consumerism, the breakdown of 
the nuclear family and the rise of new age spiritual movements. The second assumption of 
popular human rights histories is that they tend to ‘describe’ the world’s religions as an important 
historical stage leading to the development of a universal world order based on human rights. In 
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this regard, this study has argued that the historicization of religion is misleading because the 
latter continues to play a central and active role in the lives of millions. This is seen, for example, 
in the rise of the so-called ‘religious resurgence’ and contemporary ‘Islamist’ movements. 
Moreover, this study argues that religions are inherently dynamic and have boundaries that are 
constantly being negotiated. Therefore, religions can incorporate the concept of human rights and 
therefore, help legitimize the latter in the eyes of the faithful. The third common assumption 
underlying popular human rights histories is that the Medieval Age was a ‘dark’ and oppressive 
time in the West. However, chapter one argues that this view is an inaccurate overgeneralization. 
Some historians, such as Norman Cantor, argue that the period’s religious nature and hierarchical 
structure facilitated times of unprecedented growth and development in areas such as agriculture, 
philosophy and art.446 In light of all this, this study has argued that the assumptions underlying 
popular human rights history are clearly problematic and therefore, contemporary human rights 
should not be seen as the rightful and inevitable end to the search for justice.  
 Chapter two argues that human rights are normative claims that need to be justified in 
order to be accepted by peoples around the world. To this end, the chapter critically explores 
three of the most popular ethical theories that attempt to justify or ‘ground’ human rights in a 
universal manner. These are the theories of utilitarianism, natural rights and postmodern ethical 
sentimentalism. In terms of utilitarianism, this study argues that it is problematic for three main 
reasons. First, it wrongly assumes that it is possible to know all the various effects that are 
produced by human actions and thereby calculate what is moral and what is not. Second, 
utilitarianism mistakenly argues that peoples from different cultural traditions and their 
respective worldviews would agree on what constitutes ‘human utility’. This is mistaken because 
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determining ‘human utility’ clearly depends on how a particular society understands reality and 
the human being’s relationship to it. Lastly, even if the first two problems are somehow solved, 
utilitarianism is still left with the impossible issue of measuring and grading qualitative 
experiences in quantitative terms. Thus, chapter two argues that utilitarianism cannot universally 
ground human rights. In regards to natural rights, chapter two argues that it is also problematic 
and cannot legitimize one specific universal human rights model. This is because modern natural 
rights theories, which can be traced back to John Locke and his imaginative ‘state of nature’, 
assume that all peoples think in the same way. However, this study argues that human reason and 
nature cannot operate in a vacuum, and as such, human rights are largely determined by a 
peoples’ inherited culture and the latter’s respective ‘teachings’, assumptions and experiences. 
Chapter two then goes on to critically explore the theory of ethical sentimentalism, and in doing 
so, argues that it is also problematic for two main reasons. First, ethical sentimentalism argues 
that empathy – as opposed to knowledge – should be the basis for human rights. This is 
troublesome because empathy is based on sentimentality and the latter is always open to 
manipulation by those in control of public information. The second principal problem with 
ethical sentimentalism is that it argues that there is no foundation for anything. If this is the case, 
then there is also no foundation for morality in general, and human rights in particular. This 
legitimizes the claim that human rights are relative to the Western historical experience and as 
such, their forceful implementation is a form of imperialism. Therefore, like utilitarianism and 
natural rights, ethical sentimentalism cannot work to legitimize a universal theory of human 
rights. Of course, these three theories have their strengths and should be continued to be 
developed. Nevertheless, the point remains: all three theories are subject to an ongoing debate 
within the secular-liberal tradition itself. Thus, there is nothing definitive about contemporary 
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human rights and therefore, there is no good reason to ignore any alternative approaches. It is 
important to remember that this study does not argue in favor of constructing one universal 
human rights theory. Rather, it argues for the construction of multiple human rights models and 
its working assumption is that the latter will produce an ‘accidental universality’. That is, an 
‘after-the-fact’ minimal overlapping consensuses between the world’s cultural traditions. 
 After ‘clearing up a space for dialogue’, chapter three goes on to explore the issue of 
Islam and human rights in particular. In doing so, it points out that there are four principal 
‘spaces of friction’ between the two traditions. These are the implementation of Islamic law in 
general; the marginalization of religious minorities; the use of corporeal punishment and the 
differential legal treatment between men and women. It also points out that the Muslim response 
to these issues can be divided into four broad schools of thought. These are the Fundamental, 
Traditional, Progressive and Liberal. Chapter three focuses on the Traditional and Progressive 
Schools because they are the most nuanced in their respective approaches and together, they 
represent the majority of Muslims today. In doing so, this study argues that the Progressive 
School is an important ‘voice’ but nevertheless, that it is also deeply problematic. This is because 
its general socio-historical approach is alien to the Islamic intellectual tradition as a whole and 
moreover, it has a tendency to negate aspects of the Islamic tradition that many Muslims 
consider inviolable, such as the hadith literature and the shariah in general. Thus, chapter three 
argues that ‘Progressive Islam’ – at least in its totality – cannot be easily accepted by Muslims in 
general and therefore, it will not succeed in its goal of legal reform. For this reason, among 
others, this study works within the framework of the Traditional School of thought in the Islamic 
context, that is, ‘Islamic Traditionalism’. Chapter three readily admits that Islamic Traditionalism 
represents just one of many ‘Muslim voices’ and moreover, that it is primarily ‘esoteric’ in nature 
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and emphasizes spiritual realities over socio-political contingencies. Nevertheless, this study 
maintains that Islamic Traditionalism represents an important and substantial ‘Muslim voice’ that 
is generally underrepresented in Western academic institutions. Moreover, it argues that this 
School of thought is important because it approaches Muslims on their own terms and also 
because it understands that Islamic law cannot be understood, let alone ‘reformed’, without 
addressing the law’s deeper assumptions concerning the nature of reality, the human being and 
the ‘good’.447 Before looking at these ‘deeper assumptions’, chapter three concludes by situating 
the Traditional School within the larger context of religious studies. It argues that the Traditional 
School is unique because it is able to combine the strengths of the theological and academic 
approaches to religion without falling victim to their weaknesses. In other words, chapter three 
points out that the Traditional School accepts the truth claims of virtually all religions without 
being biased and partial towards a particular religion. This is because it sees all religions as 
various expressions of the Absolute, and therefore, different but valid paths that ‘lead to the same 
summit’.  
 Chapter four develops a theory of virtue ethics by primarily drawing on the Quran and 
thought of Ali. This is important because virtue ethics addresses the fundamental questions 
concerning the human condition that need to be answered in order to determine any human rights 
model. In doing so, chapter four argues that the Quran and thought of Ali present human nature 
as a spectrum between two dualities and that the goal of all humans is to ‘be’ their higher nature 
as servants and representatives of God on Earth. This is possible because humans have the ability 
know the Truth, that is, the essence of things, and to apply justice, that is, to put things in their 
                                               
447 The Traditional School can be seen as a counterweight to the Progressive School and therefore, it is with both 
approaches in mind that one can have a more accurate understanding of the Islamic tradition as a whole and the 
Muslims that belong to the tradition. 
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rightful place or to give each thing its rightful due. This understanding is based on the Quranic 
story of the Prophet Adam – the prototype of humanity – who received the ‘Divine breath’ and 
the knowledge of the ‘name of all things’. Moreover, according to Islamic Traditionalism, 
knowing the truth and applying justice can only be achieved through inner transformation 
culminating in the attainment of a virtuous heart. This is because the inner Heart is the seat of 
true wisdom; it is able to know God and know all else in relation to God. Moreover, this 
knowledge is not ‘acquired’ but rather, it is ‘remembered’ by the theurgic power of religious rites 
and the descent of Divine grace. For this reason, chapter four argues that an ‘Islamic’ human 
rights society is one that is filled with reminders of the Divine presence and thereby helps 
Muslims achieve their primary purpose in life – a virtuous heart in this world and felicity in the 
hereafter. 
 Chapter five addresses some of the more specific issues concerning human rights in light 
of the study’s virtue theory. It argues that many Muslims cannot accept a theory of human rights 
that is not grounded in God and His revelation. Moreover, it argues that an ‘Islamic’ human 
rights model must emphasize human duties, inward freedom, and familial and societal harmony. 
This is because much of the friction between the Islamic tradition and contemporary human 
rights is a product of the latter’s emphasis on the liberal and extrinsic interpretation of concepts 
such as freedom and equality. For example, chapter five argues that the Universal Declaration 
and its offshoots have a tendency to focus on freedom as liberty for the egoic self, while Muslim 
Traditionalists, in line with the Quran’s intellectual and spiritual ethos, emphasize the importance 
of liberty from the egoic self. Chapter five goes on to makes some introductory remarks on the 
issues of Islamic law, pluralism, corporeal punishment and gender. In doing so, it argues that 
there are ‘spaces of convergence’ between Islamic Traditionalism and contemporary human 
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rights. For example, in terms of corporeal punishment, this study argues that a ‘space of 
convergence’ can be etched out by incorporating a system of rehabilitation in line with the 
Quranic principles of Divine mercy and human free-will. At the same time however, it also notes 
that there are fundamental differences between the two traditions. In these cases, this study 
argues that it is the responsibility of human rights advocates to protect any differences in the 
name of human rights, rather than opposing them as ‘primitive’ and/or ‘outdated’. After all, 
Islam’s perennial principles and their societal expressions have successfully held together 
Islamic societies for over a thousand years. On the other hand, human rights societies are still in 
their infancy, and only time will tell if they are able to do the same. 
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APPENDICIES 
 
Appendix A: 
THE UNIVERSAL DECLERATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Preamble 
 
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, 
 
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have 
outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall 
enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the 
highest aspiration of the common people, 
 
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to 
rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of 
law, 
 
Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations, 
 
Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights 
of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life 
in larger freedom, 
 
Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United 
Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, 
 
Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for 
the full realization of this pledge, 
 
Now, Therefore,  
 
The General Assembly,  
 
proclaims This Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement 
for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, 
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keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote 
respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to 
secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of 
Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.  
 
 
 
 
Article 1 
  
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason 
and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. 
 
Article 2 
  
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made 
on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to 
which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other 
limitation of sovereignty. 
 
Article 3 
  
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person. 
 
Article 4 
  
No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all 
their forms. 
 
Article 5 
  
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
 
Article 6 
  
Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law. 
 
Article 7 
  
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of 
the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this 
Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination. 
 
Article 8 
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Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts 
violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law. 
 
Article 9 
  
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile. 
 
Article 10 
  
Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial 
tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against 
him. 
 
Article 11 
  
1. Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved 
guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary 
for his defence. 
 
2. No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which 
did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it 
was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable 
at the time the penal offence was committed. 
 
Article 12 
  
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the 
protection of the law against such interference or attacks. 
 
Article 13 
 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each 
state. 
 
2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his 
country. 
 
Article 14 
  
1. Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution. 
 
2. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-
political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations. 
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Article 15 
  
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality. 
 
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his 
nationality. 
 
Article 16 
  
1. Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, 
have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to 
marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. 
 
2. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending 
spouses. 
 
3. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to 
protection by society and the State. 
 
Article 17 
  
1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. 
 
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. 
 
Article 18 
  
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others 
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and 
observance. 
 
Article 19 
  
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold 
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any 
media and regardless of frontiers. 
 
Article 20. 
  
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. 
 
2.  No one may be compelled to belong to an association. 
 
Article 21 
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1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through 
freely chosen representatives. 
 
2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country. 
 
3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be 
expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal 
suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. 
 
Article 22 
  
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, 
through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization 
and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his 
dignity and the free development of his personality. 
 
Article 23 
  
1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable 
conditions of work and to protection against unemployment. 
 
2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work. 
 
3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for 
himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if 
necessary, by other means of social protection. 
 
4. Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 
 
Article 24 
  
Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and 
periodic holidays with pay. 
 
Article 25 
  
1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of 
himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and 
necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, 
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances 
beyond his control. 
 
2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, 
whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection. 
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Article 26 
  
1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary 
and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and 
professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be 
equally accessible to all on the basis of merit. 
 
2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the 
strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote 
understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and 
shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace. 
 
3. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their 
children. 
 
Article 27 
  
1. Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy 
the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits. 
 
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from 
any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author. 
 
Article 28 
  
Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth 
in this Declaration can be fully realized. 
 
Article 29 
  
1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of 
his personality is possible. 
 
2.  In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition 
and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of 
morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society. 
 
3. These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations. 
 
Article 30 
  
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any 
right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights 
and freedoms set forth herein.
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APPENDIX B:  
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RESPONSIBILITIES 
Proposed by the InterAction Council 
 
Preamble 
 
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world and 
implies obligations or responsibilities, 
 
whereas the exclusive insistence on rights can result in conflict, division, and endless dispute, 
and the neglect of human responsibilities can lead to lawlessness and chaos, [b]whereas[/b] the 
rule of law and the promotion of human rights depend on the readiness of men and women to act 
justly, 
 
whereas global problems demand global solutions which can only be achieved through ideas, 
values, and norms respected by all cultures and societies, 
 
whereas all people, to the best of their knowledge and ability, have a responsibility to foster a 
better social order, both at home and globally, a goal which cannot be achieved by laws, 
prescriptions, and conventions alone, 
 
whereas human aspirations for progress and improvement can only be realized by agreed values 
and standards applying to all people and institutions at all times, 
 
Now, therefore, 
The General Assembly, 
proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities as a common standard for all 
peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this 
Declaration constantly in mind, shall contribute to the advancement of communities and to the 
enlightenment of all their members. We, the peoples of the world thus renew and reinforce 
commitments already proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: namely, the full 
acceptance of the dignity of all people; their inalienable freedom and equality, and their 
solidarity with one another. Awareness and acceptance of these responsibilities should be taught 
and promoted throughout the world. 
 
Fundamental Principles for Humanity 
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Article 1 
 
Every person, regardless of gender, ethnic origin, social status, political opinion, language, age, 
nationality, or religion, has a responsibility to treat all people in a humane way. 
 
Article 2 
 
No person should lend support to any form of inhumane behavior, but all people have a 
responsibility to strive for the dignity and self-esteem of all others. 
 
Article 3 
 
No person, no group or organization, no state, no army or police stands above good and evil; all 
are subject to ethical standards. Everyone has a responsibility to promote good and to avoid evil 
in all things. 
 
Article 4 
 
All people, endowed with reason and conscience, must accept a responsibility to each and all, to 
families and communities, to races, nations, and religions in a spirit of solidarity: What you do 
not wish to be done to yourself, do not do to others. 
 
Non-Violence and Respect for Life 
 
Article 5 
 
Every person has a responsibility to respect life. No one has the right to injure, to torture or to 
kill another human person. This does not exclude the right of justified self-defense of individuals 
or communities. 
 
Article 6 
 
Disputes between states, groups or individuals should be resolved without violence. No 
government should tolerate or participate in acts of genocide or terrorism, nor should it abuse 
women, children, or any other civilians as instruments of war. Every citizen and public official 
has a responsibility to act in a peaceful, non-violent way. 
 
Article 7 
 
Every person is infinitely precious and must be protected unconditionally. The animals and the 
natural environment also demand protection. All people have a responsibility to protect the air, 
water and soil of the earth for the sake of present inhabitants and future generations. 
 
Justice and Solidarity 
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Article 8 
 
Every person has a responsibility to behave with integrity, honesty and fairness. No person or 
group should rob or arbitrarily deprive any other person or group of their property. 
 
Article 9 
 
All people, given the necessary tools, have a responsibility to make serious efforts to overcome 
poverty, malnutrition, ignorance, and inequality. They should promote sustainable development 
all over the world in order to assure dignity, freedom, security and justice for all people. 
 
Article 10 
 
All people have a responsibility to develop their talents through diligent endeavor; they should 
have equal access to education and to meaningful work. Everyone should lend support to the 
needy, the disadvantaged, the disabled and to the victims of discrimination. 
 
Article 11 
 
All property and wealth must be used responsibly in accordance with justice and for the 
advancement of the human race. Economic and political power must not be handled as an 
instrument of domination, but in the service of economic justice and of the social order. 
 
Truthfulness and Tolerance 
 
Article 12 
 
Every person has a responsibility to speak and act truthfully. No one, however high or mighty, 
should speak lies. The right to privacy and to personal and professional confidentiality is to be 
respected. No one is obliged to tell all the truth to everyone all the time. 
 
Article 13 
 
No politicians, public servants, business leaders, scientists, writers or artists are exempt from 
general ethical standards, nor are physicians, lawyers and other professionals who have special 
duties to clients. Professional and other codes of ethics should reflect the priority of general 
standards such as those of truthfulness and fairness. 
 
Article 14 
 
The freedom of the media to inform the public and to criticize institutions of society and 
governmental actions, which is essential for a just society, must be used with responsibility and 
discretion. Freedom of the media carries a special responsibility for accurate and truthful 
reporting. Sensational reporting that degrades the human person or dignity must at all times be 
avoided. 
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Article 15 
 
While religious freedom must be guaranteed, the representatives of religions have a special 
responsibility to avoid expressions of prejudice and acts of discrimination toward those of 
different beliefs. They should not incite or legitimize hatred, fanaticism and religious wars, but 
should foster tolerance and mutual respect between all people. 
 
Mutual Respect and Partnership 
 
Article 16 
 
All men and all women have a responsibility to show respect to one another and understanding in 
their partnership. No one should subject another person to sexual exploitation or dependence. 
Rather, sexual partners should accept the responsibility of caring for each other well-being. 
 
Article 17 
 
In all its cultural and religious varieties, marriage requires love, loyalty and forgiveness and 
should aim at guaranteeing security and mutual support. 
 
Article 18 
 
Sensible family planning is the responsibility of every couple. The relationship between parents 
and children should reflect mutual love, respect, appreciation and concern. No parents or other 
adults should exploit, abuse or maltreat children. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Article 19 
 
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any state, group or person any 
right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the 
responsibilities, rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration and in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights of 1948. 
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Appendix C 
Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights 
 
This is a declaration for mankind, a guidance and instruction to those who fear God. 
(Al Qur'an, Al-Imran 3:138) 
 
Foreword 
 
Islam gave to mankind an ideal code of human rights fourteen centuries ago. These rights aim at 
conferring honour and dignity on mankind and eliminating exploitation, oppression and injustice. 
 
Human rights in Islam are firmly rooted in the belief that God, and God alone, is the Law Giver 
and the Source of all human rights. Due to their Divine origin, no ruler, government, assembly or 
authority can curtail or violate in any way the human rights conferred by God, nor can they be 
surrendered. 
 
Human rights in Islam are an integral part of the overall Islamic order and it is obligatory on all 
Muslim governments and organs of society to implement them in letter and in spirit within the 
framework of that order. 
 
It is unfortunate that human rights are being trampled upon with impunity in many countries of 
the world, including some Muslim countries. Such violations are a matter of serious concern and 
are arousing the conscience of more and more people throughout the world. 
 
I sincerely hope that this Declaration of Human Rights will give a powerful impetus to the 
Muslim peoples to stand firm and defend resolutely and courageously the rights conferred on 
them by God. 
 
This Declaration of Human Rights is the second fundamental document proclaimed by the 
Islamic Council to mark the beginning of the 15th Century of the Islamic era, the first being the 
Universal Islamic Declaration announced at the International Conference on The Prophet 
Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him) and his Message, held in London from 12 to 15 
April 1980. 
 
The Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights is based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah and 
has been compiled by eminent Muslim scholars, jurists and representatives of Islamic 
movements and thought. May God reward them all for their efforts and guide us along the right 
path. 
 
  
Paris 21 Dhul Qaidah 1401 Salem Azzam 
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19th September 1981 Secretary General 
 
  
 
O men! Behold, We have created you all out of a male and a female, and have made you into 
nations and tribes, so that you might come to know one another. Verily, the noblest of you in the 
sight of God is the one who is most deeply conscious of Him. Behold, God is all-knowing, all 
aware. (Al Qur'an, Al-Hujurat 49:13) 
 
  
 
Preamble 
 
WHEREAS the age-old human aspiration for a just world order wherein people could live, 
develop and prosper in an environment free from fear, oppression, exploitation and deprivation, 
remains largely unfulfilled; 
 
WHEREAS the Divine Mercy unto mankind reflected in its having been endowed with super-
abundant economic sustenance is being wasted, or unfairly or unjustly withheld from the 
inhabitants of the earth; 
 
WHEREAS Allah (God) has given mankind through His revelations in the Holy Qur'an and the 
Sunnah of His Blessed Prophet Muhammad an abiding legal and moral framework within which 
to establish and regulate human institutions and relationships; 
 
WHEREAS the human rights decreed by the Divine Law aim at conferring dignity and honour 
on mankind and are designed to eliminate oppression and injustice; 
 
WHEREAS by virtue of their Divine source and sanction these rights can neither be curtailed, 
abrogated or disregarded by authorities, assemblies or other institutions, nor can they be 
surrendered or alienated; 
 
Therefore we, as Muslims, who believe 
 
a) in God, the Beneficent and Merciful, the Creator, the Sustainer, the Sovereign, the sole 
Guide of mankind and the Source of all Law; 
 
b) in the Vicegerency (Khilafah) of man who has been created to fulfill the Will of God on 
earth; 
 
c) in the wisdom of Divine guidance brought by the Prophets, whose mission found its 
culmination in the final Divine message that was conveyed by the Prophet Muhammad 
(Peace be upon him) to all mankind; 
 
d) that rationality by itself without the light of revelation from God can neither be a sure 
guide in the affairs of mankind nor provide spiritual nourishment to the human soul, and, 
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knowing that the teachings of Islam represent the quintessence of Divine guidance in its 
final and perfect form, feel duty-bound to remind man of the high status and dignity 
bestowed on him by God; 
 
e) in inviting all mankind to the message of Islam; 
 
f) that by the terms of our primeval covenant with God our duties and obligations have 
priority over our rights, and that each one of us is under a bounden duty to spread the 
teachings of Islam by word, deed, and indeed in all gentle ways, and to make them 
effective not only in our individual lives but also in the society around us; 
 
g) in our obligation to establish an Islamic order: 
 
i) wherein all human beings shall be equal and none shall enjoy a privilege or suffer 
a disadvantage or discrimination by reason of race, colour, sex, origin or 
language; 
 
ii) wherein all human beings are born free; 
 
iii) wherein slavery and forced labour are abhorred; 
 
iv) wherein conditions shall be established such that the institution of family shall be 
preserved, protected and honoured as the basis of all social life; 
 
v) wherein the rulers and the ruled alike are subject to, and equal before, the Law; 
 
vi) wherein obedience shall be rendered only to those commands that are in 
consonance with the Law; 
 
vii) wherein all worldly power shall be considered as a sacred trust, to be exercised 
within the limits prescribed by the Law and in a manner approved by it, and with 
due regard for the priorities fixed by it; 
 
viii) wherein all economic resources shall be treated as Divine blessings bestowed 
upon mankind, to be enjoyed by all in accordance with the rules and the values set 
out in the Qur’an and the Sunnah; 
 
ix) wherein all public affairs shall be determined and conducted, and the authority to 
administer them shall be exercised after mutual consultation (Shura) between the 
believers qualified to contribute to a decision which would accord well with the 
Law and the public good; 
 
x) wherein everyone shall undertake obligations proportionate to his capacity and 
shall be held responsible pro rata for his deeds; 
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xi) wherein everyone shall, in case of an infringement of his rights, be assured of 
appropriate remedial measures in accordance with the Law; 
 
xii) wherein no one shall be deprived of the rights assured to him by the Law except 
by its authority and to the extent permitted by it; 
 
xiii) wherein every individual shall have the right to bring legal action against anyone 
who commits a crime against society as a whole or against any of its members; 
 
xiv) wherein every effort shall be made to 
 
 
(a) secure unto mankind deliverance from every type of exploitation, injustice 
and oppression, 
 
(b) ensure to everyone security, dignity and liberty in terms set out and by 
methods approved and within the limits set by the Law; 
 
Do hereby, as servants of Allah and as members of the Universal Brotherhood of 
Islam, at the beginning of the Fifteenth Century of the Islamic Era, affirm our 
commitment to uphold the following inviolable and inalienable human rights that 
we consider are enjoined by Islam. 
 
I Right to Life 
 
a) Human life is sacred and inviolable and every effort shall be made to protect it. In 
particular no one shall be exposed to injury or death, except under the authority of the 
Law. 
 
b) Just as in life, so also after death, the sanctity of a person's body shall be inviolable. It is 
the obligation of believers to see that a deceased person's body is handled with due 
solemnity. 
  
II Right to Freedom 
 
a) Man is born free. No inroads shall be made on his right to liberty except under the 
authority and in due process of the Law. 
 
b) Every individual and every people has the inalienable right to freedom in all its forms 
physical, cultural, economic and political — and shall be entitled to struggle by all 
available means against any infringement or abrogation of this right; and every oppressed 
individual or people has a legitimate claim to the support of other individuals and/or 
peoples in such a struggle. 
 
III Right to Equality and Prohibition Against Impermissible Discrimination 
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a) All persons are equal before the Law and are entitled to equal opportunities and 
protection of the Law. 
 
b) All persons shall be entitled to equal wage for equal work. 
 
c) No person shall be denied the opportunity to work or be discriminated against in any 
manner or exposed to greater physical risk by reason of religious belief, colour, race, 
origin, sex or language. 
 
IV Right to Justice 
 
a) Every person has the right to be treated in accordance with the Law, and only in 
accordance with the Law. 
 
b) Every person has not only the right but also the obligation to protest against injustice; to 
recourse to remedies provided by the Law in respect of any unwarranted personal injury 
or loss; to self-defence against any charges that are preferred against him and to obtain 
fair adjudication before an independent judicial tribunal in any dispute with public 
authorities or any other person. 
 
c) It is the right and duty of every person to defend the rights of any other person and the 
community in general (Hisbah). 
 
d) No person shall be discriminated against while seeking to defend private and public 
rights. 
 
e) It is the right and duty of every Muslim to refuse to obey any command which is contrary 
to the Law, no matter by whom it may be issued. 
 
V Right to Fair Trial 
 
a) No person shall be adjudged guilty of an offence and made liable to punishment except 
after proof of his guilt before an independent judicial tribunal. 
 
b) No person shall be adjudged guilty except after a fair trial and after reasonable 
opportunity for defence has been provided to him. 
 
c) Punishment shall be awarded in accordance with the Law, in proportion to the seriousness 
of the offence and with due consideration of the circumstances under which it was 
committed. 
 
d) No act shall be considered a crime unless it is stipulated as such in the clear wording of 
the Law. 
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e) Every individual is responsible for his actions. Responsibility for a crime cannot be 
vicariously extended to other members of his family or group, who are not otherwise 
directly or indirectly involved in the commission of the crime in question. 
 
VI Right to Protection Against Abuse of Power 
 
Every person has the right to protection against harassment by official agencies. He is not liable 
to account for himself except for making a defence to the charges made against him or where he 
is found in a situation wherein a question regarding suspicion of his involvement in a crime 
could be reasonably raised 
 
  
VII Right to Protection Against Torture 
 
No person shall be subjected to torture in mind or body, or degraded, or threatened with injury 
either to himself or to anyone related to or held dear by him, or forcibly made to confess to the 
commission of a crime, or forced to consent to an act which is injurious to his interests. 
 
VIII Right to Protection of Honour and Reputation 
 
Every person has the right to protect his honour and reputation against calumnies, groundless 
charges or deliberate attempts at defamation and blackmail. 
 
IX Right to Asylum 
 
a) Every persecuted or oppressed person has the right to seek refuge and asylum. This right 
is guaranteed to every human being irrespective of race, religion, colour and sex. 
 
b) Al Masjid Al Haram (the sacred house of Allah) in Mecca is a sanctuary for all Muslims. 
 
X Rights of Minorities 
 
a) The Qur'anic principle "There is no compulsion in religion" shall govern the religious 
rights of non-Muslim minorities. 
 
b) In a Muslim country religious minorities shall have the choice to be governed in respect 
of their civil and personal matters by Islamic Law, or by their own laws. 
 
XI Right and Obligation to Participate in the Conduct and Management of Public Affairs 
 
a) Subject to the Law, every individual in the community (Ummah) is entitled to assume 
public office. 
 
b) Process of free consultation (Shura) is the basis of the administrative relationship 
between the government and the people. People also have the right to choose and remove 
their rulers in accordance with this principle. 
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XII Right to Freedom of Belief, Thought and Speech 
 
a) Every person has the right to express his thoughts and beliefs so long as he remains 
within the limits prescribed by the Law. No one, however, is entitled to disseminate 
falsehood or to circulate reports which may outrage public decency, or to indulge in 
slander, innuendo or to cast defamatory aspersions on other persons. 
 
b) Pursuit of knowledge and search after truth is not only a right but a duty of every Muslim. 
 
c) It is the right and duty of every Muslim to protest and strive (within the limits set out by 
the Law) against oppression even if it involves challenging the highest authority in the 
state. 
 
d) There shall be no bar on the dissemination of information provided it does not endanger 
the security of the society or the state and is confined within the limits imposed by the 
Law. 
 
e) No one shall hold in contempt or ridicule the religious beliefs of others or incite public 
hostility against them; respect for the religious feelings of others is obligatory on all 
Muslims. 
 
XIII Right to Freedom of Religion 
 
Every person has the right to freedom of conscience and worship in accordance with his religious 
beliefs. 
 
XIV Right to Free Association 
 
a) Every person is entitled to participate individually and collectively in the religious, social, 
cultural and political life of his community and to establish institutions and agencies 
meant to enjoin what is right (ma'roof) and to prevent what is wrong (munkar). 
 
b) Every person is entitled to strive for the establishment of institutions whereunder an 
enjoyment of these rights would be made possible. Collectively, the community is 
obliged to establish conditions so as to allow its members full development of their 
personalities. 
 
XV The Economic Order and the Rights Evolving Therefrom 
 
a) In their economic pursuits, all persons are entitled to the full benefits of nature and all its 
resources. These are blessings bestowed by God for the benefit of mankind as a whole. 
 
b) All human beings are entitled to earn their living according to the Law. 
 
 
 
 245 
c) Every person is entitled to own property individually or in association with others. State 
ownership of certain economic resources in the public interest is legitimate. 
 
d) The poor have the right to a prescribed share in the wealth of the rich, as fixed by Zakah, 
levied and collected in accordance with the Law. 
 
d) All means of production shall be utilised in the interest of the community (Ummah) as a 
whole, and may not be neglected or misused. 
 
e) In order to promote the development of a balanced economy and to protect society from 
exploitation, Islamic Law forbids monopolies, unreasonable restrictive trade practices, 
usury, the use of coercion in the making of contracts and the publication of misleading 
advertisements. 
 
f) All economic activities are permitted provided they are not detrimental to the interests of 
the community(Ummah) and do not violate Islamic laws and values. 
 
XVI Right to Protection of Property 
 
No property may be expropriated except in the public interest and on payment of fair and 
adequate compensation. 
 
  
XVII Status and Dignity of Workers 
 
Islam honours work and the worker and enjoins Muslims not only to treat the worker justly but 
also generously. He is not only to be paid his earned wages promptly, but is also entitled to 
adequate rest and leisure. 
 
XVIII Right to Social Security 
 
Every person has the right to food, shelter, clothing, education and medical care consistent with 
the resources of the community. This obligation of the community extends in particular to all 
individuals who cannot take care of themselves due to some temporary or permanent disability. 
 
XIX Right to Found a Family and Related Matters 
 
a) Every person is entitled to marry, to found a family and to bring up children in 
conformity with his religion, traditions and culture. Every spouse is entitled to such rights 
and privileges and carries such obligations as are stipulated by the Law. 
 
b) Each of the partners in a marriage is entitled to respect and consideration from the other. 
 
c) Every husband is obligated to maintain his wife and children according to his means. 
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d) Every child has the right to be maintained and properly brought up by its parents, it being 
forbidden that children are made to work at an early age or that any burden is put on them 
which would arrest or harm their natural development. 
 
e) If parents are for some reason unable to discharge their obligations towards a child it 
becomes the responsibility of the community to fulfill these obligations at public expense. 
 
e) Every person is entitled to material support, as well as care and protection, from his 
family during his childhood, old age or incapacity. Parents are entitled to material support 
as well as care and protection from their children. 
 
f) Motherhood is entitled to special respect, care and assistance on the part of the family and 
the public organs of the community (Ummah). 
 
g) Within the family, men and women are to share in their obligations and responsibilities 
according to their sex, their natural endowments, talents and inclinations, bearing in mind 
their common responsibilities toward their progeny and their relatives. 
 
h) No person may be married against his or her will, or lose or suffer dimunition of legal 
personality on account of marriage. 
 
  
XX Rights of Married Women 
 
Every married woman is entitled to: 
 
a) live in the house in which her husband lives; 
 
b) receive the means necessary for maintaining a standard of living which is not inferior to 
that of her spouse, and, in the event of divorce, receive during the statutory period of 
waiting (iddah) means of maintenance commensurate with her husband's resources, for 
herself as well as for the children she nurses or keeps, irrespective of her own financial 
status, earnings, or property that she may hold in her own rights; 
 
c) seek and obtain dissolution of marriage (Khul'a) in accordance with the terms of the Law. 
This right is in addition to her right to seek divorce through the courts. 
 
d) inherit from her husband, her parents, her children and other relatives according to the 
Law; 
 
e) strict confidentiality from her spouse, or ex-spouse if divorced, with regard to any 
information that he may have obtained about her, the disclosure of which could prove 
detrimental to her interests. A similar responsibility rests upon her in respect of her 
spouse or ex-spouse. 
 
XXI Right to Education 
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a) Every person is entitled to receive education in accordance with his natural capabilities. 
 
b) Every person is entitled to a free choice of profession and career and to the opportunity 
for the full development of his natural endowments. 
 
XXII Right of Privacy 
 
Every person is entitled to the protection of his privacy. 
  
XXIII Right to Freedom of Movement and Residence 
 
a) In view of the fact that the World of Islam is veritably Ummah Islamia, every Muslim 
shall have the right to freely move in and out of any Muslim country. 
 
b) No one shall be forced to leave the country of his residence, or be arbitrarily deported 
therefrom without recourse to due process of Law. 
 
Explanatory Notes 
 
1 In the above formulation of Human Rights, unless the context provides otherwise: 
 
a) the term 'person' refers to both the male and female sexes. 
 
b) the term 'Law' denotes the Shari'ah, i.e. the totality of ordinances derived from the Qur'an 
and the Sunnah and any other laws that are deduced from these two sources by methods 
considered valid in Islamic jurisprudence. 
 
2 Each one of the Human Rights enunciated in this declaration carries a corresponding duty. 
 
3 In the exercise and enjoyment of the rights referred to above every person shall be subject only 
to such limitations as are enjoined by the Law for the purpose of securing the due recognition of, 
and respect for, the rights and the freedom of others and of meeting the just requirements of 
morality, public order and the general welfare of the Community (Ummah). 
 
The Arabic text of this Declaration is the original. 
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Appendix D 
The Asean Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) Bangkok, 8 August 1967 
The Ministers and representatives of Asian States, meeting at Bangkok from 29 March to 2 April 
1993, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 46/116 of 17 December 1991 in the context of 
preparations for the World Conference on Human rights, 
  
Adopt this Declaration, to be known as "The Bangkok Declaration", which contains the 
aspirations and commitments of the Asian region: 
  
BANGKOK DECLARATION 
  
Emphasizing the significance of the World Conference on Human Rights, which provides an 
invaluable opportunity to review all aspects of human rights and ensure a just and balanced 
approach thereto, 
  
Recognizing the contribution that can be made to the World Conference by Asian countries with 
their diverse and rich cultures and traditions, 
  
Welcoming the increased attention being paid to human rights in the international community, 
  
Reaffirming their commitment to principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations and 
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 
  
Recalling that in the Charter of the United Nations the question of universal observance and 
promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms has been rightly placed within the context 
of international cooperation, 
  
Noting the progress made in the codification of human rights instruments, and in the 
establishment of international human rights mechanisms, while expressing concern that these 
mechanisms relate mainly to one category of rights, 
  
Emphasizing that ratification of international human rights instruments, particularly the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, by all States should be further encouraged, 
  
Reaffirming the principles of respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-
interference in the internal affairs of States, 
  
Stressing the universality, objectivity and non-selectivity of all human rights and the need to 
avoid the application of double standards in the implementation of human rights and its 
politicization, 
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Recognizing that the promotion of human rights should be encouraged by cooperation and 
consensus, and not through confrontation and the imposition of incompatible values, 
  
Reiterating the interdependence and indivisibility of economic, social, cultural, civil and political 
rights, and the inherent interrelationship between development, democracy, universal enjoyment 
of all human rights, and social justice, which must be addressed in an integrated and balanced 
manner, 
  
Recalling that the Declaration on the Right to Development has recognized the right to 
development as a universal and inalienable right and an integral part of fundamental human 
rights, 
  
Emphasizing that endeavours to move towards the creation of uniform international human rights 
norms must go hand in hand with endeavours to work towards a just and fair world economic 
order, 
  
Convinced that economic and social progress facilitates the growing trend towards democracy 
and the promotion and protection of human rights, 
  
Stressing the importance of education and training in human rights at the national, regional and 
international levels and the need for international cooperation aimed at overcoming the lack of 
public awareness of human rights, 
  
1. Reaffirm their commitment to the principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations 
and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights as well as the full realization of all human rights 
throughout the world; 
  
2. Underline the essential need to create favorable conditions for effective enjoyment of human 
rights at both the national and international levels; 
  
3. Stress the urgent need to democratize the United Nations system, eliminate selectivity and 
improve procedures and mechanisms in order to strengthen international cooperation, based on 
principles of equality and mutual respect, and ensure a positive, balanced and non-
confrontational approach in addressing and realizing all aspects of human rights; 
  
4. Discourage any attempt to use human rights as a conditionality for extending development 
assistance; 
  
5. Emphasize the principles of respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as 
non-interference in the internal affairs of States, and the non-use of human rights as an 
instrument of political pressure; 
  
6. Reiterate that all countries, large and small, have the right to determine their political systems, 
control and freely utilize their resources, and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development; 
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7. Stress the universality, objectivity and non-selectivity of all human rights and the need to 
avoid the application of double standards in the implementation of human rights and its 
politicization, and that no violation of human rights can be justified; 
  
8. Recognize that while human rights are universal in nature, they must be considered in the 
context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the 
significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious 
backgrounds; 
  
9. Recognize further that States have the primary responsibility for the promotion and protection 
of human rights through appropriate infrastructure and mechanisms, and also recognize that 
remedies must be sought and provided primarily through such mechanisms and procedures; 
  
10. Reaffirm the interdependence and indivisibility of economic, social, cultural, civil and 
political rights, and the need to give equal emphasis to all categories of human rights; 
  
11. Emphasize the importance of guaranteeing the human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
vulnerable groups such as ethnic, national, racial, religious and linguistic minorities, migrant 
workers, disabled persons, indigenous peoples, refugees and displaced persons; 
  
12. Reiterate that self-determination is a principle of international law and a universal right 
recognized by the United Nations for peoples under alien or colonial domination and foreign 
occupation, by virtue of which they can freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development, and that its denial constitutes a grave violation 
of human rights; 
  
13. Stress that the right to self-determination is applicable to peoples under alien or colonial 
domination and foreign occupation, and should not be used to undermine the territorial integrity, 
national sovereignty and political independence of States; 
  
14. Express concern over all forms of violation of human rights, including manifestations of 
racial discrimination, racism, apartheid, colonialism, foreign aggression and occupation, and the 
establishment of illegal settlements in occupied territories, as well as the recent resurgence of 
neo-nazism, xenophobia and ethnic cleansing; 
  
15. Underline the need for taking effective international measures in order to guarantee and 
monitor the implementation of human rights standards and effective and legal protection of 
people under foreign occupation; 
  
16. Strongly affirm their support for the legitimate struggle of the Palestinian people to restore 
their national and inalienable rights to self-determination and independence, and demand an 
immediate end to the grave violations of human rights in the Palestinian, Syrian Golan and other 
occupied Arab territories including Jerusalem; 
  
17. Reaffirm the right to development, as established in the Declaration on the Right to 
Development, as a universal and inalienable right and an integral part of fundamental human 
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rights, which must be realized through international cooperation, respect for fundamental human 
rights, the establishment of a monitoring mechanism and the creation of essential international 
conditions for the realization of such right; 
  
18. Recognize that the main obstacles to the realization of the right to development lie at the 
international macroeconomic level, as reflected in the widening gap between the North and the 
South, the rich and the poor; 
  
19. Affirm that poverty is one of the major obstacles hindering the full enjoyment of human 
rights; 
  
20. Affirm also the need to develop the right of humankind regarding a clean, safe and healthy 
environment; 
  
21. Note that terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, as distinguished from the legitimate 
struggle of peoples under colonial or alien domination and foreign occupation, has emerged as 
one of the most dangerous threats to the enjoyment of human rights and democracy, threatening 
the territorial integrity and security of States and destabilizing legitimately constituted 
governments, and that it must be unequivocally condemned by the international community; 
  
22. Reaffirm their strong commitment to the promotion and protection of the rights of women 
through the guarantee of equal participation in the political, social, economic and cultural 
concerns of society, and the eradication of all forms of discrimination and of gender-based 
violence against women; 
  
23. Recognize the rights of the child to enjoy special protection and to be afforded the 
opportunities and facilities to develop physically, mentally, morally, spiritually and socially in a 
healthy and normal manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity; 
  
24. Welcome the important role played by national institutions in the genuine and constructive 
promotion of human rights, and believe that the conceptualization and eventual establishment of 
such institutions are best left for the States to decide; 
  
25. Acknowledge the importance of cooperation and dialogue between governments and non-
governmental organizations on the basis of shared values as well as mutual respect and 
understanding in the promotion of human rights, and encourage the nongovernmental 
organizations in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council to contribute 
positively to this process in accordance with Council resolution 1296 (XLIV); 
  
26. Reiterate the need to explore the possibilities of establishing regional arrangements for the 
promotion and protection of human rights in Asia; 
  
27. Reiterate further the need to explore ways to generate international cooperation and financial 
support for education and training in the field of human rights at the national level and for the 
establishment of national infrastructures to promote and protect human rights if requested by 
States; 
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28. Emphasize the necessity to rationalize the United Nations human rights mechanism in order 
to enhance its effectiveness and efficiency and the need to ensure avoidance of the duplication of 
work that exists between the treaty bodies, the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities and the Commission on Human Rights, as well as the need to avoid 
the multiplicity of parallel mechanisms; 
  
29. Stress the importance of strengthening the United Nations Centre for Human Rights with the 
necessary resources to enable it to provide a wide range of advisory services and technical 
assistance programmes in the promotion of human rights to requesting States in a timely and 
effective manner, as well as to enable it to finance adequately other activities in the field of 
human rights authorized by competent bodies; 
  
30. Call for increased representation of the developing countries in the Centre for Human Rights. 
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Appendix E 
AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND PEOPLES RIGHTS 
 
Adopted in Nairobi June 27, 1981 
Entered into Force October 21, 1986 
 
 
 
PREAMBLE 
 
The African States members of the Organisation of African Unity, parties to the present 
Convention entitled “African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights”; 
Recalling Decision 115 (XVI) of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at its 
Sixteenth Ordinary Session held in Monrovia, Liberia, from 17 to 20 July 1979 on the 
preparation of “a preliminary draft on an African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
providing inter alia for the establishment of bodies to promote and protect human and peoples’ 
rights”; 
Considering the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity, which stipulates that “freedom, 
equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate 
aspirations of the African peoples”; 
Reaffirming the pledge they solemnly made in Article 2 of the said Charter to eradicate all 
forms of colonialism from Africa, to coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to 
achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa and to promote international cooperation having 
due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 
Taking into consideration the virtues of their historical tradition and the values of African 
civilization which should inspire and characterize their reflection on the concept of human and 
peoples’ rights; 
Recognizing on the one hand, that fundamental human rights stem from the attitudes of 
human beings, which justifies their international protection and on the other hand that the reality 
and respect of peoples’ rights should necessarily guarantee human rights; 
 Considering that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms also implies the performance of 
duties on the part of everyone; 
 Convinced that it is henceforth essential to pay particular attention to the right to 
development and that civil and political rights cannot be dissociated from economic, social and 
cultural rights in their conception as well as universality and that the satisfaction of economic, 
social and cultural rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political rights; 
Conscious of their duty to achieve the total liberation of Africa, the peoples of which are still 
struggling for their dignity and genuine independence, and undertaking to eliminate colonialism, 
neo-colonialism, apartheid, zionism and to dismantle aggressive foreign military bases and all 
forms of discrimination, language, religion or political opinions; 
Reaffirming their adherence to the principles of human and peoples’ rights and freedoms 
contained in the declarations, conventions and other instruments adopted by the Organisation of 
African Unity, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the United Nations; 
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Firmly convinced of their duty to promote and protect human and peoples’ rights and 
freedoms and taking into account the importance traditionally attached to these rights and 
freedoms in Africa; 
Have agreed as follows: 
 
Part 1. Rights and Duties 
 
Chapter 1. Human and Peoples’ Rights 
 
ARTICLE 1 
 
The Member States of the Organisation of African Unity, parties to the present Charter shall 
recognise the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in the Charter and shall undertake to adopt 
legislative or other measures to give effect to them. 
 
ARTICLE 2 
 
Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognised and 
guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, 
birth or any status. 
 
ARTICLE 3 
 
1. Every individual shall be equal before the law 
2. Every individual shall be entitled to equal protection of the law 
 
ARTICLE 4 
 
Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled to respect for his life and the 
integrity of his person. No one may be arbitrarily deprived of this right. 
 
ARTICLE 5 
 
Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being and 
to the recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man, 
particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment 
shall be prohibited. 
 
ARTICLE 6 
 
Every individual shall have the right to liberty and to the security of his person. No one may be 
deprived of his freedom except for reasons and conditions previously laid down by law. In 
particular, no one may be arbitrarily arrested or detained. 
 
ARTICLE 7 
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1. Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This comprises: 
 
a) The right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts of violating his 
fundamental rights as recognized and guaranteed by conventions, laws, 
regulations and customs in force; 
b) The right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty by a competent court or 
tribunal; 
c) The right to defence, including the right to be defended by counsel of his choice; 
d) The right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal. 
 
 
2. No one may be condemned for an act or omission which did not constitute a legally 
punishable offence at the time it was committed. No penalty may be inflicted for an 
offence for which no provision was made at the time it was committed. Punishment is 
personal and can be imposed only on the offender. 
 
ARTICLE 8 
 
Freedom of conscience, the profession and free practice of religion shall be guaranteed. No one 
may, subject to law and order, be submitted to measures restricting the exercise of these 
freedoms. 
 
ARTICLE 9 
 
1. Every individual shall have the right to receive information. 
2. Every individual shall have the right to express and disseminate his opinions within the 
law. 
 
ARTICLE 10 
 
1. Every individual shall have the right to free association provided that he abides by the 
law. 
2. Subject to the obligation of solidarity provided for in Article 29, no one may be 
compelled to join an association. 
 
ARTICLE 11 
 
Every individual shall have the right to assemble freely with others. The exercise of this right 
shall be subject only to necessary restrictions provided for by law, in particular those enacted in 
the interest of national security, the safety, health, ethics and rights and freedoms of others. 
 
ARTICLE 12 
 
1. Every individual shall have the right to freedom of movement and residence within the 
borders of a State provided he abides by the law. 
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2. Every individual shall have the right to leave any country including his own, and to return 
to his country. This right may only be subject to restrictions, provided for by law for the 
protection of national security, law and order, public health or morality. 
3. Every individual shall have the right, when persecuted, to seek and obtain asylum in other 
countries in accordance with the law of those countries and international conventions. 
4. A non-national legally admitted in a territory of a State Party to the present Charter, may 
only be expelled from it by virtue of a decision taken in accordance with the law 
5. The mass expulsion of non-nationals shall be prohibited. Mass expulsion shall be that 
which is aimed at national, racial, ethnic or religious groups. 
 
ARTICLE 13 
 
1. Every citizen shall have the right to participate freely in the government of his country, 
either directly or through freely chosen representatives in accordance with the provisions 
of the law. 
2. Every citizen shall have the right of equal access to the public service of the country. 
3. Every individual shall have the right of access to public property and services in strict 
equality of all persons before the law. 
 
ARTICLE 14 
 
The right to property shall be guaranteed. It may only be encroached upon in the interest of 
public need or in the general interest of the community and in accordance with the provisions of 
appropriate laws. 
 
ARTICLE 15 
 
Every individual shall have the right to work under equitable and satisfactory conditions, and 
shall receive equal pay for equal work. 
 
ARTICLE 16 
 
1. Every individual shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and 
mental health. 
2. State Parties to the present Charter shall take the necessary measures to protect the health 
of their people and to ensure that they receive medical attention when they are sick. 
 
ARTICLE 17 
 
1. Every individual shall have the right to education 
2. Every individual may freely take part in the cultural life of his community. 
3. The promotion and protection of morals and traditional values recognized by the 
community shall be the duty of the State. 
 
ARTICLE 18 
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1. The family shall be the natural unit and basis of society. It shall be protected by the State 
which shall take care of its physical health and moral. 
2. The State shall have the duty to assist the family which is the custodian of morals and 
traditional values recognized by the community. 
3. The State shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women and also 
ensure the protection of the rights of women and the child as stipulated in international 
declarations and conventions. 
4. The aged and the disabled shall also have the right to special measures of protection in 
keeping with their physical or moral needs. 
 
ARTICLE 19 
 
All peoples shall be equal; they shall enjoy the same respect and shall have the same rights. 
Nothing shall justify the domination of a people by another. 
 
ARTICLE 20 
 
1. All peoples shall have the right to existence. They shall have the unquestionable and 
inalienable right to self-determination. They shall freely determine their political status 
and shall pursue their economic and social development according to the policy they have 
freely chosen. 
2. Colonized or oppressed peoples shall have the right to free themselves from the bonds of 
domination by resorting to any means recognized by the international community. 
3. All peoples shall have the right to the assistance of the State Parties to the present Charter 
in their liberation struggle against foreign domination, be it political, economic or 
cultural. 
 
ARTICLE 21 
 
1. All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. This right shall be 
exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall a people be deprived of 
it 
2. In case of spoilation, the dispossessed people shall have the right to the lawful recovery 
of its property as well as to an adequate compensation. 
3. The free disposal of wealth and natural resources shall be exercised without prejudice to 
the obligation of promoting international economic cooperation based on mutual respect, 
equitable exchange and the principles of international law. 
4. State Parties to the present Charter shall individually and collectively exercise the right to 
free disposal of their wealth and natural resources with a view to strengthening African 
Unity and solidarity. 
5. State Parties to the present Charter shall undertake to eliminate all forms of foreign 
exploitation particularly that practised by international monopolies so as to enable their 
peoples to fully benefit from the advantages derived from their national resources. 
 
ARTICLE 22 
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1. All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural development with 
due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the common 
heritage of mankind. 
2. States shall have the duty, individually or collectively, to ensure the exercise of the right 
to development. 
 
ARTICLE 23 
 
1. All peoples shall have the right to national and international peace and security. The 
principles of solidarity and friendly relations implicitly affirmed by the Charter of the 
United Nations and reaffirmed by that of the Organisation of African Unity shall govern 
relations between States. 
2. For the purpose of strengthening peace, solidarity and friendly relations, State Parties to 
the present Charter shall ensure that: 
 
a) any individual enjoying the right of asylum under Article 12 of the present 
Charter shall not engage in subversive activities against his country of origin or 
any other State Party to the present Charter; 
b) their territories shall not be used as bases for subversive or terrorist activities 
against the people of any other State Party to the present Charter. 
 
ARTICLE 24 
 
All peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to their 
development. 
 
ARTICLE 25 
 
State Parties to the present Charter shall have the duty to promote and ensure through teaching, 
education and publication, the respect of the rights and freedoms contained in the present Charter 
and to see to it that these freedoms and rights as well as corresponding obligations and duties are 
understood. 
 
ARTICLE 26 
 
State Parties to the present Charter shall have the duty to guarantee the independence of the 
Courts and shall allow the establishment and improvement of appropriate national institutions 
entrusted with the promotion and protection of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the present 
Charter. 
 
CHAPTER II: Duties 
 
ARTICLE 27 
 
1. Every individual shall have duties towards his family and society, the State and other 
legally recognised communities and the international community. 
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2. The rights and freedoms of each individual shall be exercised with due regard to the 
rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest. 
 
ARTICLE 28 
 
Every individual shall have the duty to respect and consider his fellow beings without 
discrimination, and to maintain relations aimed at promoting, safeguarding and reinforcing 
mutual respect and tolerance. 
 
ARTICLE 29 
 
The individual shall also have the duty: 
1. To preserve the harmonious development of the family and to work for the cohesion and 
respect of the family; to respect his parents at all times, to maintain them in case of need; 
2. To serve his national community by placing his physical and intellectual abilities at its 
service; 
3. Not to compromise the security of the State whose national or resident he is; 
4. To preserve and strengthen social and national solidarity, particularly when the latter is 
strengthened; 
5. To preserve and strengthen the national independence and the territorial integrity of his 
country and to contribute to his defence in accordance with the law; 
6. To work to the best of his abilities and competence, and to pay taxes imposed by law in 
the interest of the society; 
7. To preserve and strengthen positive African cultural values in his relations with other 
members of the society, in the spirit of tolerance, dialogue and consultation and, in 
general, to contribute to the promotion of the moral well being of society; 
8. To contribute to the best of his abilities, at all times and at all levels, to the promotion and 
achievement of African unity. 
 
PART II: Measures of Safeguard 
 
CHAPTER I: Establishment and Organization of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights  
 
ARTICLE 30 
 
An African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, hereinafter called “the Commission”, 
shall be established within the Organisation of African Unity to promote human and peoples’ 
rights and ensure their protection in Africa. 
 
ARTICLE 31 
 
1. The Commission shall consist of eleven members chosen from amongst African 
personalities of the highest reputation, known for their high morality, integrity, 
impartiality and competence in matters of human and peoples’ rights; particular 
consideration being given to persons having legal experience. 
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2. The members of the Commission shall serve in their personal capacity. 
 
ARTICLE 32 
 
The Commission shall not include more than one national of the same State. 
 
ARTICLE 33 
 
The members of the Commission shall be elected by secret ballot by the Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government, from a list of persons nominated by the State Parties to the present 
Charter. 
 
ARTICLE 34 
 
Each State Party to the present Charter may not nominate more than two candidates. The 
candidates must have the nationality of one of the State Parties to the present Charter. When two 
candidates are nominated by a State, one of them may not be a national of that State. 
 
ARTICLE 35 
 
1. The Secretary General of he Organisation of African Unity shall invite State Parties to the 
present Charter at least four months before the elections to nominate candidates; 
2. The Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity shall make an alphabetical 
list of the persons thus nominated and communicate it to the Heads of State and 
Government at least one month before the elections; 
 
ARTICLE 36 
 
The members of the Commission shall be elected for a six year period and shall be eligible for 
re-election. However, the term of office of four of the members elected at the first election shall 
terminate after two years and the term of office of three others, at the end of four years. 
 
ARTICLE 37 
 
Immediately after the first election, the Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government of the Organisation of African Unity shall draw lots to decide the names of those 
members referred to in Article 36. 
 
ARTICLE 38 
 
After their election, the members of the Commission shall make a solemn declaration to 
discharge their duties impartially and faithfully. 
 
ARTICLE 39 
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1. In case of death or resignation of a member of the Commission, the Chairman of the 
Commission shall immediately inform the Secretary General of the Organisation of 
African Unity, who shall declare the seat vacant from the date of death or from the date 
on which the resignation takes effect. 
2. If, in the unanimous opinion of other members of the Commission, a member has stopped 
discharging his dutiesfor any reason other than a temporary absence, the Chairman of the 
Commission shall inform the Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity, 
who shall then declare the seat vacant. 
3. In each of the cases anticipated above, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government 
shall replace the member whose seat became vacant for the remaining period of his term, 
unless the period is less than six months. 
 
ARTICLE 40 
 
Every member of the Commission shall be in office until the date his successor assumes office. 
 
ARTICLE 41 
 
The Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity shall appoint the Secretary of the 
Commission. He shall provide the staff and services necessary for the effective discharge of the 
duties of the Commission. The Organisation of African Unity shall bear cost of the staff and 
services. 
 
ARTICLE 42 
 
1. The Commission shall elect its Chairman and Vice Chairman for a two-year period. They 
shall be eligible for re-election. 
2. The Commission shall lay down its rules of procedure. 
3. Seven members shall form the quorum. 
4. In case of an equality of votes, the Chairman shall have a casting vote. 
5. The Secretary General may attend the meetings of the Commission. He shall neither 
participate in deliberations nor shall he be entitled to vote. The Chairman of the 
Commission may, however, invite him to speak. 
 
ARTICLE 43 
 
In discharging their duties, members of the Commission shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and 
immunities provided for in the General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
Organisation of African Unity. 
 
ARTICLE 44 
 
Provision shall be made for the emoluments and allowances of the members of the Commission 
in the Regular Budget of the Organisation of African Unity. 
 
CHAPTER II: Mandate of the Commission 
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ARTICLE 45 
 
The functions of the Commission shall be: 
1. To promote human and peoples’ rights and in particular: 
a) to collect documents, undertake studies and researches on African problems in the 
field of human and peoples’ rights, organise seminars, symposia and conferences, 
disseminate information, encourage national and local institutions concerned with 
human and peoples’ rights and, should the case arise, give its views or make 
recommendations to Governments. 
b) to formulae and lay down, principles and rules aimed at solving legal problems 
relating to human and peoples’ rights and fundamental freedoms upon which 
African Governments may base their legislation. 
c) Cooperate with other African and international institutions concerned with the 
promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights. 
 
2. Ensure the protection of human and peoples’ rights under conditions laid down by the 
present Charter. 
3. Interpret all the provisions of the present Charter at the request of a State Party, an 
institution of the OAU or an African Organisation recognised by the OAU. 
4. Perform any other tasks which may be entrusted to it by the Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government. 
 
CHAPTER III: Procedure of the Commission 
 
ARTICLE 46 
 
The Commission may resort to any appropriate method of investigation; it may hear from the 
Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity or any other person capable of 
enlightening it. 
 
Communication from States 
 
ARTICLE 47 
 
If a State Party to the present Charter has good reasons to believe that another State Party to this 
Charter has violated the provisions of the Charter, it may draw, by written communication, the 
attention of that State to the matter. This Communication shall also be addressed to the Secretary 
General of the OAU and to the Chairman of the Commission. Within three months of the receipt 
of the Communication, the State to which the Communication is addressed shall give the 
enquiring State, written explanation or statement elucidating the matter. This should include as 
much as possible, relevant information relating to the laws and rules of procedure applied and 
applicable and the redress already given or course of action available. 
 
ARTICLE 48 
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If within three months from the date on which the original communication is received by the 
State to which it is addressed, the issue is not settled to the satisfaction of the two States involved 
through bilateral negotiation or by any other peaceful procedure, either State shall have the right 
to submit the matter to the Commission through the Chairman and shall notify the other States 
involved. 
 
ARTICLE 49 
 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 47, if a State Party to the present Charter considers that 
another State Party has violated the provisions of the Charter, it may refer the matter directly to 
the Commission by addressing a communication to the Chairman, to the Secretary General of the 
Organisation of African unity and the State concerned. 
 
ARTICLE 50 
 
The Commission can only deal with a matter submitted to it after making sure that all local 
remedies, if they exist, have been exhausted, unless it is obvious to the Commission that the 
procedure of achieving these remedies would be unduly prolonged. 
 
ARTICLE 51 
 
1. The Commission may ask the State concerned to provide it with all relevant information. 
2. When the Commission is considering the matter, States concerned may be represented 
before it and submit written or oral representation. 
 
ARTICLE 52 
 
After having obtained from the States concerned and from other sources all the information it 
deems necessary and after having tried all appropriate means to reach an amicable solution based 
on the respect of human and peoples’ rights, the Commission shall prepare, within a reasonable 
period of time from the notification referred to in Article 48, a report to the States concerned and 
communicated to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. 
 
ARTICLE 53 
 
While transmitting its report, the Commission may make to the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government such recommendations as it deems useful. 
 
ARTICLE 54 
 
The Commission shall submit to each Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government a report on its activities. 
 
 
 
Other Communications 
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ARTICLE 55 
 
1. Before each Session, the Secretary of the Commission shall make a list of the 
Communications other than those of State Parties to the present Charter and transmit 
them to Members of the Commission, who shall indicate which Communications should 
be considered by the Commission. 
2. A Communication shall be considered by the Commission if a simple majority of its 
members so decide. 
 
ARTICLE 56 
 
Communications relating to Human and Peoples’ rights referred to in Article 55 received by the 
Commission, shall be considered if they: 
1. Indicate their authors even if the latter requests anonymity, 
2. Are compatible with the Charter of the Organisation of Afri- can Unity or with the 
present Charter, 
3. Are not written in disparaging or insulting language directed against the State concerned 
and its institutions or to the Organisation of African Unity, 
4. Are not based exclusively on news disseminated through the mass media, 
5. Are sent after exhausting local remedies, if any, unless it is obvious that this procedure is 
unduly prolonged, 
6. Are submitted within a reasonable period from the time local remedies are exhausted or 
from the date the Commission is seized with the matter, and 
7. Do not deal with cases which have been settled by those States involved in accordance 
with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, or the Charter of the 
Organisation of African Unity or the provisions of the present Charter. 
 
ARTICLE 57 
 
Prior to any substantive consideration, all communications shall be brought to the knowledge of 
the State concerned by the Chairman of the Commission. 
 
ARTICLE 58 
 
1. When it appears after deliberations of the Commission that one or more Communications 
apparently relate to special cases which reveal the existence of a series of serious or 
massive violations of human and peoples’ rights, the Commission shall draw the attention 
of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government to these special cases. 
2. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government may then request the Commission to 
undertake an in-depth study of these cases and make a factual report, accompanied by its 
finding and recommendations. 
3. A case of emergency duly noticed by the Commission shall be submitted by the latter to 
the Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government who may request an in-
depth study. 
ARTICLE 59 
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1. All measures taken within the provisions of the present Chapter shall remain confidential 
until the Assembly of Heads of State and Government shall otherwise decide. 
2. However the report shall be published by the Chairman of the Commission upon the 
decision of he Assembly of Heads of State and Government. 
3. The report on the activities of the Commission shall be published by its Chairman after it 
has been considered by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. 
 
CHAPTER IV: Applicable Principles 
 
ARTICLE 60 
 
The Commission shall draw inspiration from international law on human and peoples’ rights, 
particularly from the provisions of various African instruments on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, other instruments adopted by the United Nations and by African 
countries in the field of Human and Peoples’ Rights, as well as from the provisions of various 
instruments adopted within the Specialised Agencies of the United Nations of which the Parties 
to the present Charter are members. 
 
ARTICLE 61 
 
The Commission shall also take into consideration, as subsidiary measures to determine the 
principles of law, other general or special international conventions, laying down rules expressly 
recognised by Member States of the Organisation of African Unity, African practices consistent 
with international norms on Human and Peoples’ Rights, customs generally accepted as law, 
general principles of law recognised by African States as well as legal precedents and doctrine. 
 
ARTICLE 62 
 
Each State Party shall undertake to submit every two years, from the date the present Charter 
comes into force, a report on the legislative or other measures taken, with a view to giving effect 
to the rights and freedoms recognised and guaranteed by the present Charter. 
 
ARTICLE 63 
 
1. The present Charter shall be open to signature, ratification or adherence of the Member 
States of the Organisation of African Unity. 
2. The instruments of ratification or adherence to the present Charter shall be deposited with 
the Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity. 
3. The present Charter shall come into force three months after the reception by the 
Secretary General of the instruments of ratification or adherence of a simple majority of 
the Member States of the Organisation of African Unity. 
 
 
PART III: General Provisions 
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ARTICLE 64 
 
1. After the coming into force of the present Charter, members of the Commission shall be 
elected in accordance with the relevant Articles of the present Charter. 
2. The Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity shall convene the first 
meeting of the Commission at the Headquarters of the Organisation within three months 
of the constitution of the Commission. Thereafter, the Commission shall be convened by 
its Chairman whenever necessary but at least once a year. 
 
ARTICLE 65 
 
For each of the States that will ratify or adhere to the present Charter after its coming into force, 
the Charter shall take effect three months after the date of the deposit by that State of the 
instrument of ratification or adherence. 
 
ARTICLE 66 
 
Special protocols or agreements may, if necessary, supplement the provisions of the present 
Charter. 
 
ARTICLE 67 
 
The Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity shall inform members of the 
Organisation of the deposit of each instrument of ratification or adherence. 
 
ARTICLE 68 
 
The present Charter may be amended if a State Party makes a written request to that effect to the 
Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity. The Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government may only consider the draft amendment after all the State Parties have been duly 
informed of it and the Commission has given its opinion on it at the request of the sponsoring 
State. The amendment shall be approved by a simple majority of the State Parties. It shall come 
into force for each State which has accepted it in accordance with its constitutional procedure 
three months after the Secretary General has received notice of the acceptance. 
 
ADOPTED by the eighteenth Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 
June 1981 - Nairobi, Kenya 
 
